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CHAPTER 
General Introduction
1
10
AIM OF THIS THESIS
When I ask you to think of a couch potato, I am sure that you can come up with 
at least one person in your surrounding who deserves that title. Probably that 
person is lazy, wears jogging pants and enjoys to eat crisps while binge-watching 
series on Netflix. However, this thesis is not about the couch potato in its classical 
terms, but about the mental couch potato. Unlike aversion with regard to physical 
exercise, the mental couch potato enjoys to put his brain on a couch. However, 
every mental couch potato is unique: some are particularly averse to focusing 
on long demanding movies and can’t handle any extra input, such as incoming 
WhatsApp messages; Others suffer mainly from fast, ever-changing, flexible 
mental activities, such as playing my favorite game Halli-Galli.
To begin with, I find it interesting to observe that individuals differ in their 
willingness to engage in cognitively demanding tasks and I wonder why this is 
the case. For physical effort, there are several advantages to being averse to 
activity (Hull, 1943): muscle tension requires the limited resource glucose, muscle 
aches are painful, risk of injury, etc. However, I have never met a person who 
reported injuries or muscle ache-like pain in his brain after a long day of thesis-
writing. So, the question that inspired me and this thesis is what kind of cognitive 
demands are particularly aversive to which people? And, more importantly, by 
understanding mechanisms of cognitive demand avoidance, is there a way of 
promoting motivation to engage in effortful cognition on the long term? To begin 
to address these questions, in this thesis I aim to 
• quantify the willingness (i.e. motivation) to conduct cognitively effortful tasks 
and assess how the motivation is affected by pharmacological interventions 
that challenge the catecholamine system,
• develop a novel paradigm that allows to quantify the motivation to engage 
in flexible versus stable cognition, and
• study how a catecholamine challenge alters performance on a task probing 
flexible versus stable cognition.
In this chapter, I will introduce the key concepts that will help the reader navigate 
through the subsequent chapters. This thesis builds on classical work on cognitive 
control functions and the role of motivation in the willingness to recruit cognitive 
control, introduced in 1.2 and 1.3. Next, I will introduce the neural structures 
and neurochemical factors that have been implicated in cognitive control and 
its avoidance in the healthy young population (1.4), before describing how 
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these factors are altered in healthy aging (1.5). Finally, I will introduce the 
pharmacological interventions that we employ (1.6) and outline specific research 
projects presented in this thesis (1.7).
COGNITIVE CONTROL
Cognitive control is a broad term which can be defined as the capacity to guide 
behavior in the service of internally represented goals (Braver, 2012; Braver and 
Barch, 2006; Miller, 2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Montague et al., 2004). 
As such, it is an umbrella term that refers to the set of cognitive functions that 
enable us to stabilize our goals by resisting impulses, temptation and distraction. 
Cognitive control generally includes three core executive functions: working 
memory, inhibition and cognitive flexibility (Diamond, 2013).
In this thesis, I study cognitive control from two perspectives: the willingness to 
engage in broad cognitive control functions (further introduced in 1.3) and the 
neural and behavioral mechanisms of cognitive stability and cognitive flexibility, 
which I will further outline here. The need for flexible and stable cognition can 
be illustrated easily by means of our office life: When you share an office with 
multiple people, it requires you to inhibit incoming distractors, such as office 
mates running in and out or conversations with students. However, when the 
fire alarm in the building goes off or your office mate offers chocolate, you 
should be able to integrate the signal and act on it. The relevance of an optimal 
balance becomes also evident when looking at different neuropsychiatric diseases 
that affect cognitive control. Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) for 
example is characterized by excessive distractibility, reduced working memory 
(Castellanos et al., 2006; Martinussen et al., 2001), but perhaps better flexibility 
and creativity (Boot et al., 2017; Healey and Rucklidge, 2005). Patients suffering 
from Parkinson’s disease or obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) in contrast 
suffer from rigid, compulsive cognition with trouble switching to new things (Cools 
et al., 1984, 2001; Gu et al., 2008; Lees and Smith, 1983; Meiran et al., 2011). 
Many working memory paradigms, such as the N-back task, but also many 
situations in everyday life rely on a mixture of these processes: keeping online 
in working memory recently presented stimuli (i.e. cognitive stability), but also 
integrating new stimuli in the stream while letting go of initially relevant ones (i.e. 
cognitive flexibility). Thus, performance impairments can be a consequence of 
reduced stability or increased flexibility. In chapter 5 & 6, we study the opposing 
functions by administering an adapted delayed match-to-sample task. Like in 
delayed match-to-sample tasks, participants need to encode stimuli and judge 
after a delay whether a probe is a ‘match’ or ‘non-match’. However, during the 
1
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delay period, we either present distracting stimuli that need to be ignored (i.e. the 
office mates), or stimuli that need to be updated (i.e. the fire alarm). By analyzing 
performance on the two task conditions, we can independently assess cognitive 
flexibility and stability.
MOTIVATED COGNITION
When we assess cognitive control in the lab or grade exams, we often assume 
that the performance or grade reflects a person’s true and maximal capacity. 
This implies that we always perform at our best. However, there is a rich body of 
evidence suggesting that, unfortunately, this is not the case.
One clear example is the often observed incentivization effect: When employees 
expect to receive a bonus for their work, they tend to improve their output (Gielen 
et al., 2010; Weibel et al., 2009). The same is observed in the lab: Participants 
who can receive a bonus or monetary incentive for good performance, tend to 
improve it (Botvinick and Braver, 2015). This has been shown on a variety of tests, 
including task-switching, working memory, conflict tasks, etc (Aarts et al., 2011; 
Chib et al., 2012, 2014; Manohar et al., 2015; Padmala and Pessoa, 2011). Such 
a performance benefit due to incentives has commonly been ascribed to an effect 
of motivation, where motivation is defined as energizing of behavior in pursuit of a 
goal (Simpson and Balsam, 2015). Thus, it seems that we do not always perform 
at our best and that cognitive control performance is a mixture of (at least) our 
capacity to perform a certain task and our motivation, or choice, to do so (Cools, 
2015, 2016). Remember the classical couch potato who is lying on the couch 
watching Netflix instead of doing sports in the gym. We can evaluate his behavior 
as an inability to stand up or move, but I think it is obvious that in principle he is 
able to run and even do sports and it’s a matter of motivation. Likewise, a mental 
couch potato might not be incapable of reading a book or solve difficult puzzles, 
but just doesn’t feel like it. The problem is that often we cannot distinguish one 
from the other when we only assess performance. Therefore, in this thesis, I aim 
to quantify the motivation to engage in cognitive effortful tasks and I want to 
introduce next how this is generally obtained. 
The motivation to ‘work’ for a certain goal has already been studied for ages, 
albeit primarily in the motor domain (Salamone, 2009). How willing is a rat to 
invest physical effort (i.e. climb a certain barrier) for varying levels of reward? 
Effort is defined as the intensification of either mental or physical activity in the 
service of meeting some goal (Inzlicht et al., 2018). Thus, effort is the mean 
by which motivation is translated into goal-directed actions. When quantifying 
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motivation, usually a harder option is contrasted with an easier, lower-effort 
option, in which a rat does not need to climb any barrier, but receives a smaller 
reward. The general unsurprising finding is that higher amounts of reward, such 
as sucrose or pellets, increase the likelihood of rats to choose the harder option, 
interpreted again as increased motivation. This work has been translated to 
study motivation for physical effort in humans, both in the healthy and diseased 
population (Chong et al., 2015; Treadway et al., 2012; Wardle et al., 2011). Even 
though motivation for cognitive control has been a hot topic for ages already 
(Kahneman, 1973), there is a recent interest in quantifying human motivation 
with choice paradigms.
In 2007, a paradigm was published that was designed to assess the implicit 
engagement versus avoidance of cognitively demanding process, namely task-
switching (Botvinick, 2007). In a later version of this task (Kool et al., 2010), 
participants repeatedly choose between two stimuli that vary in their demand for 
task-switching and, following every choice, execute the chosen demand right away 
(task-repeat versus task-switch). Cognitive demand avoidance can be measured in 
terms of the overall proportion of low versus high demand choices. Unlike many 
rodent and human versions of physical effort avoidance, in this paradigm there 
is no benefit or reward offered for engaging in the high-demand trials. Thus, 
choices are believed to be driven exclusively by participants’ internal desire to 
avoid or engage in cognitive demand, sometimes even unconsciously (Kool et 
al., 2010). Importantly, there is also no feedback presented on how participants 
execute the task-switching task, such that performance (feedback) should not 
alter choices. I employ this paradigm, the demand selection task, in chapter 3 to 
assess avoidance of task-switching in a young healthy population.
An alternative way of quantifying motivation for cognitive control is to employ 
discounting paradigms formally known from the intertemporal choice literature 
(Berns et al., 2007). A common procedure in intertemporal choice paradigms is to 
let participants choose between receiving a certain amount of money today or a 
higher amount of money at a later point in time. Based on the choices, researchers 
extract an indifference point: the indifference point indicates that a participant is 
equally likely (i.e. indifferent) to choose one option (e.g. Eur 1 today) or the other 
(e.g. Eur 10 in 10 days). In intertemporal choice, indifference points are used 
to derive an index for impulsivity, as it reflects the tendency to forego money to 
obtain a sooner reward. Westbrook and colleagues adapted such a paradigm 
in order to obtain an index of motivation for cognitive control (Westbrook et al., 
2013). Participants can choose to earn or forego monetary rewards for conducting 
different levels of a working memory N-back task. The N-back task is well-suited 
1
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as the load on the working memory is manipulated parametrically: in the 1-back 
task, participants need to remember 1 stimulus, in the 2-back task 2 stimuli, etc. 
On every trial of this paradigm participants choose between a smaller monetary 
reward for conducting an easy task (1-back) and a larger reward for conducting 
one of the harder tasks (higher N-back levels). Depending on participants’ 
choices, the amount offered for the easy task is adapted in a staircase procedure 
(i.e. increased or decreased) until participants become indifferent between two 
choices. Based on the indifference point, the subjective value of conducting the 
N-back task can be calculated per participant per demand level. Subjective value 
scores range from 0 to 1, where a high value means that a participant prefers to 
obtain higher monetary rewards in exchange for investing more cognitive effort, 
and a low value reflects the tendency to forego monetary rewards for the sake 
of avoiding cognitive effort. Obviously, participants need to know what it feels 
like to conduct the different levels, which is achieved by having them perform the 
N-back task preceding the choices. In chapter 4, I employ this cognitive effort 
discounting (COGED) paradigm to quantify the subjective value that healthy older 
adults perceive when conducting the N-back task. 
So far, I have described that we do not always perform at our best and that 
different factors, such as enhancing the motivation, can improve it. The obvious 
next question is why we are not always performing at our maximum? Based 
on earlier studies employing above choice paradigms, it seems that the short 
answer is that investing cognitive control can be aversive and we tend to avoid 
it (Botvinick, 2007). On average, healthy young students select to avoid task-
switching (Kool et al., 2010), and prefer to sacrifice money to avoid performing 
difficult N-back levels (Westbrook et al., 2013) or backward compared to forward 
word-typing (Massar et al., 2015). This suggests that cognitive control is costly. 
Therefore, I chose the title mental couch potato. Despite a recent hype in studying 
the cost of cognitive control, there is no agreement yet on the nature of the cost 
(Kurzban, 2016). In short, according to some reports, the cost is energetic and 
reflects blood glucose metabolism (Gailliot et al., 2007). When people engage 
in self-control (tasks), glucose is progressively depleted yielding people unable to 
engage in additional control. However, this account has received robust criticism 
and replications failed (Carter and Mccullough, 2014; Carter et al., 2015; 
Hagger et al., 2016). More recent motivational accounts, instead of focusing on 
capacity, propose that performance is sensitive to changes in motivational state. 
As such, the degree and intensity of cognitive control recruitment follows from 
an evaluation of its benefits (e.g. monetary rewards) and costs (Shenhav et al., 
2013), where control is integrated as an intrinsic cost (Kool et al., 2013). Relatedly, 
Inzlicht and colleagues complemented the motivational models by describing 
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that the phenomenology of fatigue is a signal to stop focusing and orient to 
new activities with higher utility (Inzlicht et al., 2014). This account is similar 
to the idea of opportunity cost proposed by Kurzban. Due to the problem of 
simultaneity, we cannot commit to multiple activities requiring the same (neural) 
resources. Thus, while focusing on one task, we miss out on other perhaps more 
rewarding opportunities (Kurzban et al., 2013). According to this account, the 
phenomenology of effort here relates to the ramping up of an opportunity cost 
and reflects the cost of staying engaged. 
In the light of these motivational accounts, one might hypothesize that enhanced 
distractibility (partly) reflects changes in preference and not just an inability to 
focus or to let go. Distractible colleagues might rather be unmotivated to focus 
and prefer to process (also distracting) stimuli. To start to address this question, in 
chapter 6, we aim to develop a novel discounting paradigm that allows to tease 
apart the motivation for flexible versus stable cognitive processes. This thesis 
builds primarily on these motivational accounts and assesses the contribution 
of catecholamines to cost-benefit decision-making about cognitive control 
recruitment. Thus, in the next paragraph, I present neural and neurochemical 
background on cognitive control and its avoidance.
NEURAL AND NEUROCHEMICAL MODULATION OF 
COGNITIVE CONTROL (AVOIDANCE)
Neural mechanisms of the motivation for cognitive control have been studied in 
various ways. On the one hand, it is crucial to study the activity of neural networks 
when executing cognitive control and ultimately relate these to the subsequent 
avoidance. In such a way we can assess what kind of cognitive activities are 
perceived as aversive and what they have in common. Maybe the cost of control is 
related to the recruitment of specific brain regions or signals? On the other hand, 
people study the neural signature of decision making itself. How are value and 
cost represented and how do they alter decisions to engage or avoid cognitive 
control? The same distinction holds for work on the neurochemical modulation 
where the role of different neuromodulators in cognitive control execution is 
studied, but also in choices about its avoidance. Here, I will provide a short 
overview, but given its relevance for the thesis chapters, I will focus primarily on 
the modulation of cognitive control and its avoidance by catecholamines. 
1
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Cognitive control
Many executive functions are known to implicate the prefrontal cortex (PFC; Figure 
1.1A) (Fuster, 2000; Koechlin et al., 2003; Miller and Cohen, 2001). Prefrontal 
lesions have been shown to impair performance on different tasks requiring task-
switching, working memory and distractor inhibition in monkeys and humans 
(Baldo and Shimamura, 2002; Chao and Knight, 1995; Jacobsen and Nissen, 
1937; Müller and Knight, 2006; Tsuchida and Fellows, 2008). Of course, the 
prefrontal cortex does not act in isolation (Middleton and Strick, 2000), but is 
part of a larger network, including cortico-basal ganglia loops that link prefrontal 
cortex and the striatum (Alexander et al., 1986; Haber, 2003). This frontostriatal 
network is affected by multiple neuropsychiatric disorders including ADHD and 
schizophrenia that are also accompanied by deficits in executive functions (Cubillo 
et al., 2012; Morey et al., 2005; Robbins, 1990). The interaction of the prefrontal 
cortex with the basal ganglia seems to be of particular importance when tasks 
or environments require flexible adaptations (Cools et al., 2004). Lesions in the 
basal ganglia resulted in deficits in the updating of current goal representations in 
animals (Oberg and Divac, 1975; Taghzouti et al., 1985). In humans, BOLD signal 
in the striatum (Figure 1.1A), part of the basal ganglia, has been observed during 
tasks that require cognitive flexibility, e.g. task switching, attentional set-shifting 
and reversal learning (Cools et al., 2002a, 2004; Leber et al., 2008; Rogers et al., 
2000; van Schouwenburg et al., 2010a). As such, the prefrontal cortex has been 
suggested to support the stabilization of goals and distractor resistance while the 
striatum has been associated with the de-stabilization of goals with the purpose of 
letting in new environmental stimuli for flexible responses (Hazy et al., 2007; van 
Schouwenburg et al., 2010a). In that way, the prefrontal cortex and striatum have 
been suggested to interact to establish the balance between cognitive stability 
and flexibility (Cools, 2011; Frank et al., 2001; Hazy et al., 2007). It seems that 
not only frontostriatal activity is needed for successful implementation of cognitive 
tasks but also its modulation by dopamine. 
Dopamine is a neurotransmitter that acts as a neuromodulator. Thus, instead 
of a direct role in the activation or inhibition of single neurons like classical 
neurotransmitters (i.e. glutamate and GABA), dopamine release potentiates 
or weakens signal transfer in a diffuse network of brain regions (Stahl, 2008). 
Dopamine neurons reside in the midbrain, in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) 
and substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) and project throughout large parts 
of the brain, but in particular to the basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex, where 
dopamine receptors are dense (see Figure 1.1C). Dopamine is synthesized from 
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its precursors tyrosine and L-DOPA and is further converted to noradrenaline. 
Noradrenaline and dopamine together then comprise the catecholamines.
An important role for dopamine in cognitive control performance, mainly 
working memory, has been evidenced a long time ago by Brozoski, who showed 
in monkeys that prefrontal dopamine depletion led to impairments in working 
memory to the same degree as complete ablation of the PFC (Brozoski et al., 
1979). Since then, the administration of dopamine agonists (i.e. stimulation 
of dopamine receptors) and antagonists (i.e. blocking dopamine receptors) to 
humans and monkeys have been shown to improve and impair working memory 
performance, respectively (Luciana et al., 1992; Mehta et al., 1999). In addition, 
amphetamine and methylphenidate have been found to increase BOLD signal 
during working memory tasks, especially in the PFC (e.g. Fallon, Schaaf, Huurne, 
& Cools, 2016; Mattay et al., 2000). While the exact mechanism remains unclear, 
effects of dopamine on working memory might reflect dopamine-induced 
increases in the signal-to-noise ratio of neuronal firing in the PFC, leading to 
increased stabilization of currently goal-relevant representations (Durstewitz and 
Seamans, 2008; Durstewitz et al., 2000; Seamans and Yang, 2004; Servan-
schreiber et al., 1990). 
But also dopamine in the basal ganglia is important for cognitive control, 
evidenced for example by cognitive impairments in Parkinson’s disease. Reduced 
input of dopaminergic neurons to the basal ganglia have been associated with 
specific impairments in flexible cognition (Aarts et al., 2012; Cools et al., 2001). 
In addition, the administration of bromocriptine, a stimulator of D2 receptors, 
which are abundant in the basal ganglia, impaired distractor resistance in humans 
(Bloemendaal et al., 2015) and modulated basal ganglia signals during cognitive 
switching (Cools et al., 2007).
One hypothesis for how the brain arbitrates between stable versus flexible states 
is with the use of a gating mechanism that regulates the inputs to PFC. When 
the gate is open, sensory input can update working memory, but when closed, 
distracting input is suppressed. Several models have been proposed for how 
a gating mechanism might be implemented, all of which assign an important 
role to dopamine (Braver and Cohen, 2000; Frank et al., 2001; Rougier et al., 
2005). As such, gating signals and updating of working memory representations 
in PFC should be accompanied by the phasic release of dopamine. According 
to one model, similar to the role of the basal ganglia in action selection (Gerfen 
and Surmeier, 2011; Mink, 1996), where BG provides a ‘Go’ versus ‘NoGo’ 
modulation of frontal action representations, it has a ‘gating-like’ function in 
1
INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1
18
working memory: more ‘Go’ activity, which is triggered by dopamine release due 
to expected reward or drug treatment, stimulates update of WM representations in 
the PFC (Hazy et al., 2007). This is in line with the observation that BOLD signals 
in the BG and the PFC were increased when novel stimuli triggered attention 
switches (van Schouwenburg et al., 2010b) and striatal activity when information 
needed to be updated (Fallon et al., 2016).
In sum, based on studies assessing neural and neurochemical contribution to 
cognitive control, we can conclude that the prefrontal cortex and its modulation 
by dopamine support cognitive stability while striatum and its modulation by 
dopamine seem to support cognitive flexibility (Figure 1.1B). This implies that, 
depending on their locus of effect, pharmacological interventions can yield 
opposite effects. In chapter 5, I study the neural and behavioral consequences 
of administering the catecholamine precursor tyrosine on working memory 
performance with demand for cognitive stability versus flexibility.
FIGURE 1.1 | A The prefrontal cortex is marked in violet, the striatum in cyan. B An illus-
tration of the hypothesis that the prefrontal cortex supports primarily cognitive stability, 
while the striatum enables flexible cognition. C Simplified presentation of projections of the 
ascending neuromodulator dopamine to the prefrontal cortex (again violet) and striatum 
(cyan). A and B were prepared in MRIcron by overlaying masks of PFC (aal atlas) and 
striatum (https://osf.io/jkzwp/) on a standard MNI template. C is adapted from chapter 2. 
Cognitive control avoidance
When studying the motivation to engage in or avoid cognitive control tasks, an 
interesting question is to what degree neural activity during the execution predicts 
subsequent avoidance. Few studies have tried to achieve this with mixed results: 
McGuire and colleagues have shown in two experiments that prefrontal cortex 
activity during task-switching positively correlated with the self-reported desire to 
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avoid a task and demand avoidance as assessed with the demand selection task 
(described in 1.3; McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). This suggests that prefrontal cortex 
activity registers the cost of control. This is in line with a recent account proposing 
the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex signals the allocation of control based on 
an evaluation of the expected value of control (Shenhav et al., 2013, 2017). 
However, in a recent study, in which demand was manipulated parametrically by 
employing multiple levels of task-switching proportions, the effect did not replicate 
(Sayalı and Badre, 2019). Task-switching was again accompanied by activity in 
frontoparietal network, but this activity did not correlate with subsequent demand 
avoidance. Surprisingly, here the degree of default mode network de-activation 
related to demand avoidance. Even though it seems to be still unclear whether 
the recruitment of specific anatomical regions during effort execution reflects the 
cost of control and what its implications for subsequent avoidance are, there is 
rich body of evidence indicating that investing cognitive control is valenced and 
is integrated as a cost during cost-benefit decision-making. The ‘expected value 
of control’ account mentioned above, describes that the degree and intensity of 
cognitive control recruitment is the consequence of weighting its benefits against 
its cost, in which the cost of cognitive effort is integrated. Based on different 
streams of evidence, we hypothesize that striatal dopamine plays a key role 
during this value-based decision-making process by signaling the value (benefit 
minus cost) of control recruitment (Boureau et al., 2015; Cools, 2016; Westbrook 
et al., 2013). I will provide an overview of the evidence below, but note that it 
is discussed in more detail in a literature review in chapter 2 and subsequent 
chapter introductions.
First of all, in the domain of physical effort there is a clear role defined for striatal 
dopamine in altering choices about engagement versus avoidance. Animals, in 
which a lesion or pharmacological intervention interferes with striatal dopamine 
transmission show reduced willingness to climb a barrier to obtain a reward, while 
still being able to climb and still preferring the larger reward in the absence of 
an obstacle (e.g. Bardgett, Depenbrock, Downs, & Green, 2009; see Salamone, 
2009 for review). Stimulation of striatal dopamine increased the frequency of 
choices for the effortful option (Floresco et al., 2008a; Yohn et al., 2015). In 
humans, this pattern has been replicated in patients with Parkinson’s disease 
suffering from loss of striatal dopamine cells. Patients seem to be less motivated 
to invest physical effort (e.g. in the form of squeezing a handgrip; McGuigan et 
al., 2019) and dopaminergic treatment remedies the loss of motivation (Chong et 
al., 2015). The idea is that by stimulating dopamine release, signals of the value 
of an action are augmented resulting in more effortful choices. This generally 
concurs with neurocomputational models of dopamine in the basal ganglia, such 
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as the OPAL model and supportive empirical evidence (Collins and Frank, 2014), 
showing that prolonging (striatal) dopamine likely enhances the benefit while 
also reducing the cost of actions by having opposite effects on the D1 (GO) and 
D2 (NO-GO) pathways of the basal ganglia. Recordings in monkeys support a 
similar role in effort-based decision making. When reward and (physical) effort 
were independently manipulated and monkeys were cued with the identity of 
an upcoming trial, activity in dopamine neurons increased with an increase in 
expected reward. Interestingly, the signal was also sensitive to the upcoming effort 
level, such that the same reward was ‘worth less’ when it was accompanied by 
high versus low physical effort (Floresco, 2015; Varazzani et al., 2015). This puts 
the striatum in a position to integrate benefit and cost of an upcoming action. In 
line with a similar role in the cognitive domain, Botvinick has shown that reward-
induced nucleus accumbens activity was sensitive to how much cognitive effort 
someone has spent (Botvinick and Rosen, 2009). The same amount of monetary 
reward induced less nucleus accumbens activity in participants that had just 
finished a high versus low demanding task block, suggesting that the value was 
reduced due to effort spent. Interestingly, this activity was inversely related to 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex activity during (switch-) task execution, following 
the idea that dACC provides effort-demand information (Shenhav et al., 2013), 
perhaps to the NAcc (Botvinick and Rosen, 2009). The finding of reduced reward-
related activity after cognitive effort is similar to the observation that behaviorally 
response conflict acts as an aversive signal (Dreisbach and Fischer, 2012) and 
strengthens avoidance learning (Cavanagh et al., 2014). More specifically, the 
presence of response conflict in a Simon task modified learning about action 
values, such that the value of received rewards was downgraded due to response 
conflict (Cavanagh et al., 2014, 2017). Importantly, these effects varied with 
conditions and manipulations associated with changes in striatal dopamine, 
such as genetic polymorphisms and pharmacological dopamine manipulations 
(Cavanagh et al., 2014).
More indirect evidence for a role for dopamine in motivation for cognitive control 
stems from the incentivization effect that I described in 1.3: reward expectation 
often improves cognitive performance (Botvinick and Braver, 2015). We know 
that unexpected reward receipt and reward expectation elicit phasic dopamine 
release (Schultz, 1997, 2017). A performance improvement after reward might 
suggest that striatal dopamine release affects performance by increasing the 
value of control. In line with this account, by combining incentivization and effort 
discounting, Massar and colleagues have shown that motivation can boost 
sustained attention through increased effort (Massar et al., 2016). The role for 
dopamine in this process was made explicit in recent modeling work, which shows 
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that the incentive effect on performance is explained best by a model including a 
cost of control parameter (Manohar et al., 2015). It seems that reward, signaled by 
dopamine release, “pays the cost of control”. Critically, this effect was diminished 
in Parkinson’s disease patients, supporting that dopamine biased the benefits over 
the cost of control in healthy participants.
In sum, there is rich evidence suggesting (indirectly) that dopamine is a key 
player when it comes to decision-making about cognitive effort. Based on this 
evidence, we expect that increases in dopamine will increase the benefits, while 
reducing the costs of actions and hypothesize that this extends to decisions 
about cognitive actions. First causal evidence comes from a rodent task, in 
which amphetamine administration increased high effort choices. However, no 
studies have been conducted in humans that directly assess the consequences 
of a dopamine challenge in healthy adults on decision-making about cognitive 
effort. We therefore setup two pharmacological experiments to quantify how 
catecholamine challenges alter value-based decision making about cognitive 
control investment. In chapter 3, we administer the catecholamine transporter 
blocker methylphenidate and assess demand avoidance in a large young sample 
to probe individual differences. Chapter 4 describes how the catecholamine 
precursor tyrosine alters subjective value of cognitive effort in older adults. In 
the next paragraph (1.5), I will summarize how healthy aging has been shown 
to affect catecholamine transmission, cognitive control and its motivation before 
introducing the specific pharmacological interventions and individual differences 
in intervention effects (1.6).
AGING
When we think of aging, perhaps looking at our parents or grandparents, the 
overall stereotype is that various functions decline, ranging from motor abilities, 
such as running or walking to cognitive abilities, including remembering the 
shopping list or switching off the stove after cooking. In line with the general view 
on cognitive decline, healthy aging has been characterized by impairments when 
assessing performance on cognitive control tasks in the lab, including working 
memory (Cai and Arnsten, 1997; Gazzaley et al., 2005; Turner and Spreng, 
2012), response inhibition (Bloemendaal et al., 2016) and distractor resistance 
(Clapp and Gazzaley, 2012; Gazzaley et al., 2007a; McNab et al., 2015). It has 
been argued that primarily the online maintenance of information is affected due 
to impaired internally guided, top-down suppression of irrelevant working memory 
items (Gazzaley et al., 2005; Jost et al., 2011). This suggests that cognitive stability 
is impaired while flexible updating might in fact be improved due to greater 
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reliance on (distracting) environmental cues (for a review, see Lindenberger & 
Mayr, 2014). There is some evidence against this account, including reports 
on impairments in other tasks requiring flexible updating of current goal 
representations, such as task-switching (Kray et al., 2002) and reversal learning 
(Vo et al., 2018). As introduced in 1.4.1, the processes of cognitive stability versus 
flexibility have been shown to rely on distinct neural regions (PFC versus striatum; 
Figure 1.1B) and their stimulation by dopamine. Older adults turn out to be 
an interesting study population not only due to perhaps shifts in the stability/
flexibility tradeoff, but also because healthy aging is accompanied by changes 
in the dopamine system (Bäckman et al., 2006). A recent meta-analysis of 95 
positron emission tomography (PET) and single-photon emission-computed 
tomography (SPECT) studies revealed lower prefrontal and striatal D1 and D2 
receptor densities and striatal dopamine transporters with increasing age (Karrer 
et al., 2017). Findings regarding dopamine synthesis are more mixed with reports 
on reduced (Ota et al., 2006) as well as enhanced dopamine synthesis (Braskie et 
al., 2008) in older age. Due to the mixed findings, the meta-analysis concludes 
that there are no significant changes in dopamine synthesis. However, there is 
evidence for a link between age-related dopamine changes in prefrontal cortex 
and age-related impairments in working memory performance in healthy older 
adults (Bäckman et al., 2006, 2011; Goldman-Rakic and Brown, 1981; Landau 
et al., 2009; MacDonald et al., 2012). In aged animals, a causal relationship 
has been established between prefrontal cortex dopamine and working memory 
by repleting prefrontal cortex dopamine with a D1 receptor agonist improved 
performance on working memory tasks (Cai and Arnsten, 1997; Mizoguchi et al., 
2009). In chapter 5, we assess whether the administration of tyrosine, which has 
been shown to stimulate dopamine synthesis (see 1.6.1), changes performance 
on a working memory task that probes distinct demands for flexibility versus 
stability. Tyrosine is hypothesized to restore deficits in distractor inhibition by 
increasing prefrontal activity in older adults. To address this question, we combine 
the pharmacological intervention and behavioral task with functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) allowing us to assess whether behavioral changes rely 
on neural effects in distinct networks.
Any performance changes as a function of age or treatment can (as introduced 
in 1.3) be a consequence of impairments in the ability to conduct a certain task, 
reduced motivation to do so or a combination. This interpretation is informed 
also by reports on reduced motivation of older adults to conduct a demanding 
N-back task compared with young adults (Westbrook et al., 2013). Given age-
related declines in dopamine transmission and our hypothesis that dopamine 
contributes to cost-benefit decision making about cognitive control recruitment 
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(see 1.4.2), in chapter 4 we assess whether tyrosine increases the motivation for 
cognitive control in older adults by employing the cognitive effort discounting 
procedure described in 1.3.
PHARMACOLOGY 
There are different ways of studying the effects of catecholamines on cognitive 
functioning in humans. Think of patient studies with Parkinson’s disease, ADHD 
or schizophrenia (Chong et al., 2015; Cools, 2006) or assessing variance in the 
catecholamine system in terms of genetic mutations, polymorphisms or quantifying 
its synthesis using positron emission tomography (e.g. Aarts et al., 2010; Geurts, 
Huys, den Ouden, & Cools, 2013). Each approach has different implications. 
In this thesis, we manipulate catecholamines in the healthy population by acute 
pharmacological interventions. One advantage is that we can manipulate 
catecholamines in a relatively naive and homogenous system comparing placebo 
to intervention sessions. Thus, effects are acute, cannot be ascribed to chronic 
changes due to disease or chronic drug treatment and are compared within-
subjects. Some might argue that a disadvantage is that these drug studies in 
healthy adults don’t serve any applied (clinical) aim and might in fact promote 
the use of ‘smart drugs’. However, next to addressing our fundamental research 
questions on how the healthy brain responds to changes in catecholamine levels, 
there is also societal relevance of this work in the absence of direct translation 
into clinical settings. There are reports that more and more healthy students 
and academics use ‘smart pills’, such as Ritalin (i.e. methylphenidate), Adderall 
(i.e. amphetamines) or tyrosine to boost their cognitive performance (Maher, 
2008). While drugs that potentiate catecholamine neurotransmission are generally 
thought to enhance cognitive control, they certainly do not have enhancing effects 
in all people. There is large individual variability in the direction and extent 
of catecholaminergic drug effects on human cognition (Cools and D’Esposito, 
2011; Samanez-Larkin and Buckholtz, 2013) with reports on impaired instead 
of improved performance (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011; van de Rest et al., 
2017). Thus, knowing beforehand who would benefit in which situations has 
large implications. Here, I first introduce the two pharmacological drugs that we 
administer before addressing such individual differences in drug responses, which 
are relevant for our approach in chapter 3.
1
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Pharmacological interventions
In the scope of this thesis, we conduct two pharmacological studies in which we 
administer methylphenidate to healthy young adults (Chapter 3; Figure 1.2C) and 
tyrosine to healthy older adults (Chapter 4 and 5; Figure 1.2D). These interventions 
have both been shown to alter catecholamine transmission, however by different 
mechanisms of action. 
Tyrosine is one of the large neutral amino acids and biochemical precursor of 
the catecholamines. It is naturally present in protein-rich food such as cheese, 
milk, fish or seeds but also available as over-the-counter food supplement. While 
tyrosine has different peripheral functions in the body, it acts centrally by passing 
the blood-brain-barrier in competition with other large neutral amino acids, such 
as tryptophan and phenylalanine. In the midbrain, it is converted to L-DOPA by 
the rate-limiting enzyme tyrosine hydroxylase (TH; Daubner, Le, & Wang, 2011) 
and to dopamine by aromatic l-amino acid decarboxylase (AADC). Dopamine 
is subsequently converted to noradrenaline in the locus coeruleus (Carlsson and 
Lindqvist, 1978; Tam and Roth, 1997). The oral administration of tyrosine has 
been shown to significantly enhance central catecholamine synthesis in rodents 
(Cuche et al., 1985; Fernstrom, 1983; Gibson and Wurtman, 1976; Scally et al., 
1977; Sved et al., 1979; Tam et al., 1990) and humans (Growdon et al., 1982). 
Plasma levels slowly ramp up and reach peak concentrations ~90 minutes after 
administration and remain significantly elevated up to 8h (Glaeser et al., 1979). 
In young adults, tyrosine administration has been shown to improve cognitive 
control functions that are commonly associated with catecholamine transmission, 
such as working memory, response inhibition, and task switching (see Deijen, 
2005; Jongkees, Hommel, Kühn, & Colzato, 2015). Following multiple previous 
studies (e.g. Mahoney, Castellani, Kramer, Young, & Lieberman, 2007; Shurtleff, 
Thomas, Schrot, Kowalski, & Harford, 1994), we administer 150 mg/kg L-tyrosine 
powder mixed with banana-flavored yoghurt. This is a relatively high dose, as it is 
4-5 times higher than the advised daily tyrosine intake (WHO 1985: 14 mg/kg; 
Basile-Filho et al., 1998; Food and Nutrition Board of the Institute of Medicine: 
2.2-2.6g/day). Importantly, tyrosine is not commonly prescribed as medication 
but an over-the-counter product, advertised online for cognitive enhancement 
and ingredient of different prescription-free ‘smart drugs’, such as NervaCore. 
Methylphenidate in contrast, mainly known as Ritalin, is generally associated 
with its pharmaceutical effects, as it is commonly prescribed to increase cognitive 
performance in ADHD patients (Coghill et al., 2013; Faraone and Buitelaar, 
2010; Leonard et al., 2004). Instead of stimulating catecholamine synthesis, it 
blocks catecholamine transporters that are responsible for clearing dopamine 
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and noradrenaline from the synaptic cleft (Volkow et al., 2002a). If blocked, 
catecholamine reuptake of the presynaptic neuron is inhibited leading to increased 
catecholaminergic stimulation. Plasma concentrations peak after 2 hr with a half-
life of 2–3 hr (Kimko et al., 1999). Next to improving cognitive functions in ADHD 
patients (e.g. Coghill et al., 2013), acute administration of a single dose to healthy 
volunteers has been shown to improve various cognitive functions (Elliott et al., 
1997; Rogers et al., 1999; Samanez-Larkin and Buckholtz, 2013). We administer 
one capsule containing 20 mg of methylphenidate. 20 mg is comparable with a 
single dose used by ADHD patients, however patients might take multiple pills a 
day depending on the individualized therapy scheme.
To conclude, tyrosine and methylphenidate have both been shown to alter the 
catecholamine transmission and performance on different cognitive control tasks. 
It is important to note that drug effects cannot be ascribed selectively to changes 
in dopamine or noradrenaline because a) tyrosine is a precursor of dopamine 
and noradrenaline and b) methylphenidate blocks transporters of dopamine (DAT) 
and noradrenaline (NET). 
Individual differences 
As mentioned above, there is large individual variability in the direction and extent 
of catecholaminergic drug effects on human cognition (Cools and D’Esposito, 
2011; Samanez-Larkin and Buckholtz, 2013). We believe, and earlier research 
has shown, that the individual differences in drug effects reflect dependency on 
baseline levels of dopamine (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). For example, higher 
striatal dopamine synthesis capacity in healthy students, as measured by positron 
emission tomography (PET), was related to better learning from reward than 
from punishments. However, the administration of bromocriptine, a dopamine 
receptor agonist, impaired reward learning in these high-synthesis subjects while 
improving it in participants with lower dopamine synthesis (Cools et al., 2009). 
When we want to predict who will benefit from catecholaminergic drugs, it might 
not be a good solution to acquire PET measures of every single person, because 
administering radioactive PET ligands is expensive and invasive. However, several 
measures have been shown to correlate with dopamine synthesis and have been 
suggested to be used as proxy variables. Thus, in chapter 3 we recruit a large 
sample to assess individual differences in drug responses with the longer-term 
goal to be able to predict, based on different measures, who will benefit in which 
situations by e.g. methylphenidate administration. 
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We include in the study two putative proxy measures: working memory capacity as 
assessed with the listening span, which has been observed to correlate positively 
with striatal dopamine synthesis (Cools et al., 2008; Landau et al., 2009) and 
trait impulsivity measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, which has been 
associated with dopamine receptor availability and striatal dopamine release 
(Buckholtz et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2009; Reeves et al., 2012). 
Previous work indicates that taking into account these proxy variables allows 
to reveal sometimes contrasting drug effects. Working memory capacity was 
predictive of catecholaminergic drug effects on cognitive control tasks, including 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Kimberg et al., 1997), N-back task (Mattay et al., 
2000), spatial working memory (Mehta et al., 2000) and reversal learning (van 
der Schaaf et al., 2013). Similarly, trait impulsivity has been shown to correlate 
with effects of catecholaminergic drugs on attention switching (Cools et al., 
2007) and probabilistic reversal learning (Clatworthy et al., 2009). There have 
been other measures proposed to approximate dopamine or noradrenaline 
transmission, such as eye blink rate (Groman et al., 2014; Müller et al., 2007; 
but Dang et al., 2017; Sescousse et al., 2018), color vision (Roy et al., 2003) or 
pupil dilation (Joshi, Li, Kalwani, & Gold, 2016; but Costa & Rudebeck, 2016). 
However, in chapter 3, we focus on two measures that have directly been assessed 
to correlate with dopamine synthesis using PET in the healthy human population 
and shown in the past to predict drug effects. Future studies should quantify also 
the contribution of other putative proxy variables. 
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FIGURE 1.2 | A Simplified representation of the last steps of catecholamine (i.e. dopa-
mine and noradrenaline) synthesis. B Illustration of catecholamine transmission. Catechol-
amines are released from presynaptic neurons into the synaptic cleft. Released catechol-
amines are then either taken back up by the pre-synaptic neuron or act post-synaptically 
via post-synaptic catecholamine receptors. C Methylphenidate alters catecholamine trans-
mission by blocking their pre-synaptic transporters, resulting in increased catecholamine 
transmission. D Tyrosine has been shown to increase catecholamine synthesis and thereby 
alter catecholamine transmission.
1
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THESIS OUTLINE
The overarching goal of this thesis is to characterize the role of catecholamines 
and specific task-demands in shaping our motivation for cognitively demanding 
processes in the healthy population. 
In chapter 2, we highlight in a literature review the contribution of the major 
ascending neuromodulators dopamine, noradrenaline and serotonin to the 
avoidance of cognitive demand. We present a hypothesis that might account for 
paradoxical intervention effects in the domain of motivation for physical versus 
cognitive effort avoidance. Due to the more global, overarching scope, I present 
this literature review before the empirical studies. Note that results of chapter 3 
are integrated in this literature review.
Based on our hypothesis that dopamine contributes to decision making about 
cognitive control (see 1.4.2), in chapter 3 and 4, we assess how choices about 
cognitive control execution (i.e. motivation) are altered when challenging the 
catecholamine system. More specifically, in chapter 3, we administer in a within-
subject design the catecholamine transporter blocker methylphenidate (see 1.6.1) 
and measure cognitive demand avoidance (see 1.3) in a healthy young population. 
The large sample size (N = 100) allows us to stratify methylphenidate effects by 
individual differences in putative proxy measures of dopamine transmission (see 
1.6.2): working memory capacity and trait impulsivity scores. In chapter 4, we 
ask whether the administration of the catecholamine precursor tyrosine decreases 
the cost of control in healthy aging, previously associated with reduced motivation 
for cognitive control and age-related changes in the dopamine system (see 1.5). 
In a within-subject design, using a cognitive effort discounting procedure (see 
1.3), we quantify tyrosine effects (see 1.6.1) on the cost of executing a demanding 
N-back task.
Adaptive behavior and many cognitive functions rely on an arbitration between 
cognitive stability and flexibility (see 1.2). These two seemingly opposing processes 
were hypothesized to implicate distinct neural regions and their modulation by 
dopamine (see 1.4.1). Thus, in chapter 5, we assess the neural and behavioral 
consequences of tyrosine on the flexibility/stability tradeoff in healthy aging by 
combining functional magnetic resonance imaging with an adapted delayed 
match-to-sample task probing flexible and stable working memory processes. 
Note that this experiment was conducted in the context of the same study 
(population) as described in chapter 4. In addition to characterizing whether 
catecholamine effects depend on the demand for flexible and stable cognition, 
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we develop in chapter 6 a novel paradigm that allows to assess the subjective 
cost of executing tasks requiring cognitive flexibility versus stability.
Taken together, this thesis presents a multimodal, multidisciplinary approach 
by combining literature review, causal interventions (i.e. pharmacology), well-
established and novel behavioral paradigms, and neuroimaging to increase 
our understanding of the role of catecholamines in our motivation for cognitive 
control.
In chapter 7, I summarize the main findings of the research presented in this 
thesis. Further, I discuss limitations of this research, future directions and speculate 
about its implications for society and education.
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ABSTRACT
Why do we so often fail to exert cognitive control, even though we are in principle 
able to do so? In this review, we begin to address this question by considering the 
contribution of the major ascending neuromodulators that are often implicated 
in cognitive control and motivation, in particular dopamine, noradrenaline and 
serotonin. Accumulating evidence indicates that cognitive control is subjectively 
costly and people generally choose to refrain from mentally effortful tasks, despite, 
at times, devastating consequences. This tendency to avoid cognitive control tasks 
has been shown to be sensitive to catecholaminergic interventions in rodents and 
humans, where choices about cognitive control can be altered even in the absence 
of performance changes. Such effects might reflect modulation by dopamine and/
or noradrenaline of a variety of mechanisms that contribute to our motivation for 
cognitive control. These likely include the calculation and integration into behavior 
of both the expected value (i.e. cost versus benefit), as well as outcome uncertainty 
of exerting cognitive control. In addition, serotonin might impact cognitive control 
avoidance by modulating specifically the computation of effort costs. Advancing 
our understanding of the distinct roles of the various chemical neuromodulators 
will help elucidate the computational mechanisms that contribute to our tendency 
to avoid difficult cognitive tasks.
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INTRODUCTION
Cognitive control is effortful, subjectively costly and people are generally biased 
to avoid it (Botvinick and Braver, 2015; Kool et al., 2017; Shenhav et al., 2013; 
Westbrook and Braver, 2016). They prefer to perform a task with less rather 
than more task-switching (Kool et al., 2010) and with lower rather than higher 
working memory load (Westbrook et al., 2013). On average, people also choose 
to forego a higher monetary reward to avoid a more demanding task (Massar et 
al., 2015; Westbrook et al., 2013). This can be considered paradoxical, given the 
following observations. First, cognitive control is a hallmark of the human mind 
and the brain region commonly associated with cognitive control, the prefrontal 
cortex (Duverne and Koechlin, 2017), is exquisitely well developed. Accordingly, 
we are very good at exerting cognitive control. Second, exerting cognitive control 
has obvious benefits for performance, and most of us are aware that failures of 
cognitive control can have disastrous consequences, ranging from obesity and 
monetary crises to murder. Finally, there is a growing consensus that cognitive 
control functions, are unlikely to be metabolically more costly than other functions, 
associated, for example, with the visual cortex (Kurzban et al., 2013; Molden et 
al., 2012; Vadillo, Gold, & Osman, 2016, but Holroyd, 2015). Therefore, a key 
open question is why do we so often fail to exert cognitive control, even though 
we are in principle able to do so (Cools, 2016; Shenhav et al., 2017). We begin 
to address this question by considering the contributions to value-based choice 
about cognitive control of a set of major ascending neuromodulators that have 
been strongly implicated in motivation, choice and cognitive control, in particular 
dopamine, noradrenaline and serotonin (Figure 2.1A). Note that few empirical 
studies have so far addressed this specific question. Thus, we present ideas that 
build on current literature, but need to be tested in future studies.
DOPAMINE AND COGNITIVE CONTROL AVOIDANCE
Effortful cognitive control has long been associated with optimal catecholamine 
transmission. For example, patients with disorders that implicate dopamine, like 
Parkinson’s disease or attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), exhibit 
cognitive control deficits which can be remedied by dopaminergic medication 
(Coghill et al., 2013). Moreover, dopamine is also a key ingredient in drugs 
that are used to boost cognitive control in healthy adults (Linssen et al., 
2014). Paradoxically, however, altering dopamine transmission by medication 
or by promising reward can also impair cognitive performance (Aarts et al., 
2014a; Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). For example, in Parkinson’s disease, the 
dopaminergic medication doses that are well established to improve motor 
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control can contribute to the development of impulse control disorder, putatively 
by impairing cognitive control (Weintraub et al., 2015). Here, we consider the 
possibility that such paradoxical effects might reflect, in part, modulation by 
dopamine of value- (and effort cost) based choice about whether or not to exert 
motor and cognitive control (Collins and Frank, 2014). Indeed the phasic firing of 
midbrain dopamine neurons are well accepted to contribute to reward prediction 
error signaling (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz, 1997), which drives temporal 
difference learning and value-based choice, not only of actions that have high 
value but also of valuable (while costly) cognitive tasks (Boureau et al., 2015; 
Collins and Frank, 2014).
As made explicit in the expected value of control (EVC) model (Shenhav et al., 
2017), one way in which dopamine might bias such value-based learning and 
choice about cognitive tasks is by altering the (expected) value of cognitive 
control, which corresponds to the benefit minus the costs of control. According to 
neurocomputational models of dopamine in the basal ganglia, such as the OPAL 
model and supportive empirical evidence (Collins and Frank, 2014; Skvortsova et 
al., 2017), prolonging (striatal) dopamine likely enhances the benefit while also 
reducing the cost of actions by having opposite effects on the D1 (GO) and D2 
(NO-GO) pathways of the basal ganglia. Thus, based on this evidence, we argue 
that increases in dopamine will increase the benefits, while reducing the costs of 
cognitive control. Based on further empirical evidence for an ‘inverted U’-shaped 
relationship between dopamine and reward- versus punishment-based learning 
(Cools and D’Esposito, 2011; Cools et al., 2009), we also hypothesize that excess 
or supraoptimal levels of dopamine might paradoxically reduce the benefits versus 
the costs of cognitive control, perhaps by acting via a presynaptic mechanism 
of action, thus leading to a net reduction in dopamine synthesis and/or release.
The nature of the control cost is currently under active study. Some have argued 
that it represents an intrinsic conflict-related cost (Cavanagh et al., 2014, 2017; 
Shenhav et al., 2017), while others highlight that it might correspond to an 
opportunity cost of time, equal to either the value of the next best alternative 
(Kurzban et al., 2013) or, following work on dopamine’s role in motor motivation 
(Beierholm et al., 2013; Niv et al., 2007) to an average net reward per unit time 
(Boureau et al., 2015). Regardless of the origin of the putatively dopaminergic cost 
of cognitive control, empirical evidence for an effect of dopamine on value-based 
choice about cognitive control is still scarce. So far, two studies have revealed that 
challenging catecholamine transmission by amphetamine or methylphenidate 
administration, which prolongs the activity of both dopamine and noradrenaline, 
alters the willingness to engage in cognitive effort. Work with experimental animals 
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revealed that administration of amphetamine motivated rodent ‘slackers’ (but not 
‘workers’) to choose a perceptually more demanding option for a higher reward 
(Cocker et al., 2012). However, follow-up work from the same group suggested 
that this effect was mediated by changes in noradrenaline rather than dopamine 
transmission, as selective dopamine antagonists did not alter demand avoidance 
(Hosking et al., 2015). In parallel, work with young healthy human volunteers 
has shown that the administration of methylphenidate (20 mg, oral) altered the 
avoidance of a classic cognitive control task, task-switching (Froböse et al, 2018; 
Chapter 3), in a demand selection paradigm previously shown to be sensitive to 
demand avoidance (Kool et al., 2010). The effect of methylphenidate depended on 
participants’ degree of trait impulsivity, a measure that has been associated with 
enhanced drug-induced dopamine release and reduced D2/D3 (auto-)receptor 
availability (Buckholtz et al., 2010; Dalley et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2009). More 
impulsive participants became more demand avoidant relative to low-impulsive 
participants (Froböse et al., 2018). Intriguingly, in the latter study, methylphenidate 
did not alter the ability to implement task-switching, as measured during the 
performance of the task-switching and –repetition trials that followed each choice 
(Figure 2.1B), although the drug did render performance across trial types faster 
as well as more accurate, consistent with a general performance enhancing 
effect. Thus, in this study methylphenidate impacted only the avoidance and not 
the execution of cognitive control, with methylphenidate actually undermining 
impulsive participants’ motivation to exert control. The hypothesis that this effect 
reflects modulation of the cost of cognitive effort by dopamine is currently under 
study.
Which mechanism might underlie the paradoxical effects of methylphenidate in 
high-impulsive individuals, where it potentiates the avoidance of cognitive control? 
One possibility, as referred to above, is that the cost of cognitive control was 
increased, because methylphenidate elicited supraoptimal levels of dopamine in 
these individuals with high trait impulsivity. Trait impulsivity has been shown to be 
accompanied by enhanced baseline levels of striatal dopamine release and low 
(but perhaps more sensitive) presynaptic dopamine D2 receptor availability in the 
midbrain (Buckholtz et al., 2010). Indeed, methylphenidate has previously been 
argued to act presynaptically, especially in high dopamine states, by triggering a 
self-regulatory mechanism, thus leading to a net reduction in dopamine release 
(Grace, 2001; Seeman and Madras, 2002).
An alternative, more speculative possibility is inspired by opportunity cost accounts 
of tonic dopamine’s role in motivating vigor (physical effort) (Beierholm et al., 
2013; Griffiths and Beierholm, 2017; Niv et al., 2007). Generalization of this 
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account led to the hypothesis that an increase in tonic dopamine motivates 
people to avoid slow cognitive control strategies because such an increase is 
accompanied by an increase in the opportunity cost of time (Kurzban et al., 2013). 
In one account the opportunity cost of time is equal to the average reward rate 
of the environment (Boureau et al., 2015). Although one study demonstrated that 
dopaminergic medication effects on physical effort-based decision making were 
independent of the possibility to save time (Zénon et al., 2016), another recent 
study provided some preliminary supportive evidence that strategic adjustments in 
the degree to which people perform fast and accurately on Simon, task-switching 
and perceptual decision tasks do indeed depend on fluctuations in the average 
reward rate (Otto and Daw, 2019). People with high levels of tonic dopamine 
might evaluate control as relatively more costly than people with lower dopamine 
tone because their estimate of the average reward rate in the environment is 
increased.
One key implication of this hypothesis is that dopamine-induced increases in 
an opportunity cost of time might account, in part, for the contrasting motor 
and cognitive effects of dopaminergic medication in Parkinson’s disease, 
described above. According to this account, increases in tonic dopamine would 
be accompanied by increases in the cost of time, which would enhance the 
motivation for physical vigor (Niv et al., 2007), thus remediating bradykinesia, 
yet reduce the motivation for time costly cognitive control processes (Boureau et 
al., 2015), thus potentiating impulse control problems (Figure 2.1C). An account 
of dopamine’s effects in terms of time costs is particularly promising in the context 
of the recent observation that dopamine neurons control the judgment of time 
(Soares et al., 2016).
Direct empirical evidence for a role of dopamine in cognitive motivation comes 
from a separate line of work, indicating that effects of monetary incentive 
reward (the promise of a bonus) on cognitive control vary as a function of striatal 
dopamine levels. This was shown to be the case in patients with Parkinson’s 
disease depending on dopamine cell loss (Manohar et al., 2017), as well as in 
healthy volunteers depending on striatal dopamine synthesis capacity, as indexed 
by 6-[18F]fluoro-L-m-tyrosine (FMT) positron emission tomography (Aarts et al., 
2014b). Intriguingly, in these studies, the relationship between striatal dopamine 
levels and the effect of incentives on cognitive control was negative, such that 
higher striatal dopamine was associated with more detrimental effects of reward 
on cognitive control (Aarts et al., 2014b). Conversely, patients with Parkinson’s 
disease, which is accompanied by severe dopamine depletion in the striatum, 
have been shown to exhibit paradoxically greater beneficial effects of reward 
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on cognitive control than controls (Aarts et al., 2014a). Although the mechanism 
underlying these effects on incentivized cognitive control remains unclear, they 
are certainly reminiscent of the pattern of paradoxical effects of methylphenidate 
on the avoidance of cognitive control. Indeed, changes in the value of cognitive 
control might surface, in these tasks, in terms of changes in (the effect of reward 
on) task performance (Chong et al., 2015). This concurs with the recent finding that 
the effect of reward on task (-switching) performance correlated with participants’ 
scores on the need for cognition scale (Sandra and Otto, 2018), which had been 
associated with the valuation of cognitive control in earlier work (Westbrook et al., 
2013). In the current set of tasks, patients with Parkinson’s disease might exhibit 
greater beneficial effects of reward on cognitive control, because there is greater 
cost to be offset by increases in the benefits of cognitive control.
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FIGURE 2.1 | A Simplified presentation of synthesis pathway and projections of the 
major ascending neuromodulators dopamine, noradrenaline, and serotonin. B Schematic 
overview of the (opposite) effects of methylphenidate on the avoidance versus execution 
of task-switching. Methylphenidate increased task-switching avoidance in more, relative 
to less impulsive participants, whereas task-switching performance was unaffected. In 
contrast, methylphenidate actually enhanced performance in more impulsive participants, 
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evidenced by speeding of responses (illustration based on data presented in Froböse 
et al., 2018). C Dopaminergic medication in Parkinson’s disease increases dopamine 
levels and has been shown to remediate some motor symptoms, while at the same time, 
contributing, in a considerable proportion of patients, to impulse (cognitive) control dis-
order. Increased dopamine tone has been hypothesized to elevate the cost of time due 
to higher average net reward per unit time (Ṝ; Niv et al., 2007). This might account, in 
part, for the contrasting motor and cognitive effects of dopaminergic medication, which 
would enhance the motivation for physical vigor, yet reduce the motivation for time costly 
cognitive control processes.
NORADRENALINE AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
AVOIDANCE
Many drugs, including amphetamine or methylphenidate, prolong catecholamine 
transmission in a nonspecific manner by targeting both dopamine and 
noradrenaline transporters (Kuczenski and Segal, 2001). There are multiple 
reasons for thinking that such drug effects on motivated cognition reflect not just 
modulation by dopamine, but also noradrenaline, not least for its well-known 
association with arousal and fatigue.
For example, according to the classic adaptive gain theory of locus coeruleus 
function, task engagement is modulated by activity of the locus coeruleus, which 
favors either exploitation (task engagement) or exploration (task disengagement) 
depending on a tonic or phasic mode of action (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). 
In line with this, baseline pupil diameter at trial onset, a measure that has been 
associated with locus coeruleus activity (Varazzani et al., 2015), was found to 
correlate with lapses of attention in a sustained attention task (Van den Brink 
et al., 2016), with participant’s tendency to explore in a gambling task (Jepma 
and Nieuwenhuis, 2011), with decisions to disengage from a (discrimination) 
task (Gilzenrat et al., 2010) and with mental fatigue (Hopstaken et al., 2015). 
However, in contrast to predictions of the adaptive gain theory, prolonging 
tonic noradrenaline levels pharmacologically by administering reboxetine, a 
selective noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor, failed to alter task (dis)engagement 
or exploratory behavior despite intervention effects on non-specific autonomic 
nervous system parameters (Jepma et al., 2010). Thus, the jury is still out with 
regard to noradrenaline’s role in exploration and task engagement. One way in 
which the locus coeruleus-noradrenaline system might alter task engagement 
and demand avoidance is by encoding unexpected (outcome) uncertainty 
or surprise due to errors in judging uncertainty (Preuschoff et al., 2011). For 
instance, greater outcome uncertainty might elicit greater task engagement given 
the greater likelihood of unsigned (surprise) prediction error signals at outcome 
(Sara and Bouret, 2012), and thus greater potential for new learning, knowledge 
acquisition and curiosity relief (Van Lieshout et al., 2018). Conversely, greater 
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certainty about the outcome of performance, whether it is good or bad, might 
elicit boredom or learned helplessness respectively, thus reducing the opportunity 
for new learning and task engagement. Recent empirical evidence indicates 
that blocking noradrenaline, by propranolol, increases participants’ confidence 
in good performance on a dot-motion task relative to placebo (Hauser et al., 
2017). It would be interesting to contrast directly in future studies the putative 
role of noradrenaline in mediating a putative link between outcome uncertainty 
and task engagement with a putative role of dopamine in task engagement as 
a function of the expected value of an outcome, thus the probability (rather than 
uncertainty) of performing well.
SEROTONIN AND COGNITIVE CONTROL AVOIDANCE
Like the catecholamines, serotonin is a major neuromodulator that is strongly 
implicated in both motivation and cognitive (impulse) control. Serotonin 
transmission is perhaps best known for its association with (learning about) 
aversive outcomes, waiting and behavioral inhibition (Miyazaki et al., 2014; den 
Ouden et al., 2013), although there is also extensive evidence for a complementary 
role in appetitive processing and reward (Cohen et al., 2015; Matias et al., 2017). 
In line with the idea that serotonin also plays a role in (the learning about time 
and/or effort) costs, the optogenetic activation of serotonergic neurons in the 
midbrain dorsal raphe nucleus reduced the cost of waiting. Timed activation 
decreased premature responding in a delayed reward task, promoting animals’ 
patience to wait for a reward. Relatedly, an 8-week selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitor intervention (escitalopram) in healthy humans improved decision-making 
about reward and (physical) effort costs by reducing specifically effort costs, 
leaving unaffected the weight of monetary incentives (Meyniel et al., 2016). A key 
question for future work is whether such a dissociation extends from the domain 
of physical effort to that of cognitive effort.
CONCLUSIONS
In this review, we highlight the potential contribution of the major ascending 
neuromodulators, in particular dopamine, noradrenaline and serotonin, 
to our tendency to avoid cognitive control. We suggest that these chemical 
neuromodulators might alter cognitive control by altering not just the ability 
but also the willingness to exert cognitive control. In line with this hypothesis, 
catecholaminergic challenges, like amphetamine and methylphenidate, have 
been shown to alter demand avoidance while leaving unaltered the ability to 
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perform well on a cognitive control task. Based on accumulating evidence from 
chemical and functional neuroimaging studies for a role for striatal dopamine in 
our motivation for cognitive control, we hypothesize that these catecholaminergic 
effects reflect in part modulation of striatal dopamine. Striatal dopamine might 
alter choices about cognitive control (avoidance) by modulating (learning about) 
the expected value (i.e. cost) of cognitive task performance. However, we also 
consider the role of noradrenaline in cognitive control (avoidance), and speculate 
that noradrenaline might contribute by modulating, instead, our uncertainty or 
confidence in the outcome of performance. Lastly, we hypothesize that serotonin 
might affect the motivation for cognitive control by modulating (time and/or 
effort) costs, specifically. Overall, this review highlights the relevance of advancing 
our understanding of the various cognitive computations carried by the different 
ascending neuromodulators for elucidating the basis of our tendency to avoid 
cognitive control.
2
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ABSTRACT
The catecholamines have long been associated with cognitive control and value-
based decision-making. More recently, we proposed that the catecholamines 
might modulate value-based decision-making about whether or not to engage in 
cognitive control. We test this hypothesis by assessing effects of a catecholamine 
challenge in a large sample of young, healthy adults (n = 100) on the avoidance 
of a cognitively demanding control process: task switching. Prolonging 
catecholamine transmission by blocking reuptake with methylphenidate altered 
the avoidance, but not the execution of cognitive control. Crucially, these effects 
could be isolated by taking into account individual differences in trait impulsivity, 
so that participants with higher trait impulsivity became more avoidant of cognitive 
control, despite faster task performance. One implication of these findings is that 
performance-enhancing effects of methylphenidate may be accompanied by an 
undermining effect on the willingness to exert cognitive control. Taken together, 
these findings integrate hitherto segregated literatures on catecholamines’ roles 
in value-based learning/choice and cognitive control.
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INTRODUCTION
Catecholamine neurotransmitters (dopamine and noradrenaline) have long been 
implicated in key aspects of goal-directed behaviour, including on the one hand 
cognitive control (Arnsten, 1998; Brozoski et al., 1979; Cools and D’Esposito, 
2011; Cools et al., 2004; Goldman-Rakic, 1997) and on the other hand value-
based learning, motivation and choice (Collins and Frank, 2014; Niv et al., 2007; 
Robbins and Everitt, 1996; Salamone et al., 2005; Schultz, 2017). Recently, 
catecholamines have been proposed to also mediate their integration: value-
based learning and choice about whether or not to recruit cognitive control (Cools, 
2016; Westbrook and Braver, 2016). This idea implies that catecholaminergic 
drugs, such as methylphenidate (MPH), alter not just the ability to execute cognitive 
control, but also the willingness to exert or conversely, the desire to avoid, cognitive 
control. Here, we test this hypothesis by assessing the effects of a catecholamine 
challenge on the avoidance of cognitive control.
Catecholaminergic modulation of cognitive control
Cognitive control refers to the ability to flexibly adjust our behaviour to changing 
internal and external demands in order to attain (long-term) goals (Fuster, 1989; 
Monsell, 2003, 2017). Disorders accompanied by cognitive control deficits, 
such as attention deficit/ hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), Parkinson’s disease 
and schizophrenia, are commonly treated with drugs that alter catecholamine 
transmission (Arnsten, 1998; Dagher and Robbins, 2009; Frankle and Laruelle, 
2002; Prince, 2008). In ADHD, for example, MPH is usually the first-line medication 
and is generally found to remedy cognitive deficits (Coghill et al., 2013; Faraone 
and Buitelaar, 2010; Leonard et al., 2004), such as impairments in task switching 
(Cepeda et al., 2000; Kramer et al., 2001), response inhibition (Aron et al., 2003), 
and working memory (Mehta et al., 2004). In addition, psychostimulants, such 
as MPH have been shown to enhance cognitive function in healthy volunteers 
(Linssen et al., 2014), consistent with their use by students and academics to 
boost functioning in periods of high cognitive demand (Maher, 2008). Acute 
administration of a single dose of psychostimulants to healthy volunteers has 
indeed been shown to improve task switching (Samanez-Larkin and Buckholtz, 
2013), extradimensional set-shifting (Rogers et al., 1999), spatial working memory 
(Elliott et al., 1997), response inhibition (Spronk et al., 2013), distractor-resistant 
working memory (Fallon et al., 2016) and selective attention (Ter Huurne et al., 
2015). Thus, catecholaminergic drugs can both remedy cognitive control deficits 
in patients and enhance cognitive control in the healthy population.
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However, while drugs that potentiate catecholamine neurotransmission, like MPH, 
are generally thought to enhance cognitive control, they certainly do not have 
enhancing effects in all people. Indeed, there is large individual variability in the 
direction and extent of catecholaminergic drug effects on human cognition (Cools 
and D’Esposito, 2011; Cools et al., 2004; Samanez-Larkin and Buckholtz, 2013). 
These individual differences in drug effects are thought to reflect dependency on 
baseline levels of dopamine (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011; Cools et al., 2004) and 
covary with proxy variables, such as trait impulsivity (Buckholtz et al., 2010; Kim 
et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2009; Reeves et al., 2012) and working memory capacity 
(Cools et al., 2008; Landau et al., 2009). Participants with higher trait impulsivity 
have been shown to exhibit greater beneficial effects of catecholaminergic drug 
administration across tasks including attention switching (Cools et al., 2007) 
and probabilistic reversal learning (Clatworthy et al., 2009). Such impulsivity-
dependent effects of catecholaminergic drugs correspond well with the cognitive 
enhancing effects of MPH in ADHD (Rapoport et al., 1980), with greater MPH-
induced changes in dopamine release in more severely affected ADHD patients 
(Rosa-Neto et al., 2005) and with greater beneficial effects of MPH on impulsive 
responding in higher impulsive experimental rodents (Caprioli et al., 2015). Thus, 
we expected that MPH-effects on cognitive control can be isolated by taking into 
account proxy variables, such as individual trait impulsivity.
Catecholaminergic modulation of learning and choice about 
cognitive control
In parallel, a second, so far relatively segregated line of evidence supports a key 
role for the catecholamines, dopamine in particular, in value-based learning and 
choice (Collins and Frank, 2014; Cools et al., 2011; Maia and Frank, 2015; van 
der Schaaf et al., 2013; Schultz, 2001; Swart et al., 2017). It is well-established 
that phasic firing of midbrain dopamine neurons contributes to the encoding 
of reward prediction errors (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz, 1997; Tobler et al., 
2005), driving reinforcement learning and consequently promoting the selection 
of actions with higher predicted values. It has been argued that the same principle 
applies to the selection of cognitive goals, such that dopaminergic reward 
prediction error signals can contribute to the value-based learning and selection 
of cognitive goals (Braver and Cohen, 1999; Collins and Frank, 2014; Frank and 
Badre, 2012; Frank et al., 2001; Hazy et al., 2007).
This evidence concurs with recent expected value accounts of cognitive control 
(Botvinick and Braver, 2015; Kool et al., 2017; Kurzban et al., 2013; Shenhav et 
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al., 2017), which propose that the degree (and intensity) of engagement in an 
upcoming cognitive computation is based on a cost-benefit analysis. In line with 
this account, it has been shown repeatedly that enhancing motivation, for example 
by offering reward, affects performance on cognitive control paradigms (Aarts 
et al., 2011; Botvinick and Braver, 2015; Chib et al., 2012, 2014; Manohar et al., 
2015; Padmala and Pessoa, 2011). Increasing the value or benefit of a demanding 
computation, such as task switching, seems to outweigh perceived demand costs.
Evidence is accumulating that cognitive demand indeed carries an intrinsic cost 
(Botvinick and Braver, 2015; Westbrook and Braver, 2016), a hypothesis that is 
supported by studies showing that, on average, healthy participants are demand 
avoidant. They prefer to perform a task with a lower cognitive demand, such as 
less task switching (Botvinick, 2007; Gold et al., 2015; Kool et al., 2010; McGuire 
and Botvinick, 2010) or lower working memory load, they choose to forego a 
higher monetary reward to avoid a more demanding task (Massar et al., 2015; 
Westbrook et al., 2013) and expend physical effort in order to reduce cognitive 
demand (Risko et al., 2014).
A role for the catecholamines in biasing meta-learning and -choice about cognitive 
effort follows also from abundant evidence implicating dopamine in physical 
effort avoidance. Enhancing dopamine transmission in non-human animals 
increases selection of high effort/high reward trials (Chong et al., 2015; Floresco 
et al., 2008a; Le Bouc et al., 2016; Salamone et al., 2016), while the opposite 
is true for reductions in dopamine functioning (Bardgett et al., 2009; Salamone 
et al., 2016). In these studies, it is evident that dopamine manipulations altered 
effort-based choice rather than the capacity to exert effort per se because animals 
were still equally able to execute the physical effortful task of climbing a barrier 
(Cousins et al., 1996; Yohn et al., 2015). In human patients with Parkinson’s 
disease, characterized by striatal dopamine depletion, dopaminergic medication 
also increased their willingness to invest physical effort on higher reward trials 
when patients were tested on, relative to off their usual dopaminergic medication 
(Chong et al., 2015; Floresco et al., 2008a; Le Bouc et al., 2016; Salamone et 
al., 2016).
There is suggestive empirical evidence that similar mechanisms underlie learning 
and choice about cognitive demand (Botvinick et al., 2009; Kurniawan et al., 
2013): Prolonging catecholamine transmission by amphetamine administration 
motivated rats to choose a cognitively more demanding option for a higher 
reward, although this was true only for rodents who were more demand-avoidant 
at baseline (Cocker et al., 2012; Hosking et al., 2015).
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In keeping with the proposal that dopamine is implicated in the strategic 
recruitment and/or value-based selection of cognitive control (Boureau et al., 
2015; Hazy et al., 2007), effects of cognitive demand on avoidance learning 
were shown to depend on striatal dopamine (Cavanagh et al., 2014, 2017). More 
specifically, the presence of response conflict in a Simon task modified learning 
about action values, such that the value of received rewards was downgraded 
due to response conflict and a lack of reward after response conflict increased 
avoidance (Cavanagh et al., 2014, 2017). These effects varied with conditions 
and manipulations associated with changes in striatal dopamine. For example, 
they varied as a function of a genetic polymorphism implicating striatal dopamine 
(DARPR-32), were modulated by a selective D2 receptor agonist (cabergoline) 
challenge and were altered in patients with Parkinson’s disease, characterized 
by striatal dopamine depletion (Cavanagh et al., 2014, 2017). A separate line of 
evidence comes from incentive motivational work, showing that incentive effects 
on cognitive control vary as a function of striatal dopamine levels in patients with 
Parkinson’s disease, and healthy volunteers (Aarts et al., 2012, 2014b; Manohar 
et al., 2015). Together, these prior findings raise the question of whether effects 
of catecholamine manipulations on cognitive control tasks might reflect (in part) 
changes in value-based learning/choice about cognitive control, in addition to 
reflecting changes in the ability to execute cognitive control per se. We note that, 
by manipulating catecholamines, we cannot draw conclusions about a selective 
role of dopamine in cognitive control avoidance. Indeed, there is also abundant 
evidence for a role for noradrenaline in demand avoidance (see discussion).
The present experiment
In the present experiment, we administered a low, oral dose of MPH to a large 
group of young healthy volunteers to address our primary question of interest: 
Does manipulation of catecholamine transmission alter the avoidance of cognitive 
demand, here task switching? Second, we also investigated effects of MPH on 
the execution of task switching (performance). To expose individual variation in 
response to MPH, we obtained putative proxy measures of baseline dopamine 
transmission: trait impulsivity scores for their association with dopamine (auto)
receptor availability and striatal dopamine release (Buckholtz et al., 2010; Dalley 
et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2009; Reeves et al., 2012), as well 
as working memory span, associated with striatal dopamine synthesis capacity 
(Cools et al., 2008; Landau et al., 2009). Given prior evidence for greater MPH-
induced improvement of learning in higher impulsive participants (Clatworthy 
et al., 2009; see above), we anticipated greater MPH-induced increases in (the 
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learning of) demand avoidance in higher impulsive participants. Conversely, 
our hypothesis with regard to working memory capacity was bidirectional, given 
prior reports of positive, but also negative associations between working memory 
capacity and cognitive effects of MPH (Mehta et al., 2000; van der Schaaf et al., 
2013).
METHODS
Participants
106 healthy, young adults participated in this study and were recruited via flyers 
around the campus and the digital participant pool of the Radboud University, 
Nijmegen. All participants were native Dutch speakers and provided written 
informed consent to participate in the study. Participants were screened extensively 
according to pre-defined exclusion criteria (Supplemental Material 3.1).
Data from five participants were incomplete due to medical (irregular heart rate: 
n = 1, elevated heart rate and nausea: n = 1), and technical (n = 1) problems and 
drop-outs (n = 2). One additional participant was discarded due to a lack of task 
understanding (explicitly reported and evidenced by below-chance performance). 
Thus, the analyses include 100 adult participants (50 women, mean age 21.5, 
SD = 2.31, range 18 - 28). Two participants had trouble swallowing the capsule 
such that for one participant the capsule dissolved orally before swallowing and for 
the other participants content of the capsule was dissolved in water. We assessed 
whether relevant results were changed when excluding these participants.
We performed a power analysis using G*Power 3.1.9.2 software (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Previous work 
from our group had revealed a correlation of 0.74 between a proxy measure of 
dopamine transmission, working memory capacity, and effects of MPH on reward-
learning with 19 participants (van der Schaaf et al., 2013). To be conservative, 
given the small sample size of that previous study and given that we are using a 
different experimental task, we anticipated that the true effect size for the present 
study would be maximally half this size (r = 0.37). Our sample size of 100 (and 
subsequent subsample of 74: see Results section) provides 97.6% (92.2%) power 
to detect such an effect size, for a two-sided test with an alpha-level of 0.05.
Additional demographic and questionnaire information of included participants 
is reported in Table 3.1. All procedures were in accordance with the local 
ethical guidelines approved by the local ethics committee (CMO protocol 
NL47166.091.13) and in line with the Helsinki Declaration of 1975. The study 
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was also registered with the Dutch National Trial register (trialregister.nl, number 
NTR4653). Data and code for the study are freely available at https://osf.io/62tkh.
Study sessions and pharmacological intervention
A within-subjects, placebo-controlled, double-blind, cross-over design was 
employed. Participants visited the institute twice for study sessions of around 4.5 
hours. The sessions started approximately at the same time of the day (maximal 
deviation: 45 minutes), with an interval of one week to 2 months between testing 
days. After signing an informed consent form, session 1 started with a medical 
screening (~20 minutes) to check for exclusion criteria (Supplemental Material 
3.1). We administered a digit span test (forward and backward; (Wechsler et 
al., 2008), Dutch reading test (NLV; (Schmand et al., 1991) and participants 
received a single oral dose of methylphenidate (MPH; Ritalin®, Novartis, 20 mg) 
on one and a placebo substance on the other day. The order of administration 
was counterbalanced and double-blind. MPH is known to block transporters of 
both dopamine (DAT) and noradrenaline (NET), thereby preventing reuptake of 
catecholamines (Volkow et al., 2002b). For this reason, any intervention effect 
needs to be interpreted as reflecting modulation of catecholamine transmission, 
and not selectively dopamine or noradrenaline. Plasma concentrations peak after 
2 hours with a half-life of 2-3 hours (Kimko et al., 1999). To test participants at 
maximal plasma levels, participants underwent a cognitive test battery starting 
50 minutes after drug intake, including the demand selection task (described in 
Demand selection task section), the paradigm of primary interest for our research 
question. The delay between the administration of MPH or placebo and the start of 
the demand selection task was on average 80.9 (SD = 3.7) minutes. The second 
testing day was identical to the first one, except that participants performed 
a listening span test instead of the medical screening (also ~20 minutes, see 
Listening span task section). The cognitive test battery consisted in total of six 
paradigms (Figure 3.1A). The order of paradigms was constant across sessions 
and participants, such that a Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer task (cf. Geurts 
et al., 2013) and a social learning task (cf. Cook, Den Ouden, Heyes, & Cools, 
2014) preceded the demand selection task on both days, and was followed after 
a break, by a valenced Go/NoGo learning task (Swart et al., 2017), working-
memory task (cf. Fallon et al., 2016), and a probabilistic reversal learning task 
(cf. den Ouden et al., 2013).
For safety reasons blood pressure and heart rate were measured three times 
throughout the days (start of testing day, before task battery, after task battery). 
At the same time points, participants’ mood and medical symptoms were assessed 
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using the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988), the Bond and Lader Visual Analogue Scales (calmness, contentedness, 
alertness; Bond & Lader, 1974) and a medical Visual Analogue Scale (symptoms, 
such as headache or muscle pain; Supplemental Material 3.2). Between the 
two testing days, participants completed self-report questionnaires at home (see 
Questionnaires section).
Demand selection task
To assess avoidance of cognitive control, we employed the demand selection task 
developed by Kool et al., (2010), programmed using the Psychophysics toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) in Matlab. Stimuli were 16 random color fractals used 
as choice cues and colored (yellow or blue) digits ranging from 1 to 10 (excluding 
5) (Figure 3.1B). Stimuli were presented on a gray background and responses 
were made using a pc mouse.
An example trial sequence is presented in Figure 1.1C. Participants were shown 
two color patches as choice cues. After choosing between the two patches, by 
moving the mouse cursor onto one cue, a digit from 1 to 10 (but not 5) appeared 
at the center of the chosen cue. Depending on the color of the digit, the task of 
the participants was to either indicate whether the digit is odd or even (i.e. parity 
judgment for yellow digits), or whether the digit is smaller or larger than 5 (i.e. 
magnitude judgment for blue digits). Judgment was made by clicking the left or 
right mouse button. After the response, the cursor returned to the center of the 
screen and the next two choice cues were presented.
Task demand was manipulated by assigning different task switching probabilities 
to the two choice cues. When choosing one choice cue, the digits switched colors 
(i.e. task) with respect to the previous trial on 90% of trials. When choosing the 
other cue, the task repeated on 90% of trials. The option with higher task switching 
probability represents the more demanding option, based on evidence of task 
switching requiring extensive cognitive control (Monsell, 2003) and reports of 
lower accuracy in earlier studies using this task (Kool et al., 2010). The task 
switching manipulation was unknown to the participants. Choice behaviour (i.e. 
demand avoidance) and performance on the task switching task (i.e. reaction 
time and accuracy) were the dependent variables of interest.
Participants first practiced 40 trials of only magnitude/parity judgments using the 
blue and yellow digits as stimuli. Participants were then instructed on the choice 
task emphasizing that they will choose between two cues repeatedly and the blue 
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or yellow digits will appear at the cue location after they have moved the cursor 
towards the cue. They were instructed that they could switch between the cues 
at any point and when they develop a preference for one choice cue, it is fine to 
keep choosing the same. Instructions were followed by 4 practice choice trials 
to illustrate the paradigm, but using different cue patches to the actual task. The 
task consisted of 600 trials, divided across 8 blocks of 75 trials each. Choices 
and magnitude/parity judgments were not time restricted, i.e. responses were 
self-paced. The visual identity and location of the 2 choice cues were constant 
within a block, whereas every new block introduced new choice cues, located 
in different positions on the screen. The two choice cues were always separated 
by 180 degrees on an imaginary circle (radius ≈ 11.5 mm) around the center 
of the screen. The change in visual identity and location of choice cues aimed 
to prevent motor, location or aesthetic cue preferences confounding the effect 
of interest (Kool et al., 2010). We assessed participants’ awareness of the task 
switching manipulation using a debriefing questionnaire on the second testing 
day after task completion. Specifically, we evaluated participants to be aware of 
the manipulation when they responded positive to the question whether they felt 
that numbers below one of the two pictures had a tendency to switch between 
colors more often while the other picture tended to repeat the same color.
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FIGURE 3.1 | A Schematic representation of testing days. Medical screening took place 
on the first day, a working memory test (i.e. listening span) on the second day. The re-
maining of the testing days were identical for both days, with methylphenidate (MPH) 
administration on one day and placebo on the other. Drug administration was followed 
by a task battery. Between the testing days, participants completed a series of self-report 
questionnaires, including the BIS-11 impulsiveness inventory. B Example stimuli of the 
demand selection task are presented. Circular color patches are used as choice cues; the 
color of the digits indicates which task had to be executed (magnitude versus parity judg-
ment). C Example trial sequence of demand selection task. Participants were shown two 
color patches as choice cues. On every trial, participants chose between the two patches, 
by moving the mouse cursor towards one cue. A digit from 1 to 10 (but not 5) appeared 
at the target location (putative mouse path indicated here by dashed line). Depending on 
the color of the digit, participants either indicated whether the digit was odd or even (i.e. 
parity judgment for yellow digits), or whether the digit was smaller or larger than 5 (i.e. 
magnitude judgment for blue digits) by clicking the left or right mouse-button. Responses 
were self-paced.
Listening span task
The listening span task (Daneman and Carpenter, 1980; Salthouse and Babcock, 
1991) was administered at the beginning of the second test session to obtain an 
estimate of participants’ working memory capacity, as a putative proxy of baseline 
dopamine synthesis capacity. During this test, participants listened to pre-recorded 
sentences and were given two tasks: They answered simple written multiple-choice 
questions about the content while remembering the last word of each sentence for 
later recall. The number of sentences on each trial (i.e. the span) increased up to 
7 over the course of the task. Three series of the same span were conducted. The 
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trial was coded as successful if the answers to the multiple-choice questions were 
correct and if all last words were remembered and reported in the correct order. 
Based on participants’ performance a listening span was calculated ranging from 
0 to a maximum of 7. The highest level for which two out of the three series were 
correctly remembered comprised the basic span. Half a point was added if one 
serie of the following span was correctly completed, resulting in the measure of 
total span. For the listening span task, internal consistency has been shown to 
be adequate (0.70 - 0.90) based on coefficient alphas and split-half correlations 
(Conway et al., 2005; Salthouse and Babcock, 1991). Also test-retest correlations 
were high, approaching 0.70 - 0.80 across different studies varying in delay 
(Conway et al., 2005). Total span and total number of words recalled have both 
been shown to correlate positively with dopamine synthesis capacity (Cools et al., 
2008; Landau et al., 2009). Previous studies have reported a medium (Landau 
et al., 2009) to large (Cools et al., 2008) effect size for the correlation between 
listening span scores and dopamine synthesis capacity. In addition, listening 
span scores have been shown to predict dopaminergic drug effects (Cools and 
D’Esposito, 2011; Kimberg and D’Esposito, 2003; van der Schaaf et al., 2014).
Questionnaires
A series of questionnaires was completed by participants at home between the two 
test sessions. The trait impulsivity questionnaire was key to our research question 
and will be described in more detail below. The other questionnaire data were 
acquired for exploratory purposes, not pursued here, and are presented in Table 
3.1.
Trait impulsivity
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; (Patton et al., 1995) was administered 
to assess participants’ degree of trait impulsivity. The scale is a self-report 
questionnaire, consisting of 30 statements that participants rate on a 4-point 
Likert scale (“never” to “almost always”). Examples are “I buy things on impulse” 
or “I am future oriented”. Scores on this questionnaire can range from 30 to 
120. BIS-11 total scores have been shown in a large sample (N > 1000) to have 
good internal consistency following a Cohen’s alpha of 0.83 and strong test-
retest reliability at one month, evidenced by a correlation of 0.83 (Stanford et al., 
2009). Scores have been found to be associated with dopamine D2/D3 receptor 
availability in the midbrain, and enhanced dopamine release in the striatum 
(Buckholtz et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2009; Reeves et al., 2012) and 
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has been shown to predict effects of MPH on learning (Clatworthy et al., 2009). 
This measure serves as a second putative proxy of baseline dopamine function 
for predicting effects of MPH. The effect sizes for the correlations between Barratt 
total scores and D2/D3 receptor availability ranged from small (Lee et al., 2009) 
to large (Buckholtz et al., 2010).
TABLE 3.1 | Demographics and questionnaire data
Characteristic Measure Score
Demographics Age Years, mean [range] 21.5 [18-28]
Gender Men/women (number) 50/50
Experimental 
information
Order Placebo first / MPH 
first (number)
52/48
Average delay MPH 
to task
Minutes* 81.2 (3.6)
Neuropsychological 
assessment
Verbal intelligence NLV 93.6 (7.8)
Working memory 
capacity
Listening span: total 
span
4.8 (1.1)
Digit span**
Forward
Backward
8.3 (1.9)
7.2 (1.6)
Self-report
questionnaires
Impulsivity BIS-11: total score 61.8 (8.6)
Need for Cognition NCS 63.3 (10.5)
Depressive symptoms BDI 3.6 (3.8)
Behavioral activation BAS: total score 23.4 (4.0)
Behavioral inhibition BIS 16.3 (3.6)
Anxiety symptoms STAI 32.6 (6.9)
Social support MDSPSS: total score 5.9 (0.8)
Social status BSMSS: total score 47.8 (12.7)
Social dominance SADQ: social score 4.1 (0.8)
Aggressive 
dominance
SADQ: aggressive 
score
2.6 (0.6)
*2 missing values; ** scores represent an average across two testing days
Demographic and background characteristics of participants included in the analysis 
(n = 100). Questionnaires included the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS; Cacioppo and 
Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al., 1984), Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1996), 
Behavioral Inhibition Scale/Behavioral Activation Scale (BIS/BAS; Carver and White, 
1994), Spielberger Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983), Multidimensional 
Scale of Perceived Social Support (MDSPSS; Zimet et al., 1988), Social and Aggressive 
Dominance Questionnaire (SADQ; Kalma et al., 1993) and Barratt Simplified Measure 
of Social Status (BSMSS; Barratt, 2006). 
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If not indicated differently, scores represent group averages and the standard deviations 
between brackets. Reported scores are comparable with observations in healthy 
populations in earlier reports. Listening span, e.g. Salthouse and Babcock, 1991; Digit 
span, e.g. van der Schaaf et al., 2014: FW mean = 8.5; BW mean = 7.9; BIS-II, e.g. 
Buckholtz et al., 2010: mean = 59.5, NCS, e.g. Westbrook et al., 2013: mean = 64.5; 
BDI, e.g. Schulte-Van Maaren et al., 2013: mean = 3.7; BIS/BAS, e.g. Franken, Muris, 
& Rassin, 2005: mean BIS = 13.8, mean BAS = 24.5; STAI, e.g. De Weerd et al., 2001: 
mean ≈ 34; MDSPSS, e.g. Canty-Mitchell and Zimet, 2000: mean = 5.5; BSMSS, e.g. 
Cook et al., 2014: mean = 49.0, 42.6; SADQ, e.g. Cook et al., 2014: social mean = 4.0, 
3.9; aggressive mean = 2.9, 2.7. The verbal IQ estimate (NLV) seems low in this sample 
(relative to e.g. van der Schaaf et al., 2014: mean = 101). However, we tested a student 
population and we expect this value to be low due to the outdated character of the test 
(1991), not accomodating the changes in language use.
Statistical analyses
The experiment was set up to assess effects of MPH on, first, demand avoidance 
(cue choice) and, second, the execution of task switching (performance). We 
assessed demand avoidance by analyzing the proportion of participants’ choices 
of the low demand cue (requiring 10% task switching) versus high demand cue 
(requiring 90% task switching). Execution of task switching was assessed by 
analyzing demand costs, which were calculated by subtracting performance 
(accuracy and (log-transformed) response times (RTs)) on trials on which 
participants chose the low- versus high-demand option. Following our primary 
questions, we assessed the effects of MPH on these measures as a function of 
two putative proxy measures of baseline dopamine function: trait impulsivity, 
measured with the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, and working memory capacity, 
measured with the listening span test.
The data were analyzed with mixed-level models using the lme4 package in 
R (Bates et al., 2015). This allowed us to account for within-subject variability 
in addition to between-subject variability. Factors drug [MPH vs. placebo] and 
demand [low vs. high] (for performance only) were within-subject factors, and 
impulsivity and listening span scores were between-subject factors. Models 
included all main effects and interactions, except for the interaction between 
impulsivity and listening span, as our question did not concern this interaction. All 
models contained a full random effects structure (Barr, 2013; Barr et al., 2013). 
P-values reported in the manuscript that pertain to the regressions were estimated 
using the “esticon” procedure in the “doBy” package which relies on the chi-
square distribution (Hojsgaard, 2006). Note that the degree of freedom is always 
1 for this statistical test, as we compute significance for a specific regression 
coefficient at a time (H0: Λβ = β0 where Λ is a (contrast) matrix probing a 
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specific coefficient). Effects were considered statistically significant if the p-value 
was smaller than 0.05. We report R2 for all models using the “r.squaredGLMM” 
procedure in the “MuMIn” package to provide a more intuitive estimate. However, 
note that there is no broad agreement yet about the most appropriate way of R2 
estimation for mixed-effects models. An overview of the basic models (cue choice, 
accuracy, RTs) is presented in Supplemental Table 3.1.
Response stickiness
Surprisingly, participants displayed extremely high rates of response stickiness, 
as indexed by low proportions of switching between the cues (note that within 
blocks all cues had fixed locations). To assess whether the observed choice effects 
were explained or masked by modulation of response stickiness, we constructed 
a second and third choice model, which extended the basic model with a stay-
regressor and then adding its interaction with MPH. The stay-regressor quantified 
the degree to which participants’ choices were the same as their choice on the 
previous trial and allowed us to investigate whether reported drug effects of 
interest are significant when accounting for (drug effects on) response stickiness. 
More specifically, the stay regressor quantified, on a trial-by-trial basis, which 
choice (low demand, coded as 1, versus high demand, coded as -1) participants 
would make on the current trial if they repeat the same choice as one trial before. 
We conducted model comparisons to assess whether the models including 
response stickiness effects improved our explanation of the data relative to the 
basic choice model. Model comparison was conducted using the anova function 
in R, which assesses whether the reduction in the residual sum of squares is 
statistically significant compared with the simpler model. Results of the winning 
model will be presented.
To confirm that the MPH-effects on demand avoidance, i.e. our primary choice 
effect of interest, did not reflect MPH-effects on response stickiness, we also 
checked whether MPH-effects on response stickiness correlated with MPH-effects 
on demand avoidance using Spearman correlations (given that the proportion 
of staying with the same cue violated assumptions of normality and contained 
outliers) in SPSS 21 (IBM Corp., Armonk, N.Y., USA).
Relationship between demand avoidance and task performance
To assess whether MPH-effects on demand avoidance relate to MPH-effects on 
task performance (accuracy or RTs), we calculated Spearman correlations between 
the proportion of low demand choices and demand costs (for RT and accuracy) 
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and the MPH-effect on these measures using SPSS 21 (IBM Corp.). To quantify 
evidence for an absence of effects, we also calculated Bayesian correlations 
between MPH-effects on these various variables using JASP software (Version 
0.7.5; JASP Team, 2016) with default priors, which reflect that each value for the 
correlation coefficient was equally liekely to be obtained (Wagenmakers et al., 
2016c).
RESULTS
Methylphenidate alters the avoidance of task switching
Cognitive demand was operationalized by two choice options with opposing 
task switching probabilities (10% vs. 90%). As expected, participants were overall 
demand avoidant; participants chose the cue with low task switching probability 
more often than the cue with the high probability (M = 0.56, SD = 0.13) (Intercept: 
X2(1) = 20.70, p < 0.001). Demand avoidance was evident both during the 
placebo and MPH session (Figure 3.2). A minority of participants (26%) reported 
during debriefing that they were aware of the fact that one choice cue resulted in 
more task switches than the other cue.
Surprisingly, participants exhibited extremely high rates of response stickiness, as 
indexed by the low number of trials on which participants switched between cues 
(across participants and sessions: M = 5.9%, SD = 17.5%) (Supplemental Figure 
3.1). Five participants never switched cues in both test sessions. An additional 
17 participants never switched cues on one testing day (a further 2 participants 
switched on every trial). It is unclear how this rate of response stickiness compares 
numerically to the rates in previous studies, as this measure was not reported. 
However, the unexpected high rate of response stickiness, in combination with 
earlier reports of dopaminergic medication effects on response stickiness (Rutledge 
et al., 2009) led us to ask whether our primary effect of interest on demand 
avoidance might reflect or be masked by effects on response stickiness. To 
assess this, we included a stay regressor in the basic choice model (Supplemental 
Table 3.1). Model comparison with the original basic model lacking the stay 
regressor showed that a model including a stay regressor (BIC = 54711, marginal 
R2GLMM = 0.122) explained significantly more variance in choice behaviour than 
did the basic model (BIC = 150826, marginal R2GLMM = 0.004; X
2(1) = 96127, p 
< 0.001). However, the model including both, a stay regressor and a regressor 
for MPH-effect on staying (BIC = 26607, marginal R2GLMM = 0.639) explained 
even more variance than the model without the interaction term (X 2(8) = 28198, 
p < 0.001). Therefore, we report the results of this extended model below.
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Results of this winning model reveal that overall, demand avoidance did not differ 
between drug sessions (Drug: X2(1) < 0.01, p = 0.964). However, we hypothesized 
that effects of MPH on demand avoidance would crucially depend on putative 
proxies of dopamine transmission, namely trait impulsivity (indexed by total Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale score), and/or working memory capacity (indexed by total 
listening span). As predicted, MPH-effects on demand avoidance varied
FIGURE 3.2 | A Average proportion of low demand choices as a function of trial, aver-
aged per participant over 8 blocks, for placebo (grey) and methylphenidate (MPH; red) 
sessions. Data lines represent the group average and shaded area represents standard 
error of the mean. B Histograms of low demand choices in the placebo (top) and MPH 
(bottom) sessions reveal large individual variability in terms of demand avoidance. Fre-
quency represents number of participants. The data follows a bell-shaped distribution 
and tests of deviation from normality (Shapiro-Wilk) confirmed that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the data came from a normally distributed population (proportion low 
demand choices placebo: p = 0.718, proportion low demand choices MPH: p = 0.324).
significantly as a function of trait impulsivity (Drug x Impulsivity: X2(1) = 5.33, 
p = 0.021). The direction of this effect was positive with greater MPH-induced 
increases in demand avoidance in more impulsive participants (Figure 3.3). 
The interaction between working memory capacity and the effect of MPH on 
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demand avoidance was only trending towards significance (Drug x Listening span: 
X2(1) = 2.91, p = 0.088). We therefore focus further analyses on trait impulsivity, 
while reporting further analyses as a function of working memory capacity in the 
Supplemental Results 3.1.
In addition, results of the winning model reveal, apart from a main effect of 
staying with the previously chosen option (Stay: X2(1) = 291.16, p < 0.001), that 
MPH also affected staying (Drug x Stay: X2(1) = 7.65, p = 0.006). MPH increased 
response stickiness relative to placebo. Complete statistics of this choice model 
are presented in Supplemental Table 3.2.
To confirm that these effects of MPH on response stickiness could not explain the 
impulsivity-dependent demand avoidance effects, we also investigated whether 
there was any correlation between MPH-effects on the proportion of staying with 
the same choice cue and MPH-effects on demand avoidance. There was no such 
correlation (low demand choices MPH – PLA & proportion staying MPH – PLA: rs = 0.12, 
p = 0.240), with Bayesian correlation analysis showing substantial evidence for 
the null effect (BF10= 5.14).
Finally, the size of our sample allowed us to assess whether the impulsivity-
dependent effects remained present when excluding participants who appeared 
to use explicit choice strategies, i.e. failed to explore the choice options at all, 
either in one (n = 17) or both sessions (n = 5), and those who switched between 
choice cues on every trial, either in one (n = 1) or both sessions (n = 1). We also 
excluded those participants for whom the capsule dissolved (orally or in water) 
before swallowing (n = 2, one of those was also a sticky participant) as well as one 
participant whose score on the BIS-11 deviated more than 3 standard deviations 
from the mean. Analysis of this smaller dataset (n = 74) confirmed the effects 
obtained from the analysis of the larger sample: MPH altered demand avoidance 
significantly as a function of trait impulsivity (Drug x Impulsivity: X2(1) = 5.80, 
p = 0.016; Supplemental Figure 3.2; Supplemental Table 3.3). In this cleaner 
sample of participants who explored both choice options on both testing days, 
we confirmed that these effects were present also when running a model without 
taking into account response stickiness: MPH altered demand significantly as a 
function of trait impulsivity (Drug x Impulsivity: X2(1) = 5.60, p = 0.018).
In sum, above control analyses show that observed MPH-effects on demand 
avoidance are robust, also when taking into account MPH-effects on response 
stickiness or excluding problematic participants. Furthermore, a correlation 
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analysis suggests that MPH-effects on response stickiness and demand avoidance 
are independent.
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FIGURE 3.3 | Methylphenidate (MPH)-effect on demand avoidance as a function of 
participants’ trait impulsivity (BIS-11) scores. A Line represents model-based estimated 
coefficients of MPH-effect on demand avoidance as a function of (z-scored) trait impulsivity 
scores. Shaded area represents simulated 95% confidential intervals of the coefficients. 
The inset shows the raw data: drug effect for every participant (n = 100) across trials as 
the difference in the proportion of low demand choices (MPH - placebo) as a function of 
trait impulsivity. B Trial-by-trial drug effect averaged across 8 blocks, and across partici-
pants (n = 100) of low (n = 49) versus high (n = 48) trait impulsivity groups as a function 
of trial. 3 participants with scores equal to the median are not included. Shaded areas 
represent standard error of the difference. See Supplemental Figure 3.3 for the impulsivi-
ty-dependent effect of MPH as a function of trial number for placebo and MPH separately.
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Avoidance of task switching does not reflect poor perfor-
mance
Following every cue choice (10% vs. 90% task switching probability), participants 
were presented with a parity/magnitude judgment task. Overall accuracy was high 
in this number judgment task (M = 0.97, SD = 0.04) and, as expected, participants 
were sensitive to the task switching manipulation. They performed better when the 
task repeated with respect to the previous trial than when they were presented with 
a task switch, evidenced by higher accuracy (M = 0.01, SD = 0.02) (X2(1) = 20.43, 
p < 0.001) and faster RTs (M = 0.36, SD = 0.29) (X2(1) = 119.70, p < 0.001) 
(Table 3.2). The improved performance for task repetitions consequently affected 
performance for the two cue options: Participants performed better on trials on 
which they chose the low demand (10% task switching) relative to high demand 
(90% task switching) cue (accuracy demand cost: X2(1) = 20.93, p < 0.001; RT 
demand cost: X2(1) = 535.73, p < 0.001). We note that participants’ choice 
of the low versus high demanding option determines the degree of exposure 
to task-switching, so that these measures are not independent. Supplementary 
analyses confirm that RT switch costs are larger for low-demand choices, where 
task-switching occurs less frequently (task-switching x demand interaction: 
X2(1) = 371.8, p < 0.001, Supplemental Results 3.3).
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TABLE 3.2 | Task performance
Task component Variable Placebo MPH
Demand avoidance
(i.e. choices)
Low Demand choice
(proportion)
0.56 (0.17) 0.55 (0.18)
High Demand choice
(proportion)
0.44 (0.17) 0.45 (0.18)
Performance
Accuracy
(in proportion correct)
Task repeat
Task switch
Switch cost
Low demand
High demand
Demand cost
0.97 (0.03)
0.97 (0.03)
0.96 (0.04)
0.01 (0.02)
0.97 (0.03)
0.96 (0.04)
0.01 (0.02)
0.97 (0.07)
0.97 (0.06)
0.96 (0.07)
0.01 (0.02)
0.97 (0.06)
0.96 (0.07)
0.01 (0.02)
Response times
(in s)
Task repeat
Task switch
Switch cost
Low demand
High demand
Demand cost
1.06 (0.33)
0.89 (0.24)
1.25 (0.44)
0.36 (0.29)
0.90 (0.24)
1.25 (0.44)
0.35 (0.28)
0.99 (0.26)
0.84 (0.21)
1.16 (0.33)
0.32 (0.19)
0.86 (0.21)
1.16 (0.33)
0.30 (0.20)
Mean values (and standard deviations) of choice proportions and performance on the 
magnitude/parity judgment task (i.e. accuracy, response times, switch and demand costs) 
for placebo and methylphenidate sessions. Note that these performance scores represent 
averages, across trials and across participants. Given the multivariate structure of our 
analyses, which quantify within as well as between subject effects, the statistical analyses 
are sensitive to capture small but consistent effects.
There were no effects of MPH, relative to placebo, on the size of the switch or 
demand costs, when assessed across the group as a whole (Drug x Demand 
for RTs: X2(1) = 0.75, p = 0.387, for accuracy: X2(1) = 1.20, p = 0.274; Drug x 
Switch for RTs: X2(1) = 0.61, p = 0.434, for accuracy: X2(1) = 1.91, p = 0.167). 
In contrast to the altered demand avoidance, the effect of MPH on the demand 
cost did not vary as a function of trait impulsivity (for RTs: Drug x Impulsivity x 
Demand: X2(1) = 0.29, p = 0.590, Figure 3.4A; for accuracy: Drug x Impulsivity 
x Demand: X2(1) = 0.001, p = 0.968, Figure 3.4B).
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Independent of demand and baseline-measures, MPH increased overall accuracy 
(Drug: X2(1) = 8.97, p = 0.003), and trended towards speeding up responses 
(Drug: X2(1) = 2.98, p = 0.084). Interestingly, these MPH-induced response time 
(but not accuracy) changes did depend on trait impulsivity (Drug x Impulsivity: 
X2(1) = 7.28, p = 0.007), with greater MPH-induced decreases in response times 
in more impulsive participants. Complete statistics of the basic performance 
models are presented in Supplemental Table 3.4. For the purpose of consistency 
with our approach for the choice analyses, we also conducted model comparisons 
for the performance models when including a stickiness regressor. Results of the 
model comparisons are presented in Supplemental Results 3.2.
This pattern of findings suggests that MPH-induced demand avoidance cannot be 
explained by reduced performance under MPH (i.e. avoidance of failure). MPH 
increased demand avoidance in more impulsive participants despite MPH-induced 
speeding of responding and unaffected accuracy (Drug x Impulsivity: X2(1) < 0.01, 
p = 0.747), also not as a function of demand (Figure 3.4B).
Although the reported findings above suggest that performance cannot explain the 
MPH-induced demand avoidance, we further assessed the potential association 
with a direct correlation. In other words, we tested whether participants who 
avoided demand more, did so because the task had become more difficult 
for them. More specifically, we computed correlations between demand costs 
(accuracy and RT) and demand avoidance. In line with our reasoning above, the 
MPH-effect on demand costs (demand cost MPH - PLA) did not correlate with the drug 
effect on demand avoidance (low demand MPH - PLA) and even provided evidence, 
though weak, for the absence of the correlation (accuracy: rs = 0.14, p = 0.167, 
BF01 = 4.80; RT: rs = -0.10, p = 0.330, BF01 = 2.60).
In sum, analyses of performance data and correlations between performance 
and demand avoidance provide evidence that observed MPH-effects on demand 
avoidance are unlikely to be explained by performance changes. This suggests 
that while the actual performance of the task did not change, this demand 
was evaluated differently (indexed by degree of demand avoidance). Bayesian 
analyses provided evidence for independence of the MPH-effects on demand 
avoidance and performance.
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FIGURE 3.4 | Drug effects on performance costs between high and low demand choices. 
Data points represent methylphenidate (MPH) effects on average demand cost (MPH - 
placebo) for each participant (n = 100) for A response times (in seconds) as a function 
of trait impulsivity (BIS-11) and B accuracy (in proportion correct) as a function of trait 
impulsivity (BIS-11). Shaded areas represent standard errors of the mean. Both effects 
are not statistically significant.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we investigated whether prolonging catecholamine transmission 
alters choices about whether or not to recruit cognitive control (i.e. demand 
avoidance). Specifically, we hypothesized that challenging the catecholamine 
system would alter the avoidance of cognitive demand. We tested this hypothesis 
by assessing the effects of acute administration of oral MPH (20mg), a potent 
blocker of catecholamine transporters, on task switching avoidance using a 
demand selection task (Kool et al., 2010). A large sample of young healthy 
participants (n = 100) was tested to expose individual differences in the response 
to such catecholaminergic drugs (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). Given the well-
established observation that drug effects vary across individuals as a function 
of baseline levels of dopamine, we obtained indices of trait impulsivity and 
working memory capacity, both previously associated with dopamine transmission 
(Buckholtz et al., 2010; Cools et al., 2008; Dalley et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2013; 
Landau et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2009; Reeves et al., 2012). As predicted, MPH 
altered the avoidance of task switching, without changing the execution of task 
switching itself. Notably, this effect was isolated when taking into account trait 
impulsivity.
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General demand avoidance effects
On average and across sessions, participants chose the low demand option 
more often than the high demand option, which indicates that our paradigm was 
sensitive to our construct of interest, i.e. demand avoidance, consistent with prior 
studies using this or very similar paradigms (Kool et al., 2010, 2013; McGuire and 
Botvinick, 2010). Moreover, as previous, demand avoidance was observed despite 
most participants reporting not to be aware of the demand manipulation. Thus 
we replicate previous observations that anticipated cognitive demand contributes 
to decision-making, so that decisions are made, partly, in order to minimize 
demands for exertion or work, a principle sometimes referred to as the law 
of less work (see also Botvinick, 2007; Westbrook et al., 2013). However, the 
average proportion of low demand choices was somewhat lower in our study 
compared with previous work (e.g. Kool et al 2010; see results section; but Gold 
et al., 2015). It is possible that this reflects the fact that our participants exhibited 
very high rates of response stickiness (see Response Stickiness), perhaps due to 
a relatively reduced engagement with or enhanced avoidance of performing the 
choice task itself.
Methylphenidate alters demand avoidance in a baseline-de-
pendent manner
Our key finding was that MPH affects demand avoidance, but that these effects 
varied as a function of trait impulsivity, with greater MPH-induced increases 
in demand avoidance in more, relative to less, impulsive participants. Much 
progress has been made recently in our understanding of the (psychological, 
neurochemical, and neural) mechanisms of our motivation to avoid cognitive 
demand (Chong et al., 2017; Cools, 2016; Shenhav et al., 2017; Westbrook and 
Braver, 2016). Here, we focus on the psychological and chemical neuromodulatory 
mechanisms of demand avoidance.
Most generally, the motivational control of goal-directed behaviour is well 
established to depend on the learning of the value and cost of our actions 
(Dickinson and Balleine, 1994). Factors that have been suggested to contribute 
to the motivational control of specifically our cognitive actions include the learning 
of time (opportunity) costs (Boureau et al., 2015; Kurzban et al., 2013; Otto and 
Daw, 2019), of intrinsic effort costs related to conflict (Cavanagh et al., 2014; 
Kool et al., 2013), of error likelihood or performance failure (Dunn et al., 2019) 
and/or a combination of these factors (Dunn et al., 2016; Shenhav et al., 2017).
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We began to address the psychological mechanism underlying our effect on 
demand avoidance by asking whether it can be attributed to indirect effects 
on performance costs (error or RT). This is unlikely in the current dataset, for 
the following reasons. First, there was evidence for an absence of correlations 
between MPH-induced demand avoidance and MPH-induced performance 
effects (i.e. demand costs in error rates and RTs) across participants. Second, 
demand costs were not modulated by MPH. Finally, in more- relative to less-
impulsive participants, MPH increased demand avoidance, but actually improved 
task performance in terms of response speed. Thus, the MPH-induced changes 
in demand avoidance are unlikely to reflect indirect effects of modulation of 
(perceived) performance failure.
Instead, we hypothesize that MPH might alter demand avoidance via modulating 
an intrinsic, or opportunity cost of effort. This hypothesis concurs generally 
with recent work showing that the effect of demand, manipulated by response 
conflict, on reward versus punishment learning varies with pharmacological 
dopamine receptor stimulation as well as individual genetic variation in dopamine 
transmission (Cavanagh et al., 2014). It might be noted that the present study 
was not set up (and, given high response stickiness rates, did not allow us) to 
disentangle the degree to which the MPH-effect on demand avoidance reflects 
learning (or choice) based on reward (effort relief) or punishment (effort cost).
In the case of learning about simple states and/or actions, it has previously 
been shown that increases in dopamine potentiate the impact of benefits 
(reward) on learning and choice, while undermining the impact of punishment 
(and other costs) on learning and choice (Collins and Frank, 2014; Cools et 
al., 2009). Critically, as is the case in the present study, evidence indicates that 
there is large individual variability in the direction and extent of the effects of 
dopaminergic drugs on the learning and choice. Here, MPH indeed reduces 
demand avoidance in less, relative to more impulsive participants, perhaps by 
increasing the value and/or reducing the cost of the high demanding option. 
With regard to the finding that MPH enhanced demand avoidance in the high 
impulsive participants, we put forward two possible neurochemical accounts. 
One possibility is that in these high-impulsive participants, MPH potentiated the 
demand cost by eliciting supraoptimal levels of dopamine. Trait impulsivity has 
been shown to be accompanied by enhanced baseline levels of striatal dopamine 
release and low (but perhaps more sensitive) presynaptic dopamine D2 receptor 
availability in the midbrain (Buckholtz et al., 2010). Indeed, MPH has previously 
been argued to act presynaptically by triggering a self-regulatory mechanism, 
thus leading to a net reduction in dopamine release in high-dopamine subjects 
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(Grace, 2001; Seeman and Madras, 2002). Based on further empirical evidence 
for an ‘inverted U’-shaped relationship between dopamine and reward- versus 
punishment-based learning (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011; Cools et al., 2009), 
we therefore hypothesize that MPH might have increased demand avoidance in 
the high-impulsive subjects by detrimentally overdosing striatal dopamine levels 
that were already high in these subjects (Buckholtz et al., 2010; Clatworthy et al., 
2009), thereby paradoxically reducing the (subjective) value of mental effort. This 
hypothesis is currently under study in an ongoing project where effects of MPH 
are assessed in cognitive effort discounting.
An alternative possibility is that a greater MPH effect on demand avoidance in 
the high-impulsive subjects represent greater MPH-induced increases in striatal 
dopamine, thereby potentiating the impact of mental effort relief (i.e. reward) 
on learning and choice. This concurs with the prior finding that MPH potentiated 
reward versus punishment learning to a greater degree in subjects with higher 
working memory capacity, putatively corresponding with higher baseline levels 
of dopamine (van der Schaaf et al., 2013; Swart et al., 2017). This open question 
is currently under study.
Critically, there are different reasons for caution when speculating about the 
mechanism by which MPH potentiates demand avoidance in high impulsive 
individuals. First, there is discrepancy with regard to the direction of the association 
between trait impulsivity and dopamine function (Buckholtz et al., 2010; Dalley 
et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2009; Reeves et al., 2012). Second, 
the direction of the link between dopamine and cognitive demand avoidance 
is unclear. Extrapolation of the physical demand avoidance literature and of 
neurocomputational models of dopamine in the basal ganglia, such as the OPAL 
model (Collins and Frank, 2014), suggests a positive link, such that prolonging 
(striatal) dopamine would enhance the benefit and reduce the cost of control. 
However, there are also indications for a negative link between dopamine and 
cognitive motivation, with patients with Parkinson’s disease (OFF medication) 
exhibiting enhanced rather than reduced cognitive motivation (Aarts et al., 2012).
Modulation of demand avoidance by dopamine versus nor-
adrenaline
MPH prolongs catecholamine transmission in a nonspecific manner by targeting 
both dopamine and noradrenaline transporters (Kuczenski and Segal, 2001; 
Scheel-Krüger, 1971). Therefore, a key remaining open question is whether the 
effects of MPH, reported here, reflect modulation of dopamine or noradrenaline. 
3
CHAPTER 3DEMAND AVOIDANCE
70
We hypothesize, in part based on the work by Cavanagh et al. (2014), reviewed 
above, that our effect of MPH on demand avoidance reflects modulation of striatal 
dopamine. This concurs with a recent study reporting striatal dopamine increases 
after administration of a low-dose of MPH (Kodama et al., 2017) and also with 
our previous finding that the effects of MPH on reward- versus punishment-
learning resembled that of the selective dopamine receptor agent sulpiride, 
which has selective affinity for D2 receptors that are particularly abundant in 
the striatum (Janssen et al., 2015; van der Schaaf et al., 2014). Moreover, it 
is generally consistent with prior work, demonstrating a key role for (striatal) 
dopamine in physical effort-based choice (Buckholtz et al., 2010; Hosking et 
al., 2015; Salamone et al., 2016; Wardle et al., 2011), although a recent study 
failed to observe modulation by the selective dopamine antagonists eticlopride 
and SCH23390 of the willingness to exert cognitive effort (Hosking et al., 2015). 
Finally, the dopamine hypothesis coincides with our finding that the effect of MPH 
depended on trait impulsivity, which implicates drug-induced dopamine release 
(Buckholtz et al., 2010) and changes in D2/D3 receptor availability (Buckholtz 
et al., 2010; Dalley et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2009; but Kim et al., 2013; Reeves et 
al., 2012).
Future studies are needed to test the hypothesis that MPH alters demand 
avoidance via affecting dopamine rather than noradrenaline transmission, for 
example using a MPH administration design in which participants are pretreated 
with a selective dopamine receptor antagonist prior to receiving MPH or in 
which effects of MPH are compared with those of atomoxetine, which leaves 
unaltered striatal dopamine transmission. This is especially pertinent because 
of the well-established link between the locus coeruleus–norepinephrine system 
and mental fatigue (Berridge and Waterhouse, 2003) and the implication of this 
system in task-related decision processes and optimization of task performance 
(Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). According to the classic adaptive gain theory of 
locus coeruleus function, task engagement is modulated by activity of the locus 
coeruleus, which favors either exploitation (task engagement) or exploration (task 
disengagement) depending on a tonic or phasic mode of action (Aston-Jones 
and Cohen, 2005). In line with this, pupil diameter, a measure that has been 
associated with locus coeruleus activity (Varazzani et al., 2015), correlated with 
lapses of attention in a sustained attention task (Van den Brink et al., 2016), with 
participant’s tendency to explore in a gambling task (Jepma and Nieuwenhuis, 
2011), with decisions to disengage from a (discrimination) task (Gilzenrat et al., 
2010) and with mental fatigue (Hopstaken et al., 2015). One way in which the 
locus coeruleus-noradrenaline system might alter task engagement is by encoding 
surprise due to outcome uncertainty (Preuschoff et al., 2011), or by modulating 
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participants’ confidence in their own performance. Recent empirical evidence 
indeed indicates that blocking noradrenaline selectively, by propranolol, increases 
participants’ confidence in good performance on a dot-motion task relative to 
placebo (Hauser et al., 2017). In addition, the injection of clonidine, a selective 
noradrenergic agonist which reduces central noradrenaline levels, has been sown 
to reduce choice volatility in a cost/benefit decision task in monkeys (Jahn et 
al., 2017). Monkeys were inclined to make the same decision when faced with 
the same type of choice. In our data, we observe the same pattern evidenced 
by enhanced response stickiness, however after prolonging catecholamine 
transmission. Future studies should assess a putative contribution of noradrenaline 
in the estimation of confidence in performance and choice volatility and thereby 
the role of noradrenaline in the avoidance of effortful cognitive control.
Methylphenidate does not alter the execution of task switch-
ing
Unlike MPH-effects on demand avoidance, there were no effects of MPH on the 
actual performance of the task, as indexed by performance costs in accuracy 
or response times. Taking into account trait impulsivity did not reveal such an 
effect of MPH on demand (or switch) costs either. This contrasts with previous 
work, which showed an amphetamine-induced improvement of task switching 
(Samanez-Larkin and Buckholtz, 2013). This discrepancy might reflect the fact that 
the current paradigm was not optimized for measuring (rapid) task switching. In 
our paradigm, the number judgement trials were separated by the choice events, 
thus likely reducing sequential effects like task switching, as subjects needed to 
switch already between the number judgment task and choices. In addition, 
the frequency of task-switches varied between participants and sessions, as this 
depended on their previous choices of the low or high demand option. As a result, 
the paradigm is likely less sensitive to subtle effects of chemical neuromodulatory 
effects than were the rapidly paced task switching paradigms used previously 
(Samanez-Larkin and Buckholtz, 2013).
Across high and low demand trials, MPH speeded responding in high- versus 
low-impulsive participants, consistent with dopamine’s well-established role in 
nonspecific behavioural activation and invigoration of responding (Niv et al., 
2007; Robbins and Everitt, 2007). Importantly, the overall speeding of responses 
was not accompanied by an impulsivity-dependent decrease in accuracy, speaking 
against a shift in the speed-accuracy tradeoff or more sloppy responding and 
putatively in favour of cognitive enhancement.
3
CHAPTER 3DEMAND AVOIDANCE
72
In line with various reports on MPH’s potential to enhance cognition after single, 
low-dose administration (Berridge and Arnsten, 2015; Linssen et al., 2014; 
Spencer et al., 2015), in this study MPH improved overall accuracy of responding 
on the task switching task, irrespective of demand or baseline measures.
Response stickiness
We were surprised about the high levels of response stickiness in the choice 
task. The high degree of response stickiness is unlikely to reflect a lack of task 
understanding, because we assured after practice blocks that instructions were 
clear by giving them the opportunity to ask questions and letting participants 
repeat the instructions. More critically, we observe significant demand avoidance 
across participants and extremely high accuracy scores on the task-switching task 
on both testing days. Nevertheless, regardless of its origin, we carefully scrutinized 
our data to assess the possibility that MPH-effects on stickiness reflect or mask 
our MPH-effect of interest on demand avoidance. For example, an increase in 
stickiness might have resulted in a failure to explore and to assign high or low 
effort costs to the two options. This is particularly pertinent, because we observed 
in the current data that MPH increased response stickiness across participants, 
and that a logistic regression model which included (MPH-effects on) response 
stickiness explained more variance than did a model without response stickiness. 
Moreover, consistent with our effect, prior work has shown that dopaminergic 
medication in Parkinson’s disease increased response stickiness during a 
reinforcement learning task (Rutledge et al., 2009). In fact, it is highly unlikely 
that the impulsivity-dependent effect of MPH on avoidance reflects modulation 
of response stickiness. First, the logistic regression model which controlled for 
response stickiness revealed significant effects of MPH on demand avoidance 
as a function of impulsivity, even when variability in stickiness was removed. 
Second, there was substantial evidence for an absence of a correlation between 
the effect of MPH on demand avoidance and that on response stickiness. Third, 
supplementary analyses revealed that the same effect remained significant after 
excluding participants who failed to explore the choice cues. Together, these 
supplementary control analyses strengthened our confidence in the dependence 
of the MPH-effect on trait impulsivity, generally consistent with previous results 
showing greater effects of MPH on learning in high versus low-impulsive 
participants (Clatworthy et al., 2009).
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Implications
The measure of trait impulsivity was primarily included in this study for its 
established relation with baseline dopamine transmission. However, impulsivity 
is also a clinically relevant dimensional trait implicated in multiple psychiatric 
disorders, such as (drug) addiction or ADHD. One direct implication of our 
findings is that while MPH may enhance (task-nonspecific) performance in 
high-impulsive participants (e.g. by altering response speed), consistent with its 
performance enhancing effect in ADHD, it may also reduce their motivation for 
(i.e. value-based learning about) cognitive control. This effect on the avoidance 
of control might seem paradoxical, given that MPH has been shown to i) remedy 
cognitive control problems in ADHD patients, who are characterized by high 
levels of impulsivity (Aron et al., 2003; Cepeda et al., 2000; Coghill et al., 2013; 
Faraone and Buitelaar, 2010; Leonard et al., 2004; Mehta et al., 2004), ii) to 
improve performance on attention tasks in high-impulsive rats (Puumala et al., 
1996; Robbins, 2002) and iii) to enhance task switching in healthy volunteers 
(Samanez-Larkin and Buckholtz, 2013). However, none of these studies examined 
the motivation or willingness to recruit or avoid cognitive control. The present 
results indicate that any cognition and performance enhancing effects of MPH 
might be accompanied by an (undermining) effect of MPH on the motivation to 
exert cognitive control.
A second implication of the present findings is that the cognitive control effects of 
disorders that implicate the catecholamine system, such as ADHD or Parkinson’s 
disease might (in part) be consequences of changes in the motivation to avoid 
cognitive control, rather than reflecting changes in the ability to execute control 
per se (Schneider, 2007). This generally concurs with a characterization of ADHD 
and Parkinson’s disorder as disorders of the will.
Finally, in line with recent work by Kool and colleagues (2017), our results raise 
the hypothesis that previously established effects of dopamine on the reliance on 
cognitively effortful (e.g. model-based versus model-free) behavioural control 
strategies (Deserno et al., 2015; Wunderlich et al., 2012) reflect partly modulation 
of cost-benefit decision-making rather than ability to execute such strategies.
CONCLUSION
We demonstrate that prolonging catecholamine transmission by MPH 
administration altered the avoidance of cognitive demand in healthy volunteers. 
These effects were isolated by taking into account individual differences in trait 
impulsivity. Control analyses support our conclusion that reported MPH-effects 
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on demand avoidance are likely results of a modulation of value-based decision-
making and not an indirect consequence of modulation of task performance.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS OF CHAPTER 3
SUPPLEMENTAL METHODS 3.1 | Need for Cognition Scale
The self-report Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et 
al., 1984) was administered to investigate participants’ tendency (trait) to engage 
in effortful tasks. The scale consists of 18 statements, which participants rate on a 
5-point Likert scale (“extremely uncharacteristic of me” to “extremely characteristic 
of me”). Example statements include “I prefer complex to simple problems” or “I 
only think as hard as I have to”. Scores range from 18 to 90. Results of the relation 
between participants’ need for cognition scores and their degree of demand 
avoidance are presented in the supplemental results (see Supplemental Results 
3.4). In this study, we did not have specific hypotheses for this scale, but aimed 
to relate to existing work by reporting whether demand avoidance as quantified 
with the demand selection task relates to this measure. Thus, we correlated the 
proportion of low-demand choices (i.e. demand avoidance) to participants’ scores 
on the Need for Cognition scale using IBM SPSS for Windows, version 21 (IBM 
Corp., Armonk, N.Y., USA).
SUPPLEMENTAL METHODS 3.2 | Statistical analyses – additional control analyses
We performed a number of control analyses using a model comparison approach, 
where we assessed whether the residual sum of squares was reduced when 
adding any of the following factors: order effects of drug and testing day, gender, 
and NLV scores (as a measure of verbal intelligence). Results of these control 
analyses are presented in Supplemental Results 3.5 and Supplemental Table 3.6.
To assess whether our key MPH effects of interest can be accounted for by 
nonspecific effects of MPH on mood and medical symptoms, we extracted 
subjective ratings of the PANAS scale (Watson et al., 1988), Bond and Lader 
Visual Analogue Scale (Bond and Lader, 1974) and the medical analogue scale 
(Supplemental Material 3.2) and performed a repeated measures MANOVA with 
the within-subject factors Time (3: start of testing day, before task battery, after 
task battery) and Drug (2: MPH, placebo) and the six measures as dependent 
variables (positive affect, negative affect, calmness, alertness, contentedness, 
medical symptoms) using IBM SPSS for Windows, version 21 (IBM Corp., Armonk, 
N.Y., USA). Significant effects were followed up with repeated measure ANOVA. 
Results are presented in Supplemental Results 3.5.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 3.1 | Overview of exclusion criteria
- (History of) psychiatric treatment
- (History of) neurological treatment
- (History of) endocrine treatment
- (History of) autonomic failure (e.g., vasovagal reflex syncope).
- (History of) clinically significant hepatic, cardiac, obstructive respiratory, renal, 
cerebrovascular, metabolic or pulmonary disease
- Family history of sudden death or ventricular arrhythmia
- (History of) epilepsy
- (History of) drug dependence (opiate, LSD, (meth)amphetamine, cocaine, 
solvents, or barbiturate) or alcohol dependence
- Suicidality
- Abnormal hearing or (uncorrected) vision.
- Use of MAO inhibitor, anaesthetic, anti-depressant or antipsychotic drugs 
within the week prior to the start of the study.
- Use of psychotropic medication, or of recreational drugs over a period of 24 
hours prior to each test session, and use of alcohol within the last 24 hours 
before each measurement.
- Regular use of corticosteroids.
- Uncontrolled hypertension, defined as diastolic blood pressure at rest > 95 
mmHg or systolic blood pressure at rest > 180 mmHg
- Hypotension, defined as diastolic blood pressure < 50 mm Hg or systolic < 
95 mm Hg or resting pulse rate < 45 beats/min
- Diabetes
- Family history of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder or major depressive disorder
- Irregular sleep/wake rhythm (e.g., regular nightshifts or cross timeline travel).
- Possible pregnancy or breastfeeding
- Lactose intolerance (placebo pill is a lactose product)
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 3.2 | Medical symptoms rating scale
1. No headache    Strong headache
2. No muscle pain    Strong muscle pain
3. No dry mouth    Very dry mouth
4. Not dizzy    Very dizzy
5. No abdominal pain   Strong abdominal pain
6. No joint pain    Strong joint pain
7. No trouble breathing   Trouble breathing
8. No throat pain    Strong throat pain
9. No chest pain    Strong chest pain
10. No eye problems   Strong eye problems
DEMAND AVOIDANCECHAPTER 3
77
SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS 3.1 | Effects of MPH as a function of working memory 
capacity
Listening span scores varied from 2.5 to 7 with a median of 4.5. This median 
and range is comparable with values observed in previous studies including 
young populations (Salthouse and Babcock, 1991). The listening span-dependent 
effects of MPH, described in the main text, are shown in Supplemental Figures 
3.4A and 3.4B.
Supplementary analysis after exclusion of participants who failed to explore at 
all, who switched cues on every trial, for whom the capsule dissolved early as 
well as an outlier on trait impulsivity scores also did not reveal any significant 
MPH-effects as a function of working-memory capacity (n = 74: Drug x Listening 
span: X2(1) = 0.68, p = 0.408).
MPH did alter the reaction time demand cost as a function of listening span (Drug 
x Listening span x Demand: X2(1) = 4.11, p = 0.043; Supplemental Figure 5A). 
High-span participants exhibited MPH-induced decreases in the RT demand cost, 
whereas low-span participants exhibited MPH-induced increases in the RT demand 
cost. However, note that in a model that takes into account response stickiness (see 
Supplemental Results 3.2 and Supplemental Table 3.5), this interaction did not 
reach significance (Drug x Listening span x Demand: X2(1) = 3.63, p = 0.057). 
There was no span-dependent effect on the error demand cost: Drug x Listening 
span x Demand: X2(1) = 0.20, p = 0.657, Supplemental Figure 3.5B).
In sum, relative to low working memory-span participants, high-span participants 
(tend to) exhibit MPH-induced improvement in task switching (in terms of RT 
demand costs), but MPH did not affect demand avoidance robustly as a function 
of working memory. We are puzzled by the lack of an effect of WM capacity, 
particularly given the effect of trait impulsivity, which has also been associated 
with dopamine transmission. We raise two alternative accounts of this pattern, 
although we also note that we do not provide evidence for a significantly greater 
impact of impulsivity than of WM capacity. First, trait impulsivity might be a more 
reliable proxy of baseline dopamine levels than WM capacity. We would argue 
this is unlikely, particularly given the subjective, self-report nature of the former 
and not the latter proxy variable. Second, trait impulsivity might index a distinct 
aspect of dopamine transmission (striatal dopamine release; (Buckholtz et al., 
2010; Dalley et al., 2007) that might be more determinant of the effect of MPH 
on demand avoidance than the dimension captured by WM capacity (striatal and 
probably prefrontal dopamine synthesis capacity).
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Our hypothesis regarding WM span was bi-directional. The finding of beneficial 
MPH-effects in high-span participants contrasts with prior evidence, showing 
greater potentiation by MPH of performance on working memory and sustained 
attention tasks in low- than high-span participants (Del Campo et al., 2013; Mehta 
et al., 2000). However, on hindsight, the positive correlation between WM span 
and MPH effects is not surprising, given that, as is the case for impulsivity (Buckholtz 
et al., 2010), WM span is also associated with higher striatal dopamine function. 
Moreover, our effect generally concurs with other evidence, indicating, conversely, 
greater potentiation by MPH of learning in high- than low-capacity subjects (van 
der Schaaf et al., 2013) as well as greater MPH-induced increases in dopamine 
release in higher-performing participants (Del Campo et al., 2013). Finally, it fits 
with the dopamine cell-activity hypothesis (Volkow et al., 2002b) suggesting that 
DAT blockade (with MPH) induces larger dopamine increases in subjects with 
high relative to low dopamine cell activity. We remain puzzled by these discrepant 
effects of working memory span across studies, but speculate that they reflect 
catecholaminergic modulation of different neural regions with distinct optimal 
levels of dopamine (e.g. Fallon and Cools, 2015). For example, the enhancing 
effects of MPH on learning and task switching might reflect catecholaminergic 
modulation of the striatum, whereas the impairing effects of MPH on working 
memory and sustained attention, reported previously, might reflect modulation 
of the prefrontal cortex, consistent with the disproportionate vulnerability of the 
prefrontal cortex to supra-optimal dopamine (D1) receptor stimulation (Berridge 
and Arnsten, 2015; Seamans and Yang, 2004; Vijayraghavan et al., 2007; 
Williams and Goldman-Rakic, 1995). Clearly this speculative hypothesis should 
be tested using pharmacological fMRI.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS 3.2 | Performance models including stay regressor
For the purpose of consistency with our approach for the choice analyses, we 
re-ran the performance models (accuracy and response times), when including the 
response stickiness regressor as main effect and interacting effect with MPH (and 
demand). We then did model comparisons using the anova function in R to assess 
whether the reduction in the residual sum of squares is statistically significant 
compared with the simpler models. For accuracy, a model without any stickiness 
regressor shows the smallest BIC (31220). Adding a stickiness regressor did not 
reduce residual sum of squares significantly (versus main effect of stickiness: 
X2 (6) = 3.6, p = 0.733; versus interactive effect of stickiness: X2 (30) = 21.5, 
p = 0.872). For response times, however, the model with the lowest BIC that shows 
a significant reduction of residual sum of squares compared with the other two 
models, is a model that includes stickiness as interactive term (BIC = 137710, 
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versus basic model: X2 (30) = 2575.3, p < 0.001); versus stickiness main effect: 
X2 (24) = 2113.5, p < 0.001). Results of this winning model are presented in 
Supplemental Table 3.5.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS 3.3 | Performance models including task-switching
Participants’ choices of low versus high demand options determine the degree 
of task-switching that they encounter and therefore also the ‘practice’ of one 
or the other trial type. To quantify this effect, we re-ran performance models 
(Supplemental Table 3.1, bottom), but now including the factor task-switching as 
predictor in addition to demand. The model confirms that switch-costs are larger 
on low demand trials relative to high demand trials. This only holds for response 
times (task-switch x demand interaction: X2(1) = 372.7, p < 0.001), and not for 
accuracy (task-switch x demand interaction: X2(1) = 0.4, p = 0.547. Critically, 
this interaction in response times was not modulated by MPH (Drug x task-switch 
x demand: X2(1) = 1.8, p = 0.179), also not as a function of impulsivity scores 
(Drug x task-switch x demand x Impulsivity: X2(1) = 1.2, p = 0.266).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS 3.4 | Need for Cognition Scale and demand avoidance
Participants’ average score on the Need for Cognition (NFC) scale was 63.3 
(SD = 10.5) ranging from 38 to 82. These values are comparable with those 
reported previously (e.g. Westbrook et al., 2013). The Need for Cognition score 
did not correlate with the degree of demand avoidance in the placebo (NFC & low 
demand choices: r = 0.13, p = 0.212), in the MPH session (NFC & low demand 
choices: r = -0.07, p = 0.498) or with the effect of MPH relative to placebo on 
demand avoidance (NFC & low demand choices MPH – PLA: r = -0.15, p = 0.133).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS 3.5 | Additional control analyses
We performed model comparisons with models including potentially confounding 
variables of no interest. We included the factors order of intervention, testing day, 
gender, and verbal intelligence (NLV) separately as fixed between-subject factors 
in the basic models, resulting in 12 comparisons presented in Supplemental Table 
3.6. Models including order, day, gender or NLV did not explain more variance 
than the basic models, except for adding the factor day to the response time 
model. Including day (BIC = 139860) explained significantly more variance than 
the basic model (BIC = 139935; X2(1) = 86.60, p < 0.001). However, significance 
and interpretation of reported effects were not altered in a model including day.
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The administration of MPH altered participants’ mood ratings (positive affect, 
negative affect, alertness, contentedness, calmness) and medical symptoms 
(Supplemental Material 3.2) significantly (MANOVA: Drug x Time [3]: V = 0.28, 
F(6,12) = 5.30, p < 0.001) in the absence of differences at time zero before drug 
administration (Drug: V = 0.06, F(6, 93) = 0.91, p = 0.492). MPH increased 
subjective report of positive affect (F(1,98) = 18.26, p < 0.001), alertness 
(F(1,98) = 16.88, p < 0.001), medical symptoms (F(1,98) = 9.60, p = 0.003) 
and decreased calmness (F(1,98) = 8.65, p = 0.004), all with respect to baseline 
(Drug x Time, measurement 1 versus later). To explore whether these mood and 
medical measures differed between dug sessions at the time point most proximal 
to the demand selection task, we conducted the same analysis again for the 
second time point and assessed whether this interacts with impulsivity scores. 
Results of this repeated measures MANOVA reveal no significant modulation 
across all measures in multivariate (Drug x Impulsivity: F(6,93) = 1.31, p = 0.260) 
nor for each measure in univariate tests. In addition, when correlating drug-
induced changes on all six mood and medical measures at this same time point 
with drug-induced changes in demand avoidance, none of these correlations 
reached significance (all p-values > 0.2). In sum, it is unlikely that MPH-induced 
mood or medical changes underlie our effect of interest: an impulsivity-dependent 
modulation of demand avoidance.
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SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE 3.1 | Response stickiness
Histogram of the proportion of participant’s response switches between the two 
choice options as a function of drug. A high frequency of participants showed 
low exploration of the two choice options. Choices of 3 participants deviated 
more than 3 standard deviations from the group’s mean regarding their extreme 
exploration behavior on placebo and methylphenidate sessions (proportion 
switching above 0.99).
Note that this low rate of exploration would have resulted in extremely skewed 
distribution of our dependent variable of interest, i.e. demand avoidance. 
However, by making use of 8 different task blocks where low and high demand 
options appear at different locations and have different visual identities, the key 
variable of demand avoidance is not significantly skewed. The distribution of the 
variable of interest, the proportion of low demand choices, is depicted in Figure 
3.2B.
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SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE 3.2 | Reduced sample
Methylphenidate-effect on demand avoidance as a function of participants’ 
trait impulsivity (BIS-11) scores for the reduced sample (n = 74). Line represents 
model-based estimated coefficients of MPH-effect on demand avoidance as a 
function of (z-scored) trait impulsivity scores. Shaded area represents simulated 
95% confidential intervals of the coefficients. The inset shows the raw data: drug 
effect for every participant (n = 74) across trials as the difference in the proportion 
of low demand choices (MPH - placebo) as a function of trait impulsivity.
DEMAND AVOIDANCECHAPTER 3
83
SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE 3.3 | Placebo and methylphenidate separately
Methylphenidate-effect on demand avoidance varied as a function of participants’ 
trait impulsivity. Data points represent proportion of low demand choices averaged 
across participants (n = 100) across 8 blocks for A low and B high impulsive 
participants as a function of trial. Three participants with median scores are not 
included in this plot.
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SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE 3.4 | Demand avoidance as a function of working memory 
capacity
Methylphenidate (MPH)-effect on demand avoidance as a function of participants’ 
working memory capacity does not reach statistical significance. Data points 
represent effects of MPH, relative to placebo, on the proportion of low demand 
choices (MPH minus placebo). A Line represents model-based estimated 
coefficients of MPH-effect on demand avoidance as a function of (z-scored) 
listening span total scores. Shaded area represents simulated 95% confidential 
intervals of the coefficients. The inset shows the raw data: drug effect for every 
participant (n = 100) across trials as the difference in the proportion of low 
demand choices (MPH - placebo) as a function of listening span scores. B Trial-
by-trial drug effect averaged across 8 blocks, and across participants (n = 100) 
of low (n = 23), medium (n = 31) and high (n = 46) listening span groups as a 
function of trial. Shaded areas represent standard error of the difference.
DEMAND AVOIDANCECHAPTER 3
85
SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE 3.5 | Performance as a function of working memory
Drug effects on demand cost in response times (RTs) and accuracy. Data points 
represent methylphenidate (MPH)-effects on average demand cost (MPH minus 
placebo) for each participant for A response times as a function of working 
memory capacity (listening span total, significant, p = 0.043) and B accuracy 
as a function of working memory capacity (listening span total, not significant, 
p = 0.657). Shaded areas represent standard errors of the difference.
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SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 3.1 | Overview of regression models
Dependent variable Regression models
Choice
category: binary
Choice ~
Drug x Impulsivity + Drug x Listening span
+ (1 + Drug | Participant)
Choice with
stay regressor
Choice ~
Drug x Impulsivity + Drug x Listening span + Stay
+ (1 + Drug + Stay | Participant)
Choice with
MPH-effect on
stay regressor
Choice ~
Drug x Impulsivity + Drug x Listening span + Drug x Stay 
+ (1 + Drug x Stay | Participant)
Accuracy
category: binary
Accuracy ~
Drug x Impulsivity x Demand + Drug x Listening span x 
Demand + (1 + Drug x Demand | Participant)
Response times
category: continuous
RT ~
Drug x Impulsivity x Demand + Drug x Listening span x 
Demand + (1 + Drug x Demand | Participant)
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 3.2 | Statistics of choice model
Coefficient Estimate (SE) X2(1) p
Intercept -0.184 (0.04) 20.70 < 0.001
Drug -0.001 (0.03) < 0.01 0.964
Drug x Impulsivity 0.009 (<0.01) 5.33 0.021
Drug x Listening span 0.052 (0.03) 2.91 0.088
Impulsivity -0.001 (0.01) 0.07 0.793
Listening span -0.029 (0.04) 0.57 0.451
Staying -4.239 (0.25) 291.16 < 0.001
Drug x Staying 0.238 (0.09) 7.65 0.006
Logistic regression coefficients indicating the influence of drug, impulsivity, listening span, 
choice on previous trial (staying) and their interactions with drug on participants’ choices 
(n = 100). Bold p-values denote significance. For this model, the marginal R2GLMM is 0.639.
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SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 3.3 | Statistics of reduced sample
Choice Accuracy Response times
Coefficient X2(1) p X2(1) p X2(1) p
Drug 0.03 0.867 5.91 0.015 1.85 0.173
Drug x Imp 5.80 0.016 0.02 0.876 8.87 0.003
Drug x LSpan 0.68 0.408 0.69 0.408 1.92 0.165
Drug x Demand N/A N/A 1.46 0.228 0.31 0.580
Drug x Imp x Demand N/A N/A 1.01 0.315 0.10 0.754
Drug x LSpan x Demand N/A N/A 0.17 0.679 0.64 0.425
Stay 465.64 < 0.001 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Drug x Stay 4.80 0.029 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Performance and choice statistics of effects of interest after the exclusion of participants 
who failed to explore the choice options at all, either in one (n = 17) or both session 
(n = 5), those who switched choice options on every cue in one (n =1) or both (n = 1) 
sessions , those for whom the capsule dissolved (orally or in water) before swallowing 
(n = 2, one of those was also a sticky participant) as well as one participant whose score 
on the BIS-11 impulsiveness questionnaire deviated more than 3 standard deviations from 
the mean. Analysis of this smaller dataset (n = 74) confirmed the effects obtained from 
the analysis of the larger sample. Marginal R2GLMM of the choice, accuracy and response 
times models are 0.698, 0.013 and 0.090, respectively.
3
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SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 3.4 | Statistics of performance model
Accuracy Response times
Coefficient Estimate (SE) X2(1) p Estimate (SE) X2(1) p
Intercept 3.868 (0.10) 1469.47 < 0.001 -0.123 (0.02) 45.22 < 0.001
Drug -0.112 (0.04) 7.29 0.007 0.016 (0.01) 2.98 0.084
Drug x Imp 0.001 (0.01) 0.10 0.747 0.003 (<0.01) 7.28 0.007
Drug x LSpan 0.012 (0.04) 0.10 0.748 0.012 (0.01) 1.92 0.166
Imp 0.015 (0.01) 1.57 0.211 0.002 (<0.01) 1.12 0.289
LSpan -0.045 (0.09) 0.23 0.635 -0.024 (0.02) 1.95 0.163
Demand 0.106 (0.03) 15.50 < 0.001 -0.139 (0.01) 535.73 < 0.001
Drug x 
Demand
-0.027 (0.02) 1.20 0.274 -0.003 (<0.01) 0.75 0.387
Drug x Imp x 
Demand
<0.001 
(<0.01)
<0.01 0.968 -0.000 (<0.01) 0.29 0.590
Drug x LSpan 
x Demand
-0.008 (0.02) 0.20 0.657 -0.007 (<0.01) 4.11 0.043
(Logistic) regression coefficients indicating the influence of drug, impulsivity (Imp), listening 
span (LSpan), task demand and their interactions on participants’ performance (n = 100). 
Bold p-values denote significance. Marginal R2GLMM of the accuracy and response times 
models are 0.011 and 0.086, respectively.
DEMAND AVOIDANCECHAPTER 3
89
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 3.5 | RT model including response stickiness
Response times
Coefficient Estimate (SE) X2(1) p
Intercept 0.08 (0.02) 10.60 <0.001
Drug 0.004 (0.01) 0.15 0.700
Drug x Imp 0.003 (<0.01) 7.96 0.005
Drug x LSpan 0.012 (0.01) 2.05 0.152
Imp 0.002 (<0.01) 1.16 0.281
LSpan -0.018 (0.02) 1.11 0.293
Demand -0.076 (<0.01) 152.39 < 0.001
Drug x Demand -0.002 (0.01) 0.17 0.681
Drug x Imp x Demand -0.000 (<0.01) 0.36 0.548
Drug x LSpan x Demand -0.006 (<0.01) 3.63 0.057
Stay -0.070 (0.01) 173.84 <0.001
Drug x Stay -0.002 (0.01) 0.16 0.687
Drug x Demand x Stay 0.011 (0.01) 2.38 0.123
Regression coefficients indicating the influence of drug, impulsivity (Imp), listening span 
(LSpan), task demand, choice on previous trial (Stay) and their interactions on participants’ 
response times (n = 100). Bold p-values denote deviations in significance relative to 
the basic RT model that did not account for response stickiness. Note that conclusions 
presented in the main text are unaltered.
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 3.6 | Control analyses
Basic + NLV + Day + Order + Gender
Choice BIC
sign.
150826 150838
p = 0.501
150835
p = 0.079
150837
p = 0.464
150835
p = 0.105
Accuracy BIC
sign.
31220 31232
p = 0.695
31231
p = 0.509
31232
p = 0.931
31232
p = 0.924
Response 
times
BIC
sign.
139935 139946
p < 0.364
139860
p < 0.001
139946
p = 0.436
139947
p = 0.806
Model comparison of basic models with control models. Bold p-values denote significance.
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CHAPTER 
Does tyrosine modulate the 
cost of cognitive control in 
healthy aging?
This chapter is under review for publication as:
M. I. Froböse, A. W. Westbrook, M. Bloemendaal, E. Aarts, R. 
Cools (under review). Catecholaminergic modulation of the cost 
of cognitive control in healthy older adults. Preprint available at: 
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/kypz3
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ABSTRACT
Catecholamines have long been associated with cognitive control and value-
based decision-making. More recently, we have shown that catecholamines 
also modulate value-based decision-making about whether or not to engage in 
cognitive control. Yet it is unclear whether catecholamines influence these decisions 
by altering the subjective value of control. Thus, we tested whether tyrosine, a 
catecholamine precursor altered the subjective value of performing a demanding 
working memory among healthy older adults (60-75 years). Contrary to our 
prediction, tyrosine administration did not significantly increase the subjective 
value of conducting an N-back task for reward, as a main effect. Instead, in 
line with our previous study, drug effects varied as a function of participants’ 
trait impulsivity scores. Specifically, tyrosine increased the subjective value of 
conducting an N-back task in low impulsive participants, while reducing its value 
in more impulsive participants. One implication of these findings is that the over-
the-counter tyrosine supplements may be accompanied by an undermining effect 
on the motivation to perform demanding cognitive tasks, at least in certain older 
adults. Taken together, these findings indicate that catecholamines alter cognitive 
control by modulating motivation (rather than just the ability) to exert cognitive 
control.
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INTRODUCTION
While catecholamines (dopamine and noradrenaline) have long been known to 
impact capacity for cognitive control, the catecholamines have been proposed to 
also mediate cost-benefit choices about whether or not to exert cognitive control 
(Cools, 2016; Westbrook and Braver, 2016). According to the expected value 
of control account, people recruit cognitive control in proportion to expected 
instrumental value (Shenhav et al., 2013), such that degree (and intensity) of 
engagement in an upcoming cognitive computation is based on a cost-benefit 
analysis. Recently, we demonstrated that acute administration of a single oral dose 
of the catecholamine transporter blocker methylphenidate indeed modulated the 
avoidance of, but not ability to perform cognitive control in young adults (Froböse 
et al., 2018; Chapter 3). The effect depended on trait impulsivity, with the most 
impulsive subjects exhibiting the greatest increases in control avoidance. Here, 
we extend this work by assessing the effects of a catecholamine precursor on the 
expected value of cognitive control, again as a function of trait impulsivity.
Catecholamines and (cognitive) effort
The role of catecholamines in decisions about effort expenditure have been the 
focus of studies for decades (Salamone et al., 2016). A well-replicated finding, 
in both human and non-human animals is that striatal dopamine blockade or 
dopamine lesions reliably shift preferences away from high effort/high reward 
options to low effort/low reward options (Bardgett et al., 2009; Salamone et al., 
2016), while increases in striatal dopamine shifts preferences towards high effort/
high reward options (Chong et al., 2015; Floresco et al., 2008a; Le Bouc et al., 
2016; Salamone et al., 2016). For example, patients with Parkinson’s disease, 
which is characterized by dopamine cell loss in the striatum, forego reward to 
avoid effort (handgrip squeezes) relative to healthy controls, when tested off 
their dopaminergic medication. Conversely, when tested on their medication, 
patients selected high-effort/high-reward options as much as controls, reflecting 
less physical effort avoidance (Chong et al., 2015). Thus, increases in dopamine 
transmission have been associated with increased motivation for physical effort.
As is the case for physical action, cognitive control is also effortful / costly such 
that people tend to avoid it (Botvinick and Braver, 2015; Kool et al., 2017; Shenhav 
et al., 2013; Westbrook and Braver, 2016). For example, they prefer to perform 
a task with less rather than more task-switching (Botvinick, 2007; Gold et al., 
2015; Kool et al., 2010; McGuire and Botvinick, 2010) and with lower rather 
than higher working memory load, even when incentives are larger for higher 
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loads (Westbrook et al., 2013). However, unlike for physical effort, the role of 
catecholamines is less clear for decision making about cognitive effort. One way 
in which dopamine might bias choices about cognitive tasks is by altering the 
(expected) value of cognitive control (i.e. the reward benefits minus the effort 
cost of control). This follows also from neurocomputational models of dopamine 
in the basal ganglia, such as the OpAL model, which suggest that increases in 
(striatal) dopamine tone, result in more emphasis on the benefit, and less on the 
cost of an action due to more direct pathway excitability, via D1 receptor binding, 
and less indirect pathway excitability, via D2 receptor binding (Collins and Frank, 
2014). Thus, taken together with the hypothesis that cognitive control follows from 
cost-benefit decision making, we expect that increases in catecholamine synthesis 
will emphasize the benefits versus the costs of control, thereby increasing the 
motivation for instrumental cognitive control (Westbrook and Braver, 2016).
There is some evidence that dopamine signaling can offset the costs of cognitive 
control. In one study, costs were offset by incentives, which are putatively signaled 
by dopamine release, thus leading to more cognitive and motor control in a 
visual saccade task (Manohar et al., 2015). Critically, this effect was diminished 
in patients with Parkinson’s disease, supporting a role for dopamine in mediating 
incentive effects on performance. Since performance could be altered via multiple 
catecholamine-dependent mechanisms, however, it remains critical to show that 
catecholaminergic drugs can alter cost-benefit decision-making itself. Direct tests 
of this prediction have yielded conflicting results. In one study, dopaminergic 
medication increased the selection of high-cognitive effort/high-benefit tasks in 
Parkinson’s disease (McGuigan et al., 2019). By contrast, a rodent study failed to 
observe changes in rats’ willingness to expend cognitive effort for reward after 
treatment with a dopamine antagonist (Hosking et al., 2015).
Conflicting results may stem from individual differences in baseline dopamine 
function and/or cognitive motivation. In one study, amphetamine motivated rodent 
‘slackers’ (but not ‘workers’) to choose a more perceptually-demanding option 
for a higher reward (Cocker et al., 2012). In parallel, our recent work with young 
healthy adults has shown that the administration of methylphenidate (20 mg, oral) 
altered the avoidance of higher task-switching demands, in a demand selection 
paradigm (Froböse et al., 2018). The effect of methylphenidate depended on 
participants’ trait impulsivity, a measure previously associated with drug-induced 
dopamine release and D2/D3 (auto-)receptor availability (Buckholtz et al., 2010). 
Relative to placebo, methylphenidate increased the avoidance of effortful task-
switching to a greater degree in more impulsive participants. These studies 
indicate that catecholamine interventions might have varying effect on motivated 
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cognition across different individuals, likely as a function of baseline levels of 
dopamine function (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011).
While prior work established a link between catecholamines and cognitive 
demand avoidance, it remains unclear whether catecholamine manipulation 
influences the value of cognitive control (Froböse et al., 2018). Here we employed 
a cognitive effort discounting task (COGED) that enabled us to explicitly quantify 
the value of cognitive control (Westbrook et al., 2013) and its modulation by 
a catecholamine challenge. The COGED paradigm consists of 2 phases: an 
effort execution phase, during which participants complete multiple levels of the 
demanding N-back task (levels 1-4 back) and an effort discounting task, during 
which participants choose between repeating a more demanding level for more 
money, or the 1-back for less money. Unlike the demand avoidance paradigm, 
choices are separated in time from performing the effortful task; as such, choices 
do not reflect learning of effort costs.
Tyrosine intervention in older adults
A second key way in which we go beyond prior studies is that we administer a 
catecholamine precursor (i.e. tyrosine) instead of a catecholamine transporter 
blocker (i.e. methylphenidate). Tyrosine is a precursor of dopamine and 
noradrenaline and the administration of tyrosine stimulates synthesis and 
release of catecholamines (Fernstrom, 1983; Glaeser et al., 1979; Growdon et 
al., 1982; Scally et al., 1977; Sved et al., 1979). The main source of tyrosine is 
protein-rich food, but tyrosine has also been administered selectively as an over-
the-counter food supplement for study purposes and has been shown to alter 
cognition (Jongkees et al., 2015). In young adults, tyrosine administration has 
been shown to improve cognitive control functions that are commonly associated 
with catecholamine transmission, such as working memory, response inhibition, 
and task switching (see Deijen, 2005; Jongkees et al., 2015 for reviews).
In the present study, we administered tyrosine to older adults, aged 60-75, for the 
following 2 reasons: 1) Healthy aging has been reported to be accompanied by 
a decline in dopamine transmission (Bäckman et al., 2006), making older adults 
perhaps more sensitive to tyrosine administration. A recent meta-analysis revealed 
lower prefrontal and striatal D1 and D2 receptor densities and striatal dopamine 
transporters with increasing age (Karrer et al., 2017). Diminished dopamine 
function is supported by evidence of reduced reward responsivity in elderly, 
evidenced by impaired reward learning, attenuated BOLD signal in the ventral 
striatum in response to reward, and less risky choices in gain trials (Eppinger 
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et al., 2013; Rutledge et al., 2016; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007) 2) The well-
established decline in cognitive functioning with advanced age (Salthouse, 1996), 
has often been attributed to diminished cognitive control capacity, but may partly 
reflect motivational rather than capacity constraints. Thus, using the COGED 
paradigm, older adults have been shown to be less motivated to engage in 
effortful cognition (Westbrook et al., 2013). Given that older adults are thought to 
exhibit diminished catecholamine function and they are less motivated to engage 
in cognitive effort, we speculate that lower catecholamine transmission contributes 
to reduced motivation for control. Following empirical and theoretical work on 
dopamine’s role in cost-benefit analysis of cognitive actions, we hypothesized that 
the administration of the catecholamine precursor tyrosine can restore motivation 
for cognitive effort in older adults.
The effects of tyrosine administration have been shown to depend on the baseline 
state of the system. For example, tyrosine was shown to be particularly effective in 
enhancing cognitive control when the catecholamine metabolism was enhanced 
by acute stress or high cognitive demand, while having no or disruptive effects in 
other conditions where the need for catecholamine transmission is lower (Jongkees 
et al., 2015; Tam and Roth, 1997). Higher doses of tyrosine have been shown to 
increase plasma tyrosine concentrations to a greater degree in older than younger 
adults (van de Rest et al., 2017), and have been associated with poorer N-back 
performance than lower tyrosine doses (van de Rest et al., 2017). Furthermore, 
tyrosine was recently found to reduce proactive response inhibition as a function 
of age (Bloemendaal et al., 2018). Although we do not have direct measures of 
baseline catecholamine function in our sample, we explored in supplemental 
analyses whether the effects of tyrosine depended on the two commonly used 
proxy measures trait impulsivity and working memory capacity (see also Froböse 
et al., 2018; Swart et al., 2017): trait impulsivity scores for their association with 
dopamine (auto-)receptor availability and striatal dopamine release (Buckholtz 
et al., 2010), as well as working memory span, associated with striatal dopamine 
synthesis capacity (Cools et al., 2008; Landau et al., 2009). Previously, we 
have shown that trait impulsivity predicts the degree to which methylphenidate 
modulates demand avoidance (Froböse et al., 2018). Thus, while our study was 
set up to assess the hypothesis that tyrosine administration would increase the 
value of cognitive control, we also explored whether tyrosine altered the value of 
cognitive control in a manner that depended on either of two dopamine proxy 
measures.
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METHODS
Participants
Exclusion criteria for this study were a history of clinically-significant psychiatric, 
neurological or cardiovascular disorder, abuse of drugs or alcohol, abnormal 
blood pressure (< 90/60 mmHg or > 160/90 mmHg), medication use that can 
interfere with tyrosine, blindness or colorblindness, smoking more than 1 pack of 
cigarettes per week, or contra-indications for MRI. For a complete list of exclusion 
criteria, see Supplemental Material 4.1.
After a screening session, thirty-three healthy, right-handed adults were initially 
included for participation. However, four additional participants were excluded or 
decided to discontinue during or after the first experimental session, due to blood 
pressure exceeding our inclusion criteria (n = 1) and fMRI-intolerance (anxiety: 
n = 1; nausea: n = 1, headache: n = 1), leaving a sample of 29 participants who 
completed both experimental sessions (age: M = 66.7, range = 61-71, 16 men). 
Our paradigm consists of two phases (see Task design section): an effort execution 
N-back task and a cognitive effort discounting (COGED) task. The COGED task 
is of primary interest to our research question and we have 29 complete datasets 
available. Due to technical, back-up problems, we have 26 complete datasets of 
the effort execution N-back task (day 1 = 27; day 2 = 28), even though all 29 
participants completed this task. As our primary research question regards the 
COGED task, we report questionnaire and neuropsychological assessment data 
for the complete sample (n = 29) in Table 4.1. All procedures were in accordance 
with the local ethical guidelines approved by the local ethics committee (CMO 
protocol NL49758.091.14) and in line with the Helsinki Declaration of 1975.
Procedure
A within-subjects, placebo-controlled, double-blind, cross-over design was 
employed. Participants visited the institute three times: once for a screening and 
twice for experimental sessions of around 4.5 hours (Figure 4.1).
The screening session included reviewing additional information about the 
study and signing informed consent forms and was mainly designed to check 
for medical exclusion criteria (see Supplemental Material 4.1). To assess specific 
exclusion criteria, we administered the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale 
(HADS, Bjelland et al., 2002), Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE, Folstein et 
al., 1975) and the Dutch reading test for an estimate of verbal intelligence (NLV, 
Schmand et al., 1991). In addition, participants’ trait impulsivity (BIS-11, Patton 
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et al., 1995) and Need for Cognition (NCS scale, Cacioppo and Petty, 1982; 
Cacioppo et al., 1984) were assessed because we had explicit, though exploratory, 
questions, related to the COGED paradigm (see Task design section). Scores of 
these self-report questionnaires are presented in Table 4.1. Included participants 
were also familiarized during the screening session with the cognitive test 
battery that was administered during the subsequent experimental sessions. This 
familiarization consisted of practice of a response inhibition task (Bloemendaal et 
al., 2018), a working memory task (cf. Fallon and Cools, 2014; Fallon et al., 2016) 
and the N-back task (see Task design section, based on Westbrook et al., 2013). 
Afterwards, participants were guided to the fMRI facility and their weight was 
assessed for adequate dosage calculation (see Tyrosine administration section).
The two experimental sessions were identical, except that participants received 
placebo on one day and tyrosine on the other (counterbalanced across 
participants). Participants were asked to come to the lab in the morning (at 
8 am or 10 am) after overnight fasting: they refrained from eating, drinking 
except from water, and taking any medication after 10 pm of the previous day. 
The overnight fast reduces variability in plasma large neutral amino acid levels 
between participants caused by the previous meal (Fernstrom and Wurtman, 
1979). A similar fasting procedure has been adopted in other research using 
tyrosine supplementation (Banderet and Lieberman, 1989; Colzato et al., 2014; 
Lieberman et al., 1985; Mahoney et al., 2007; Shurtleff et al., 1994). Sessions 
started approximately at the same time of the day (maximal deviation was 90 
minutes), with an interval of one week to a max of 17 weeks between testing 
days. After informed consent, participants practiced the response-inhibition task 
(see Bloemendaal et al., 2018), and right after drug administration (see Tyrosine 
administration section), each level of the N-back task was rehearsed followed 
by the practice of another working memory task (cf. Fallon et al., 2016). The 
cognitive test battery consisted in total of 3 paradigms (Figure 4.1). The order 
of practice and paradigms was constant across sessions and participants, such 
that the effort execution N-back task was always administered soon after drug 
intake (~+ 20min). To isolate effects on choice from effects on execution, the 
effort execution (i.e. N-back) task was timed to immediately follow ingestion of 
the intervention, so that tyrosine was highly unlikely to have taken effect during 
task execution, given its delay in reaching peak concentrations (±2 hours, see 
Tyrosine administration section). Then, after a break of 90 minutes, the response 
inhibition task (Bloemendaal et al., 2018) and working memory task (cf. Fallon 
et al., 2016) were administered during fMRI. After fMRI (duration ~90 minutes), 
the COGED task was administered together with a N-back redo which is based 
on participants’ choices (see Task design section). The delay between tyrosine 
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administration and the COGED task (described in Task design section) was on 
average 189 (+/- 22) minutes, while plasma tyrosine levels have been measured 
to remain elevated up to 8hrs (see Tyrosine administration section, Glaeser et 
al., 1979).
After task completion, we administered different neuropsychological tests, 
including immediate and delayed story recall (Wilson et al., 1989), digit span 
forward and backward (Groth-Marnat, 2001), Stroop cards (Stroop, 1935), verbal 
fluency (Tombaugh et al., 1999), box completion (Salthouse, 1996) and number 
cancellation (Lewis and Kupke, 1977). Summary scores are presented in Table 
4.1. For safety reasons, blood pressure and heart rate were measured three times 
throughout the days (start of testing day, before task battery, after task battery). 
At the same time points, participants’ mood was assessed using the Bond and 
Lader Visual Analogue Scales (calmness, contentedness, alertness; Bond and 
Lader, 1974). For exploratory purposes, assessing tyrosine’s effect on dopamine 
metabolites, urine was collected on both testing sessions off drug (i.e. before drug 
administration) and around the peak of tyrosine concentration (i.e. right after 
the fMRI part). Intervention effects on mood, blood pressure and urine data (all 
T1-T0 due to peak level of intervention) are reported in Table 4.1. Supplemental 
Material 4.2 reports mood and blood pressure data for T2-T0.
FIGURE 4.1 | Schema of study setup (A) and experimental sessions (B). A An initial 
screening was followed by two identical (except for placebo versus tyrosine intervention) 
experimental sessions. Duration between screening and session 1 was on average 22 
days, between the two experimental sessions on average 20 days. To prevent any car-
ry-over effects of pharmacological interventions, the experimental sessions were separated 
by at least 7 days. B During the experimental sessions, participants received placebo 
or tyrosine and conducted a test battery (see Procedure section). The effort discounting 
choice task was administered after an fMRI session and took place around 3 hours after 
the intervention in a behavioral lab.
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Tyrosine administration
Participants received tyrosine on one and a placebo substance on the other 
day, both adjusted to body weight as determined during the screening session 
(see Procedure section). Following multiple previous studies in young volunteers 
(Mahoney et al., 2007; Shurtleff et al., 1994; but see e.g. Colzato et al., 2013), we 
administered 150 mg/kg L-tyrosine powder (BulkpowdersTM, Sports Supplements 
Ltd. Colchester, Essex, United Kingdom). The placebo product was a mixture of 54 
mg/kg dextrine-maltose (Fantomalt by Nutricia) with 110 mg/kg maizena (ratio 
Fantomalt/cornstarch = ~½). The ratio of Fantomalt to cornstarch was adjusted 
to ensure that placebo and tyrosine mixture have an equal energy level, similar 
structure and aftertaste. Tyrosine and placebo powders were mixed with 200 g 
of banana-flavored yoghurt (Arla Foods Nederland, Nijkerk, The Netherlands) 
to ensure comfortable ingestion. In a formal blinded sensory experiment, 
a specialized dietician from the Division of Human Nutrition of Wageningen 
University (E. Siebelink) confirmed equal taste experience of the two mixtures. 
Weighting of the doses, preparing and coding the samples were performed by 
a staff member not involved in the study, thus the order of administration was 
double-blind.
Tyrosine is a catecholamine precursor: when tyrosine enters the brain via the 
blood-brain barrier, it is converted into levodopa through the rate-limiting enzyme 
tyrosine-hydroxylase (TH; Daubner et al., 2011) and then further converted 
into dopamine through the enzyme aromatic l-amino acid decarboxylase 
(AADC). In turn, dopamine can be converted into noradrenaline through the 
enzyme dopamine beta-hydroxylase (DBH; Jongkees et al., 2015; Kaufman 
& Friedman, 1965). The oral administration of tyrosine significantly enhances 
central catecholamine synthesis in rodents (Cuche et al., 1985; Fernstrom, 1983; 
Gibson and Wurtman, 1976; Scally et al., 1977; Tam et al., 1990) and humans 
(Growdon et al., 1982). Plasma concentrations peak ~2h after administration and 
remain significantly elevated up to 8h (Glaeser et al., 1979). The administration 
of 150 mg/kg body weight tyrosine has been shown to significantly increase 
plasma tyrosine concentrations also in older adults, peaking at 90 minutes and 
remaining elevated till at least 240 minutes after drug intake (van de Rest et al., 
2017). To test participants at maximal plasma levels, participants underwent the 
cognitive test battery starting ~90 minutes after drug intake. The delay between 
tyrosine administration and the COGED task (described in Task design section), 
the paradigm of primary interest for our research question, was on average 189 
(+/- 22) minutes.
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TABLE 4.1 | Secondary measures
Measure Screening Placebo Tyrosine Drug effect
Exclusion
criteria
HADS 3.7 (2.6)  N/A  N/A  N/A
MMSE 29.1 (1.3)  N/A  N/A N/A
NLV - IQ 
estimate
114.9 (8.6)  N/A  N/A  N/A
Effort 
questionnaire
NCS 50.7 (11.8) N/A N/A N/A
Dopamine proxies BIS-11 58.2 (6.3)  N/A  N/A N/A
Digit span  N/A 13.3 
(3.3)*
12.7 (3.7) t(27) = 1.5, 
p = 0.145
General 
neuropsychological 
assessment
Story recall - 
immed
 N/A 9.8 (2.8) 10.6 
(3.2)
t(28) = -1.2, 
p = 0.254
Story recall - 
delay
9.3 (2.7) 9.7 (3.0) t(28) = -0.6, 
p = 0.535
Stroop effect 
(s)
 N/A 84.3 
(48.6)*
87.7 
(73.7)**
t(26) = -0.2, 
p = 0.815
Verbal fluency, 
total
 N/A 46.3 
(9.4)
44.0 
(10.1)*
t(27) = 1.2, 
p = 0.246
Box 
completion, 
min
 N/A 90.0 
(33.7)*
82.5 
(19.4)
t(27) = 1.2, 
p = 0.248
Digit 
cancellation, 
min
 N/A 246.8 
(31.4)**
250.8 
(38.9)*
t(25) = -0.8, 
p = 0.433
Mood
(T1-T0)
Calmness  N/A -0.5 (1.7) -0.9 
(1.9)*
t(27) = 0.7, 
p = 0.485
Contentedness  N/A -0.6 (1.4) -0.7 
(1.3)*
t(27) = 0.1, 
p = 0.888
Alertness  N/A -0.2 (1.1) -0.1 
(1.0)*
t(27) = -0.6, 
p = 0.584
Total  N/A -0.4 (1.0) -0.4 
(1.0)*
t(27) = -0.1, 
p = 0.906
Blood pressure
(T1-T0)
Systolic  N/A 4.1 (8.6) -0.6 (6.7) t(28) = 2.1, 
p = 0.041
Diastolic  N/A -2.7 (5.1) -2.3 (4.4) t(28) = -0.3, 
p = 0.740
Heart rate  N/A 0.1 (5.1) -0.2 (3.4) t(28) = 0.3, 
p = 0.768
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Table 4.1 Continued
Measure Screening Placebo Tyrosine Drug effect
Metabolites in 
urine
(T1-T0)
DOPAC  N/A -0.03 
(0.3)
0.2 (0.4) t(28) = -3.0, 
p = 0.006
HVA  N/A 0.6 (0.8) 0.5 (0.7) t(28) = 0.9, 
p = 0.370
VMA  N/A 0.3 (0.2) 0.3 (0.2) t(28) = 2.1, 
p = 0.048
MOPEG  N/A 0.2 (0.1) 0.2 (0.2) t(28) = 1.5, 
p = 0.157
Data from questionnaires, neuropsychological assessment (NPA), mood, blood pressure 
and urine metabolites. Measures are acquired during screening or testing days (see 
Procedure section). Data represent mean (standard deviation) and when administered 
in both experimental sessions, results of paired-sample t-tests are presented to assess 
intervention effects. For the NLV-score and BIS-11 score, data points of 3 and 1 
participants(s) were missing, respectively.
Task design
The task design was, except for minor adaptations, identical to that described 
in Westbrook and colleagues (2013). Each experimental session consisted of an 
effort execution N-back phase (see Effort execution: N-back task section; Figure 
4.2A), the cognitive effort discounting phase (COGED; see Choices: cognitive 
effort discounting section; Figure 4.2B) and additional N-back rounds based on 
a random selection from among their choices in the discounting procedure. The 
entire protocol was programmed and administered using Psychophysics toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) in MATLAB.
Effort execution: N-back task
Participants completed the N-back task three times: a longer version during the 
screening session and a shorter version during the experimental sessions. The 
tasks were administered in behavioral labs with participants sitting comfortably in 
front of the screen, hands located on the keyboard. Participants were instructed to 
complete a working memory task in which they are presented with series of letters 
in the center of the screen and that they need to respond by indicating whether 
each letter is a target or non-target by keypress (Figure 4.2A). All versions start 
with easiest, 1-back level and increased block-wise to the highest, 4-back level. 
In the 1-back task, participants compared the current letter to the letter presented 
1 position (i.e. screen) back and if the letter was identical, they pressed the target 
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key; if not, they pressed the non-target key. For the 2-back task, a target was 
defined as identical letter presentation 2 screens back, etc.
The practice phase during screening consisted of three runs for every load level, 
the experimental sessions had two runs. Each run comprises 64 items (consonants, 
24-point Courier New font, 16 targets, black font). Participants were instructed 
explicitly at the beginning of each new level, which level they were about to 
complete. In addition to this explicit information, dark grey shapes were presented 
in the background which participants could learn to associate with the different 
N-back levels, see Figure 4.2A. Beyond indicating the current task level and 
rules, the shapes had no other utility for performing the N-back task. Shapes 
had a diameter of 10 cm and were presented in the center of the lighter gray 
screen as the background of the letter stimuli on each trial. Participants had 1.5 
s to respond to each item by button press, after which items were replaced by 
fixation cross. The inter-item interval was 0.5 s. Lures (items within N +/- 2, but 
not exactly N, positions after last presentation) were included in N-back stimulus 
lists to increase level difficulty: eight for N=1, six for 2, five for 3, and three 
for N=4. Participants were given feedback about run-wise performance (‘‘% of 
targets’’ and ‘‘% of non-targets correct’’). To motivate engagement, and to prevent 
participants from responding, e.g., ‘‘Non-target’’ at the expense of the ‘‘Target’’ 
score, participants were also given feedback of ‘‘Good job!’’ if both scores were 
above 50% or ‘‘Please try harder!’’ otherwise. Additionally, after each level of 
N-back experience, participants completed a self-report questionnaire reflecting 
on their task experience (see Supplemental Material 4.3). Participants indicated 
on a Likert scale from 1 to 10 how difficult and effortful they perceived the task 
and, for higher levels, how effortful the level was compared with level 1.
Choices: Cognitive effort discounting
The discounting procedure was also administered in behavioral labs with task 
presentation on a pc and responses given on the keyboard. In the discounting 
procedure, on every trial, participants made choices between a higher N-back 
level (2-4) for a fixed monetary amount (€2 or €5) and the 1-back task for 
a lower, variable amount (Figure 4.2B), analogous to adjusting-immediate-
amount (AIA) procedures used in intertemporal and risky choice (Holt et al., 
2012). Participants were told that they could choose which N-back level they want 
to repeat for earning a monetary bonus and that one of their choices would be 
randomly be selected and played out: they would repeat 1-10 runs of the N-back 
level that they selected and receive the monetary bonus attached to their choice. 
To reduce avoidance of mistakes rather than effort, we instructed participants 
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that they would receive the bonus if they do their best and perform comparable 
to the practice round on the same day.
Choice options were presented on the left and right side of the screen. Levels were 
referred to by the same shapes that participants learned to associate with each 
N-back level during practice and effort execution on the same day (see Effort 
execution: N-back task). To minimize confusion about levels, participants also had 
access to a paper sheet reminding them of the relevant shape-level associations. 
The amount of the monetary bonus was presented in the center of the shape 
(36-point Courier New font, black font). Each of the 3 higher levels (N= 2-4) was 
paired with the easier 1-back level in two different amount categories: higher 
levels were either offered at €2 or €5. For the first paring, the amount offered for 
the easy task was half the amount offered for the harder task, thus €1 or €2.50, 
respectively. Depending on participants’ choices, the amount offered for the 
easy task was adjusted (see Figure 4.2B.1): when participants chose the harder/
high offer option, the amount offered for the easy task on the next pairing was 
increased; when the easier/low offer option was chosen, the amount offered on 
the next trial would decrease. The magnitude of amount adjustments was cut in 
half after each adjustment such that the offer for the easy task converged towards 
a point of indifference. Figure 4.2C presents the adjustment path for the easy 
offer when participants always select the easy (red bars) or hard (green bars) task. 
The choice task comprised a total of 30 choices (level [3] * amount [2] * amount 
adjustment [5]). Trial types and offer orders were randomized. Choices were self-
paced but have a maximal duration of 9 s. The text “Take your time and choose 
carefully” was presented at the top of the screen during all choices. If no choice 
was made within 9 s the text “Too slow!” was presented.
The indifference point reflects the monetary amount offered for the easy task on 
the last trial corrected for the last choice and was assessed for each level (2-4) 
per amount condition (€2 and €5). “Subjective value” (SV) hereafter refers to 
indifference points divided by the amount category (€2 or €5), such that all 
numbers ranged from 0 to 1 for both the low and high amount offers. A SV of 
0.8 means that a participant is equally likely to choose one or the other option 
(i.e. indifferent) when the easier task is worth 80% of the amount offered for 
the harder task. A lower SV thus indicates that a participant chooses to receive 
less money but increases the likelihood to redo an easier task. After the choice 
paradigm, all participants completed their randomly selected choice exactly four 
more times and were paid the associated amount for each repetition.
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Questionnaires and digit span
A series of questionnaires and neuropsychological tests were completed by 
participants during the screening and experimental sessions. Trait impulsivity, digit 
span and Need for Cognition Scale were included in our secondary, exploratory 
analyses and will be described in more detail below. Scores on other acquired 
measures are presented in Table 4.1.
Trait impulsivity
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995) was administered 
to assess participants’ degree of trait impulsivity. The scale is a self-report 
questionnaire, consisting of 30 statements that participants rate on a 4-point 
Likert scale (“never” to “almost always”). Examples are “I buy things on impulse” 
or “I am future oriented”. Scores on this questionnaire can range from 30 to 120. 
The total Barratt score has been found to be associated with reduced dopamine 
D2/D3 receptor availability in the midbrain, and enhanced dopamine release 
in the striatum (Buckholtz et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2009) and has been shown to 
predict effects of MPH on learning (Clatworthy et al., 2009). This measure served 
as a putative proxy of baseline dopamine function in the exploratory analyses 
(see Statistical analysis section).
Digit span
Baseline working memory capacity was assessed with a recorded version of the 
digit span (Groth-Marnat, 2001) at the end of both experimental sessions. The 
digit span consists of two parts: forward and backward digit span. In the first 
part, participants’ task was to repeat series of numbers that are presented via 
headphones in the same order as presented (forward). Series start with three 
numbers and increase up to 9 numbers. Participants complete two trials for each 
span and their score is identical to the maximum of digits repeated without any 
error in one of the two trials. The second part is almost identical, except that 
participants have to repeat the span backwards, beginning with the last digit of 
the span. The lowest span contains two, and the highest eight digits. Here too, 
the score is equal to the maximum of digits repeated correctly. Forward and 
backward scores are added to obtain a total score, such that scores can range 
from 0 to 17. In the absence of tyrosine effect on this measure, as in earlier studies 
(van der Schaaf et al., 2013), the average total digit span across two days was 
selected, because it was thought to provide a more reliable estimate of working 
memory capacity. The total scores were averaged across the assessments and 
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used as putative proxy of baseline dopamine function in exploratory analyses 
(see Statistical analyses section).
Need for cognition
The self-report Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et 
al., 1984) was administered to investigate participants’ tendency (trait) to engage 
in effortful tasks. The scale consists of 18 statements, which participants rate on a 
5-point Likert scale (“extremely uncharacteristic of me” to “extremely characteristic 
of me”). Example statements include “I prefer complex to simple problems” or “I 
only think as hard as I have to”. Scores range from 18 to 90.
FIGURE 4.2 | The experimental paradigm was based on the procedure described in 
Westbrook et al., 2013. A The N-back task. Letters appeared serially on the screen for 1.5 
s, but disappeared after a response was given followed by an ITI of 0.5 s. Every trial had a 
total duration of 2 s. Participants indicated whether every letter was a target or non-target 
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by keypress. Target assignment depended on the N-back level represented by shapes. 
Levels were presented block-wise with increasing difficulty (circle up to diamond). B The 
discounting task. Higher N-back levels (2-4) were paired with the lowest level for varying 
amounts of money. B1 A simplified illustration of one trial type: 1-back (circle) versus 
2-back (triangle) in the low amount condition (harder task worth €2 instead of €5). The 
schema presents the monetary amount adjustment as a function of choice. The amount 
of the harder tasks is fixed, while the easier task varies. When the hard option is chosen, 
the amount offered for the easy task increases while it decreases when the easy choice is 
chosen. The amount adjustment reduces exponentially (by the power of 2), see C. B2 In 
the real choice task, the trial types (level [3] x amount [2] x amount adjustment [5]) were 
randomized, resulting in a total of 30 choices. Choices were self-paced but had a maximal 
duration of 9 s. After the choice is made, a box is presented around the chosen option 
for 0.75 s. If no response was given, the message “Too slow!” was presented for 0.75 s. 
Minimal trial duration was set to 2 s. C Per harder task level (triangle, square, diamond), 
5 choices were presented with respect to circle (1-back) for a varying amount offered for 
the easy task. Hard tasks were either fixed at €2 or €5. Red bars show the decrement 
if participants always chose the easy task, while the green bars show the increment if 
always the hard task was chosen. Participants’ choices thus vary in this range. The adjusted 
amount decreased as a function of trial number of the specific pair. The subjective value 
is determined based on the last trials adapted following the last choice.
Statistical analyses
Effort execution (N-back task) analysis
The N-back task was used to expose participants to different levels of working 
memory load. To assess whether performance on the N-back task was sensitive 
to the load manipulation, we analyzed performance measures: response times 
and signal detection d’ as a measure of sensitivity to targets corrected for the 
propensity to make a target response (false alarms).
Note that the N-back task was conducted right after drug intake and therefore 
we did not predict any intervention effects. However, to rule out that N-back 
performance differed between the experimental session, we assessed drug effects 
on response times and d’ also as a function of N-back levels. The data were 
analyzed with a linear mixed-effects model approach using the lme4 package 
in R (Bates et al., 2015). This allowed us to account for within-subject variability 
in addition to between-subject variability. Drug (tyrosine versus placebo) and 
level (1-4) were within-subject factors. The model included all main effects 
and interactions and a full random-effects structure (Barr et al., 2013). To 
determine p-values, we computed Type 3 conditional F tests with Kenward-Roger 
approximation for degrees of freedom as implemented in the mixed function 
of the afex package (Singmann et al., 2017), which in turn calls the function 
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KRmodcomp of the package pbkrtest (Halekoh and Højsgarden, 2014). Effects 
were considered statistically significant if the p-value was smaller than 0.05.
Given impulsivity-dependent effects of tyrosine on SV (see Figure 4.5) and to 
assess whether choice effects could be a consequence of (unexpected) effects 
of tyrosine on performance, we extended the performance models post-hoc to 
include participants’ trait impulsivity scores (BIS-11) and working memory capacity 
(digit span average) as between-subject factors. An overview of all performance 
models is presented in Supplemental Material 4.4 (Models 2.1-2.4).
Choice task (COGED) analysis
The experiment was set up to assess effects of tyrosine on the valuation of 
cognitive effort. We therefore estimated participants’ subjective values for the 
three higher N-back levels in two amount conditions (€2 or €5) for the placebo 
and tyrosine sessions. Values range from 0 to 1 and represent the subjective value 
with respect to the 1-back. Drug (tyrosine vs. placebo), level (2-4) and amount 
(€2 vs. €5) were within-subject factors. The procedure of model estimation and 
p-value extraction were identical with that described above. Relatedly, we explored 
whether tyrosine modulated the speed of choosing (i.e. median choice response 
time), by running a model with identical predictors as the choice model described 
here, but median response times as dependent variable.
In further exploratory analyses, we added participants’ trait impulsivity (BIS-11) 
and working memory capacity (digit span average) as between-subject factors to 
the basic model. Due to missing data for one participant of the trait impulsivity 
measure, the sample for this analysis is 28. An overview of all SV models is 
presented in Supplemental Material 4.4 (Models 1.1 and 1.2). Note that Model 
1.2 does not include in the random-effects term the factor ‘offer amount’ due to 
convergence-warnings. Nevertheless, statistics of the effects of interest as obtained 
with the complete model are presented for completeness in Supplemental Material 
4.9.
Questionnaire data
Self-report N-back
After each N-back level during effort execution (see Effort execution (N-back task) 
analysis section)), participants judged difficulty, effort and effort with respect to 
level 1 (for higher levels) using a 1-10 Likert scale (see Supplemental Material 4.3). 
As for N-back performance and choice data, we analyzed whether the perceived 
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difficulty and effort increased as a function of N-back level. To assess whether 
differences in perceived effort existed immediately after drug intake, we analyzed 
these measures as a function of drug with three separate repeated-measures 
ANOVAs (difficulty, effort, effort with respect to N = 1) in SPSS 23 (IBM Corp., 
Armonk, N.Y., USA).
Need for Cognition
We included the Need for Cognition Scale to assess whether we can replicate a 
(positive) relationship between SV as quantified with the COGED-task and Need 
for Cognition scores as reported in Westbrook et al., 2013. Thus, we ran another 
mixed-effects model in R with SV as dependent variable and the factors level and 
amount as within- and Need for Cognition scores as between-subjects predictors. 
Results are reported in Supplemental Material 4.5.
Control analyses
We performed a number of control analyses using a model comparison approach 
(anova function in R) where we assessed whether the residual sum of squares was 
significantly reduced when adding any of the following, perhaps confounding, 
factors to the SV model: order of drug administration, gender, age, and NLV 
scores (as a measure of verbal intelligence). Furthermore, we added an additional 
control analysis to assess directly whether the drug effect of interest (see Figure 
4.5) was altered when including the factor order in a model (Supplemental 
Material 4.6).
Given that N-back data is available for 26 instead of 29 participants, we repeated 
the choice analyses (see Choice task (COGED) analysis section) for the smaller 
sample as an additional control analysis. We also assessed in this sample whether 
the inclusion of the drug-induced performance changes on the N-back task (d’Tyr-
d’Pla and RTTyr – RTPla) in the choice analyses still reveal the significant modulation 
(see Figure 4.5). Note that the N-back task was performed shortly after drug 
administration, before tyrosine-levels are expected to peak (Glaeser et al., 1979; 
van de Rest et al., 2017).
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RESULTS
Effort execution: N-back task
Participants performed well on the N-back task, evidenced by an overall 
proportion of 0.83 and 0.84 correct responses on the placebo and tyrosine 
session, respectively. This corresponds to d’-values of 2.02 and 2.03. In line with 
earlier work (Westbrook et al., 2013), performance was sensitive to the load 
manipulation: d’ decreased as a linear function of N-back levels (level effect: 
F(1, 25) = 129.45, p < 0.001; Figure 4.3A), while response times increased 
(level effect: F(1, 25) = 20.99, p < 0.001; Figure 4.3B). As expected given 
our design, tyrosine had no main effects on performance, as assessed by d′ 
(drug effect: F(1,25) < 0.01, p = 0.978) and response times (drug effect: F(1, 
25) = 0.94, p = 0.342), or interactions with N-back level (for d′: drug x level 
interaction: F(1, 25) = 0.29, p = 0.596; for RTs: drug x level interaction: F(1, 
25) = 2.86, p = 0.103). This lack of drug effects is not surprising, because 
participants performed the N-back task immediately after tyrosine administration, 
so brain tyrosine levels were unlikely to have risen at the time of the N-back task 
performance. Average performance data (d′ and RTs) as a function of level and 
drug are presented in Table 4.2. For a complete list of statistical effects, see 
Supplemental Material 4.7.
FIGURE 4.3 | Performance on the N-back task as a function of working memory load 
(i.e. levels) across drug. A d′, the estimate of participants’ sensitivity to targets corrected 
for the propensity to make a target response (false alarms), decreased as a function of 
N-back levels.
B Response times increased as a function of N-back level, but showed an inverted U-shape, 
in line with earlier report using this task (Westbrook et al., 2013). In both graphs, the 
horizontal lines in the boxplots represent the median, the diamond represents the mean, 
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green dots are the mean per subject connected by gray lines indicating within-subjects 
data. Average d’ measures contain outliers in level 1 (see gray dots) because on one of 
the testing days these participants initially swapped keys for target vs. non-target (only in 
level 1) and had negative d’ for one session.
Choices: Cognitive effort discounting
As expected, participants’ COGED choices indicate a decline in subjective value 
(SV) when N-back levels increased (level: F(1,28) = 54.08, p < 0.001), indicating 
that effort costs increased with working memory load. Surprisingly, when higher 
amounts were offered in the discounting task (i.e. €5 instead of €2), participants’ 
SV of the N-back task was slightly lower (amount: F(1, 28) = 4.77, p = 0.037). 
While the load effect is in line with earlier reports using this task, the latter amount 
effect was unexpected given that prior work has shown shallower discounting 
for larger rewards in both cognitive effort (Westbrook et al., 2013) and delay 
discounting (Green et al., 2004). In addition to these manipulation checks for 
SV, we analyzed the speed by which choices are made. Participants chose faster 
when more money was at stake (i.e. €5 versus €2; amount for RTs: F(1, 28) = 4.1, 
p = 0.027). Response times numerically, though not significantly, decreased as a 
function of N-back level (level for RTs: F(1, 28) = 4.1, p = 0.053).
Critically, we hypothesized that the administration of tyrosine raises participants’ 
motivation for cognitive control, evidenced by higher SV of the N-back task 
compared with the placebo session. In contrast to this hypothesis, tyrosine did not 
significantly increase overall valuation of the N-back task (drug: F(1, 28) = 0.15, 
p = 0.699), and there was no significant interaction with level (drug x level: F(1, 
228) = 0.01, p = 0.912; Figure 4.4A). Choice response time analysis revealed 
that tyrosine numerically increased overall response times, but the effect was 
not statistically significant (drug: F(1, 28) = 3.8, p = 0.060). Average SVs are 
presented in Table 4.2 as a function of level and drug. For a complete list of 
statistical effects, see Supplemental Material 4.8.
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FIGURE 4.4 | Subjective value as measured by the cognitive effort discounting task. A 
Subjective value for tyrosine and placebo sessions as a function of level. The horizontal 
lines in the boxplots represent the median, the diamond represents the mean, green 
dots are the average subjective value per subject connected by gray lines indicating 
within-subject data. Both sessions show that subjective value decreased with increasing 
working memory load. However, in contrast to our prediction, subjective value did not 
differ between the interventions. Gray dots reflect individual outliers. B Subjective value 
averaged across levels as a function of drug. The horizontal line in the boxplots represent 
the median. Lines show the change in subjective value per subject, color-coded for their 
trait impulsivity score, as a function of drug.
TABLE 4.2 | Task performance
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Average
d’ 3.03 (1.49) 2.21 (0.70) 1.62 (0.49) 1.25 (0.52) 2.03 (1.12)
placebo 2.92 (1.68) 2.25 (0.73) 1.68 (0.49) 1.25 (0.47) 2.03 (1.15)
tyrosine 3.14 (1.30) 2.17 (0.69) 1.56 (0.50) 1.24 (0.57) 2.03 (1.09)
RT 0.59 (0.09) 0.74 (0.13) 0.74 (0.13) 0.70 (0.16) 0.69 (0.14)
placebo 0.58 (0.18) 0.74 (0.25) 0.75 (0.25) 0.72 (0.27) 0.70 (0.25)
tyrosine 0.60 (0.19) 0.74 (0.24) 0.73 (0.24) 0.68 (0.26) 0.68 (0.24)
 Subjective 
value
N/A 0.63 (0.36) 0.28 (0.35) 0.19 (0.28) 0.37 (0.38)
placebo N/A 0.65 (0.37) 0.28 (0.37) 0.20 (0.30) 0.38 (0.40)
tyrosine N/A 0.62 (0.34) 0.27 (0.33) 0.18 (0.26) 0.36 (0.36)
Group average (and standard deviation) of performance data (d’ and RT) on the N-back 
task and subjective value of the cognitive effort discounting task. Note that subjective 
value scores of higher N-back levels are all calculated relative to level 1, thus no values 
are available for level 1.
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Individual differences: proxy measures of dopamine
Following earlier work indicating that catecholaminergic interventions depend 
on dopamine baseline levels (Cools, 2016) and the recent study showing that 
motivation for cognitive control depended on participants’ trait impulsivity scores 
(Froböse et al., 2018), we explored whether tyrosine effects on SV varied as a 
function of trait impulsivity (BIS-11) and working memory scores (digit span). 
As in our recent methylphenidate study, tyrosine effects on SV depended on 
participants’ trait impulsivity scores, evidenced by two correlations of medium 
effect sizes: Tyrosine administration resulted in steeper SV discounting (i.e. higher 
cost) as a function of N-back levels in more relative to less impulsive participants 
(r = -0.37; drug x impulsivity x level: F(1, 25) = 5.01, p = 0.034; Figure 4.5). 
In addition to this level-dependent effect, tyrosine tended to also decrease the 
overall subjective value (i.e. irrespective of level) as a function of trait impulsivity 
(r = -0.33; drug x impulsivity: F(1, 25) = 4.19, p = 0.051; Figure 4.5B). Task 
effects did not significantly vary as a function of working memory capacity (drug x 
digit span: F(1, 25) = 1.29, p = 0.268; drug x digit span x level: F(1, 25) = 1.03, 
p = 0.320). A complete list of statistical effects is presented in Supplemental 
Material 4.8.
Although we considered it unlikely that tyrosine could have altered N-back 
performance, given the timing of the intervention, we tested this assumption by 
adding impulsivity (and digit span) scores as covariates to the N-back models. 
This analysis also allowed us to assess whether this impulsivity-dependent effect 
of tyrosine on effort discounting is an indirect consequence of an impulsivity-
dependent effect on performance (e.g. reflecting error avoidance). As expected, 
given that the N-back task was performed before tyrosine levels were peaking, 
we did not observe such impulsivity-dependent tyrosine effects for d’ (drug x 
impulsivity: F(1, 22) = 0.03, p = 0.863; drug x impulsivity x level: F(1, 22) = 1.02, 
p = 0.323). Tyrosine also did not alter overall response times as a function of 
impulsivity (drug x impulsivity: F(1, 22) = 2.25, p = 0.148). However, surprisingly, 
tyrosine administration attenuated level-related slowing to a greater degree 
in more impulsive participants (drug x impulsivity x level: F(1, 22) = 4.86, 
p = 0.038). For a complete list of statistical effects, see Supplemental Material 
4.7. To further exclude that the tyrosine-induced reduction in SV was driven 
by failure-avoidance in more impulsive participants, we assessed whether we 
could replicate the (significant) modulation of SV by tyrosine and impulsivity 
when including tyrosine-induced performance changes in the SV model. Note 
that this control analysis is based on 25 instead of 29 datasets due to missing 
N-back (n = 3) and impulsivity (n = 1) data and might thus also suffer from 
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a reduction in power to detect an effect. However, despite the smaller sample 
and the inclusion of (drug-induced) d’-scores, we replicate the effect of interest 
(drug x level x impulsivity: F(1, 19) = 4.8, p = 0.041), suggesting that an indirect 
modulation via failure (i.e. error) avoidance is unlikely. Given the (unexpected) 
observation of an impulsivity-dependent response time effect, we repeated this 
analysis when including drug-induced response time changes. Here we observed 
that the modulation of SV by tyrosine and impulsivity was no longer significant 
(drug x level x impulsivity: F(1, 19) = 3.1, p = 0.096). In sum, tyrosine enhanced 
the speed of difficult task performance in more impulsive participants, while also 
reducing their subjective value (or increasing the subjective cost) of difficult task 
performance. These findings suggest that the effects on SV do not reflect time-on-
task avoidance, as faster instead of slower task performance was accompanied 
by lower SVs.
Finally, to assess whether the effect of tyrosine on cognitive effort discounting 
might reflect modulation of mood, we also assessed impulsivity-dependent effects 
of tyrosine on mood changes (total scores T1-T0), as assessed with the Bond 
and Lader analogue scale. Results of a repeated measures ANOVA showed no 
significant effects of tyrosine on mood changes (see Table 4.1), also not as a 
function of impulsivity (drug x impulsivity: F(1,25) = 2.7, p = 0.115).
FIGURE 4.5 | Tyrosine-effect on subjective value vary as a function of participants’ trait 
impulsivity (BIS-11) scores. A Black dots represent per participant the difference scores 
(tyrosine minus placebo) of the decrease (i.e. slope) of the subjective value as a function of 
N-back levels. Negative scores reflect more pronounced discounting (i.e. steeper subjective 
value slope) on tyrosine compared with placebo. The black line represents conditional 
means given the linear model used and shaded area represents the 95% confidence in-
terval. The correlation between impulsivity scores and subjective value slope on placebo 
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is r = 0.38, suggesting that more impulsive participants have a shallower reduction in 
SV as a function of increasing demand (i.e. N-back level). The correlation on tyrosine is 
r = 0.03. B Subjective value slopes as a function of drug. The horizontal line in the box-
plots represent the median. Lines show the change in subjective value slope per subject, 
color-coded for their trait impulsivity score, as a function of drug. Negative values on the 
y-axis indicate that SV decrease as a function of higher N-back levels: a steeper slope 
represents steeper discounting with respect to level 1.
Self-report N-back questionnaire
As expected, subjective ratings of perceived difficulty and effort increased as 
a function of N-back level, evidenced by a main effect of level on difficulty 
(F(3,81) = 136.3, p < 0.001) and effort (F(3,81) = 69.6, p < 0.001) rating. Also 
the perceived effort for completing higher N-back levels compared with level 1 
increased linearly (F(2,54) = 71.1, p < 0.001). Consistent with our expectation, 
given that the task and these questionnaires were administered only shortly after 
the intervention, we do not observe any modulation of perceived difficulty or 
effort ratings as a function of drug (drug effect for difficulty: F(1,27) = 0.1; for 
effort: F(1,27) = 0.8; for relative effort: F(1,27) = 0.8), also not as a function of 
level (drug x level for difficulty: F(3,81) = 0.8; for effort: F(3,81) = 0.9; for relative 
effort: F(2,54) = 1.4). When entering trait impulsivity scores as a covariate, unlike 
the effect in the COGED paradigm, we do not observe any significant impulsivity-
dependent drug effect on subjective effort ratings relative to the 1-back task, 
a measure most similar to the COGED task (drug x impulsivity: F(1,25) = 0.4, 
p = 0.539; drug x impulsivity x level: F(2,50) = 1.7, p = 0.198). This analysis 
strengthens the confidence that effects observed on the choice task are specific 
to the tyrosine intervention and were not observed on self-reported effort scores 
right after effort execution.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we set out to assess whether a catecholamine precursor alters 
motivation of cognitive control in older adults. More specifically, we hypothesized 
that augmenting catecholamine synthesis with tyrosine increases the subjective 
value of performing the N-back task for money. For this reason, we employed 
an established economic discounting procedure (Westbrook et al., 2013) that has 
previously been shown to be sensitive to cognitive load and aging. Our aim was 
to investigate tyrosine’s effect on decision-making about cognitive effort, rather 
than tyrosine’s role in N-back performance. Therefore, participants were exposed 
to the N-back task right after drug-intake (~20 min) at which point tyrosine should 
not have taken effect. Conversely, the effort discounting task was administered 
when catecholamine levels were expected to be enhanced.
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In line with earlier reports, we observed that participants’ performance decreased, 
and effort discounting increased, as a function of working memory load (i.e. 
N-back level) (Westbrook et al., 2013). However, contrary to our prediction, 
tyrosine did not alter the subjective value of cognitive effort as a main effect. We 
predicted a positive main effect of tyrosine on motivation for cognitive control, 
given prior evidence linking increased dopamine function with willingness to 
expend physical effort in animal models (Hamid et al., 2016; Salamone et al., 
2016), reduced physical effort discounting in humans (Chong et al., 2015) and 
neurocomputational models implicating striatal dopamine in increasing sensitivity 
to effort benefits versus costs (Collins and Frank, 2014). Moreover, recent work 
has shown that increased dopamine might promote not just physical effort, 
but cognitive control as well, by offsetting effort costs (Manohar et al., 2015; 
McGuigan et al., 2019). We expected that older adults might be particularly 
sensitive to benefits of tyrosine administration, given reports on reduced dopamine 
transmission (Karrer et al., 2017) and, perhaps relatedly, reduced motivation to 
engage in effortful control (Westbrook et al., 2013). Despite multiple lines of 
evidence that dopamine increases willingness to expend effort, our results indicate 
that tyrosine administration does not have simple uniform effects on motivation 
for cognitive effort across all participants.
Instead of a main effect, we observed in exploratory analyses an interaction 
with individual differences such that tyrosine effects depended on participants’ 
baseline impulsivity. Specifically, the (demand-induced) subjective value of 
control decreased with tyrosine administration in participants with high baseline 
impulsivity, while it was increased, if anything, in less impulsive participants. 
This interaction between drug status and impulsivity is a small effect, but 
interesting because it mirrors a similar interaction between the catecholamine 
agonist methylphenidate and impulsivity in our previous study that had greater 
statistical power to assess individual differences (n = 100) (Froböse et al., 2018). 
In that study, participants with low impulsivity showed neutral or even reduced 
avoidance of cognitive demand, while those with high baseline impulsivity 
increased demand avoidance when given methylphenidate. The present results 
constitute an important extension of this prior work in two ways. First, they provide 
a critical conceptual replication of the result that catecholaminergic interventions 
can alter willingness to expend cognitive effort as a function of impulsivity despite 
differences in task, drug, and population. Second, we utilized a discounting task 
which explicitly measures cost-benefit decision-making, allowing us to directly 
test the hypothesis that pharmacological catecholamine manipulation modulates 
the subjective value of cognitive effort. The methylphenidate-dependent effects 
on demand avoidance in the prior study were plausibly linked to cost-benefit 
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decision-making. However, the inference was indirect given that 1) no explicit 
rewards / benefits were on offer, 2) demand avoidance may have reflected ability 
to detect demand differences rather than increased sensitivity to effort costs, per 
se (cf. Gold et al., 2015) and 3) effort-execution (i.e. task-switching) in addition 
to choices were conducted on drug.
Our aim here was not only to extend previous work by teasing apart effort-
execution and choices by administering them in two separate tasks, but also to 
show that tyrosine alters choices specifically without the possibility of performance 
modulation by having the N-back task performed off drug. Because of logistic 
reasons and plasma tyrosine levels reaching their peak level only after 90-120 
minutes (Glaeser et al., 1979; van de Rest et al., 2017), we administered the 
N-back task shortly after tyrosine administration. Surprisingly, performance 
analyses indicate an impulsivity-dependent response time modulation which 
is also consistent with effects observed after methylphenidate administration 
(Froböse et al., 2018): Tyrosine attenuated level-related slowing in more 
impulsive participants. This finding evidences that, contrary to our expectation, 
tyrosine modulated performance as early as 20 minutes after tyrosine ingestion. 
Thus, as in the methylphenidate study, reduced motivation for cognitive effort 
(i.e. lower subjective value) on tyrosine was accompanied by level-dependent 
speeding, indicating, if anything, relatively better performance on the day of 
tyrosine administration. Although we remain puzzled by the fact that we observe 
any modulation of performance by tyrosine that early after administration, the 
direction of effect is not in line with a performance failure account. Self-report 
ratings of perceived effort support this interpretation, as ratings did not show 
(impulsivity-dependent) drug effects.
In sum, the two studies converge in suggesting that dopamine interventions affect 
motivation for cognitive effort as a function of trait impulsivity, with undermining 
effects in more impulsive participants. Individual differences in trait impulsivity 
have been associated with baseline dopamine transmission (Buckholtz et al., 
2010) and have been shown to modulate drug effects on reversal learning 
(Clatworthy et al., 2009), working memory (Cools et al., 2007), and striatal 
interconnectivity (Piray et al., 2015) in young adult samples. As such, instead 
of finding a main effect, our findings align with the proposal that the effects of 
catecholaminergic drugs vary with individual differences in baseline levels of 
dopamine (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011).
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Why does tyrosine reduce SV in more impulsive partici-
pants?
One reason that tyrosine might have attenuated the subjective value of cognitive 
effort is by paradoxically decreasing dopamine synthesis and dynamic dopamine 
response to offer presentation for more impulsive individuals, via D2 autoreceptors. 
Thus, a reduction in dopamine synthesis might result in a shift towards more 
cost and less benefit sensitivity. Indeed, while phasic DA release following offer 
presentation makes decision makers more sensitive to offer benefits and less 
sensitive to offer costs (Collins and Frank, 2014; Schelp et al., 2017), autoreceptor 
binding can attenuate phasic DA release (Ford, 2014; Frank and O’Reilly, 2006). 
Thus, pharmacologically increased DA tone could, via increased autoreceptor 
signaling, reduce phasic DA release, making more impulsive decision-makers 
less willing to accept high-cost, high-benefit offers. This account assumes that 
tyrosine administration primarily increased pre-synaptic (autoreceptor) rather than 
post-synaptic D2 binding in older adults and that impulsive individuals differ 
in their pre-synaptic signaling sensitivity. Supporting the first assumption, the 
administration of phenylalanine, the precursor of tyrosine, to rats increased striatal 
dopamine release at lower doses, but attenuated dopamine release at higher 
doses (During et al., 1988). In line with this finding, there is evidence for up-
regulated striatal dopamine synthesis in older adults (Berry et al., 2016; Braskie et 
al., 2010), which has been associated with impaired task- switching performance 
(Berry et al., 2016). Thus, we speculate that a surge of precursor converted to 
dopamine in a system with already up-regulated dopamine synthesis may ‘over-
dose’ the system triggering a shutdown of TH activity, via cytoplasmic dopamine 
or D2 receptors (Fisone et al., 2001). This would explain the observation that 
higher doses of tyrosine (both 150 and 200 mg/kg) were associated with reduced 
working memory performance compared with a lower dose (van de Rest et al., 
2017). In support of the second assumption, more impulsive individuals have 
lower presynaptic dopamine D2 receptor availability and greater amplitude 
phasic responses to instrumental cues at baseline (Buckholtz et al., 2010). Thus, 
more impulsive individuals may be particularly sensitive to the consequences of 
dopamine agonism for autoreceptor signaling. In sum, this account predicts that 
tyrosine reduced dopamine in older adults and more impulsive individuals will 
see the largest paradoxical reduction in phasic dopamine release with dopamine 
agonists. This mechanism has elsewhere been posited to explain why the agonist 
methylphenidate can reduce impulsive responding in individuals with ADHD 
(Seeman and Madras, 2002).
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Another reason that increased dopamine tone might increase cognitive effort 
discounting, for some people, relates to striatal dopamine’s putative role in 
regulating action selection as a function of opportunity costs. In short, dopamine 
tone has been proposed to convey local environmental richness, and therefore 
the opportunity costs of ‘sloth’ (Niv et al., 2007). Thus, in the competition between 
cognitive control, and habits, higher dopamine tone conveying higher opportunity 
costs may promote an action selection bias for fast habits over slow control actions 
(Boureau et al., 2015). This effect of increasing dopamine on action selection may 
also influence explicit cost-benefit decision-making about cognitive control of the 
type studied here (Kurzban et al., 2013). Thus, individuals with high dopamine 
tone might be speculated to perceive their environment as particularly opportunity 
costly. In this context, tyrosine-related reductions in the value of cognitive effort as 
well as level-dependent speeding on the N-back task can be considered adaptive.
LIMITATIONS
Our hypotheses were motivated by a robust literature on dopamine’s role in 
physical effort and cost-benefit decision making. However, tyrosine does not 
selectively increase dopamine: Oral administration in young adults has been 
shown to also affect plasma noradrenaline levels (Kishore et al., 2013). Future 
studies are needed to test the hypothesis that tyrosine alters motivation of cognitive 
control via affecting dopamine rather than noradrenaline transmission. This 
is especially pertinent because of the well-established link between the locus 
coeruleus–norepinephrine system and mental fatigue (Berridge and Waterhouse, 
2003) and the implication of this system in task-related decision processes (Aston-
Jones and Cohen, 2005), task engagement and meta-cognitive regulatory 
functions (Hauser et al., 2017; Hopstaken et al., 2015). Moreover, instead of a 
main effect of tyrosine administration on the subjective value of cognitive effort, 
we observe that tyrosine effects were modulated by trait impulsivity scores. 
Despite the fact that these results are consistent with our recent larger scale study 
(n = 100; Froböse et al., 2018), we are aware that the effect is small and that 
our sample of 29 participants is low. As such, replication of this effect is advised 
in a larger sample, ideally in which the effort execution takes place before any 
intervention is administered.
CONCLUSION
We demonstrate that tyrosine administration altered the subjective value of 
cognitive effort in healthy older volunteers (aged 60 - 75 years). However, 
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contrary to our hypothesis that tyrosine alters overall valuation of the N-back 
task, exploratory analyses suggest an interaction between drug and individual 
differences in trait impulsivity. Interestingly, as in our recent methylphenidate 
study, tyrosine reduced the motivation for cognitive effort in more relative to less 
impulsive participants. Thus, we show that cost-benefit decision-making about 
task engagement is sensitive to changes in catecholamine synthesis and the 
direction of effect depends on individual differences in trait impulsivity, a putative 
proxy of baseline dopamine function.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS OF CHAPTER 4
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 4.1 | Exclusion criteria
A potential subject who meets any of the following criteria will be excluded from 
participation in this study:
- Clinical dementia as measured by Mini Mental State Examination score < 24)
- Severe depression or anxiety as measured by HADS score > 11
- Estimated IQ < 85 (based on Nederlandse Leestest voor Volwassenen (NLV) 
-score)
- (History of) clinically significant psychiatric disorder
- (History of) clinically significant neurological disorder, such as brain infarct, 
Parkinson’s Disease, chronic migraine, Diabetes Mellitus
- First degree family history of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder or major 
depressive disorder
- Thyroid problems and low-protein diet
- Endocrine or metabolic disorders such as hepatic or renal problems
- Under treatment for
o cardiac or vascular diseases and use medication for these conditions;
o abnormal blood pressure < 90/60mmHg or > 160/90 mmHg (to be 
determined during the
o intake session)
- Using medication that can interfere with tyrosine’s action; monoamine oxidase 
inhibitors and other antidepressants, sympathomimetic amines, and opioids
- General medical conditions, such as repetitive strain injury (RSI) or sensori-
motor handicaps, blindness or colorblindness, as judged by the investigator
- (History of) abuse of drugs or alcohol
- Habitual smoking, i.e. more than a pack of cigarettes per week
- Participation, current or within the past twelve months, in a specific cognitive 
training study or previous study using the same paradigm as the current study
- Contra-indications for MRI: 
o   Metal objects or fragments in the body that cannot be taken out
o Active implants in the body
o Using med ical plasters
o Epilepsy
o Previous head surgery
o Claustrophobia
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 4.2 | Mood / Blood pressure T2-T0
Measure Screening Placebo Tyrosine Drug effect
Mood
(T2-T0)
Calmness  N/A 0.0 (2.2) -0.3 (1.5) t(28) = 0.6, 
p = 0.566
Contentedness  N/A 0.2 (0.6) 0.1 (1.0) t(28) = 0.4, 
p = 0.689
Alertness  N/A 0.0 (1.4) 0.4 (1.4) t(28) = -1.2, 
p = 0.266
Total  N/A 0.0 (1.0) 0.2 (1.1) t(28) = -0.5, 
p = 0.599
Blood 
pressure
(T2-T0)
Systolic  N/A 7.2 (11.4) 7.9 
(10.8)*
t(27) = -0.3, 
p = 0.763
Diastolic  N/A 1.9 (4.4) 3.9 (5.2)* t(27) = -1.9, 
p = 0.062
Heart rate  N/A -2.0 (7.6) -1.3 
(6.3)*
t(27) = -0.6, 
p = 0.541
Data of mood and blood pressure assessments. Data represent mean (std) and results of 
paired-sample t-tests to assess intervention effects. Missing data points are marked by *.
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 4.3 | Questionnaire N-back
For essay questions, please answer using your own words. There is no need to go 
into great detail, a few sentences should be enough for each question.
1. Please describe what you did to complete the CIRCLE task.
2. How difficult would you rate the CIRCLE task, on a scale of 1 to 10?
(very easy) 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 . . . 4 . . . 5 . . . 6 . . . 7 . . . 8 . . . 9 . . . 10 (very difficult)
3. How much effort did the CIRCLE task require, on a scale of 1 to 10?
(very little effort) 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 . . . 4 . . . 5 . . . 6 . . . 7 . . . 8 . . . 9 . . . 10 (very effortful)
4. Please describe what you did to complete the TRIANGLE task.
5. How difficult would you rate the TRIANGLE task, on a scale of 1 to 10?
(very easy) 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 . . . 4 . . . 5 . . . 6 . . . 7 . . . 8 . . . 9 . . . 10 (very difficult)
6. How much effort did the TRIANGLE task require, on a scale of 1 to 10?
(very little effort) 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 . . . 4 . . . 5 . . . 6 . . . 7 . . . 8 . . . 9 . . . 10 (very effortful)
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7. How much effort did the TRIANGLE task require compared to the CIRCLE task?
The TRIANGLE task required … (check the most appropriate)
much less effort slightly less 
effort
about the Same slightly more 
effort
much more 
effort
… compared to the CIRCLE task.
8. Please describe what you did to complete the SQUARE task.
9. How difficult would you rate the SQUARE task, on a scale of 1 to 10?
(very easy) 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 . . . 4 . . . 5 . . . 6 . . . 7 . . . 8 . . . 9 . . . 10 (very difficult)
10. How much effort did the SQUARE task require, on a scale of 1 to 10?
(very little effort) 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 . . . 4 . . . 5 . . . 6 . . . 7 . . . 8 . . . 9 . . . 10 (very effortful)
11. How much effort did the SQUARE task require compared to the CIRCLE task?
The SQUARE task required … (check the most appropriate)
much less effort slightly less 
effort
about the same slightly more 
effort
much more 
effort
… compared to the CIRCLE task.
12. Please describe what you did to complete the DIAMOND task.
13. How difficult would you rate the DIAMOND task, on a scale of 1 to 10?
(very easy) 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 . . . 4 . . . 5 . . . 6 . . . 7 . . . 8 . . . 9 . . . 10 (very difficult)
14. How much effort did the DIAMOND task require, on a scale of 1 to 10?
(very little effort) 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 . . . 4 . . . 5 . . . 6 . . . 7 . . . 8 . . . 9 . . . 10 (very effortful)
15. How much effort did the DIAMOND task require compared to the CIRCLE 
task?
The DIAMOND task required … (check the most appropriate)
much less effort slightly less 
effort
about the same slightly more 
effort
much more 
effort
… compared to the CIRCLE task.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 4.4 | Models
1. Choice
Model 1.1: SV ~ Drug * Level * Amount + (1 + Drug * Level * Amount | 
SubNo)
Model 1.2 SV ~ Drug * Level * Amount * (BIS-11 + Digit span) + (1 + 
Drug * Level | SubNo)
2. Performance
Model 2.1: d’ d’ ~ Drug * Level + (1 + Drug * Level | SubNo)
Model 2.2: RT log(RT) ~ Drug * Level + (1 + Drug * Level | SubNo)
Model 2.3: d’ d’ ~ Drug * Level * (BIS-11 + Digit Span) + (1 + Drug * Level | 
SubNo)
Model 2.4: RT log(RT) ~ Drug * Level * (BIS-11 + Digit Span) + (1 + Drug * 
Level | SubNo)
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 4.5 | Need for cognition and SV
Using this exact paradigm, the measure of SV has been shown to correlate 
positively with participants’ self-reported need for cognition scores (NCS). 
Including NCS in the choice model, unlike the earlier report, NCS scores did 
not relate to SV of the N-back task across drug (NCS effect: F(1, 27) = 0.41, 
p = 0.530).
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 4.6 | Control analyses
We performed a number of control analyses using a model comparison approach, 
where we assessed whether the residual sum of squares was reduced when 
adding any of the following, perhaps confounding, factors to the SV model: 
order of drug administration, gender, age, and NLV scores (as a measure of 
verbal intelligence). Results of these control analyses confirm that none of the 
four models including these factors, one at a time, reduced the residual sum of 
squares significantly (all comparisons with basic model: X2(1) < 0.1, p > 0.90). In 
more recent projects, the order of catecholaminergic drug administration seems to 
interact with drug effects on subjective value of cognitive control (in preparation). 
Thus, here we assessed directly whether (i) our effect of interest (see Figure 5.5) 
remains significant when taking into account order and (ii) whether effects interact 
with order. The analysis confirms that our effects of interest are not explained by 
order-effects: Drug x Level x BIS: F(1, 208) = 4.5, p = 0.034; Drug x Level x BIS 
x order = F(1, 208) = 0.1, p = 0.770.
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Given that N-back data is available for 26 instead of 29 participants, we repeated 
the COGED analyses for the smaller sample as an additional control analysis: 
also in the reduced sample tyrosine significantly reduced the SV of the N-back 
task to a greater degree in more impulsive participants (drug x impulsivity: F(1, 
22) = 4.60, p = 0.043) and trend-wise as a function of N-back level (drug x 
impulsivity x level: F(1, 22) = 3.90, p = 0.061).
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 4.7 | Statistical effects of performance analyses
Effects Performance
Model 2.1: d’ Model 2.2: RT Model 2.3: d’ Model 2.4: RT
Level F(1,25) = 129.5,
p < 0.001
F(1,25) = 21.0,
p < 0.001
F(1,22) = 147.6,
p < 0.001
F(1,22) = 18.5,
p < 0.001
Drug F(1,25) = 0.0,
p = 0.978
F(1,25) = 0.9,
p = 0.342
F(1,22) = 0.0,
p = 0.872
F(1,22) = 1.9,
p = 0.178
Drug x 
Level
F(1,25) = 0.3,
p = 0.596
F(1,25) = 2.9,
p = 0.103
F(1,22) = 0.4,
p = 0.512
F(1,22) = 3.9,
p = 0.062
IMP N/A N/A F(1,22) = 8.9,
p = 0.007
F(1,22) = 0.0,
p = 0.851
Drug x IMP N/A N/A F(1,22) = 0.0,
p = 0.863
F(1,22) = 1.5,
p = 0.236
Drug x 
Level x IMP
N/A N/A F(1,22) = 1.0,
p = 0.323
F(1,22) = 4.9,
p = 0.038
Digit Span N/A N/A F(1,22) = 2.0,
p = 0.167
F(1,22) = 0.0,
p = 0.885
Drug x 
Span
N/A N/A F(1,22) = 0.1,
p = 0.822
F(1,22) = 4.0,
p = 0.058
Drug x 
Level x 
Span
N/A N/A F(1,22) = 0.4,
p = 0.544
F(1,22) = 6.0,
p = 0.023
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 4.8 | Statistical effects of choice analyses
Effects Choices
Model 1.1 Model 1.2
Level F(1,28) = 54.1, p < 0.001 F(1,25) = 51.5, p < 0.001
Drug F(1,28) = 0.2, p = 0.699 F(1,25) = 0.1, p = 0.744
Drug x Level F(1,228) = 0.0, p = 0.912 F(1,25) = 0.0, p = 0.853
Amt F(1,28) = 4.8, p = 0.037 F(1,212) = 5.2, p = 0.023
Drug x Amt F(1,228) = 0.9, p = 0.338 F(1,212) = 0.9, p = 0.342
Level x Amt F(1,228) = 2.8, p = 0.093 F(1,212) = 2.9, p = 0.088
Drug x Amt x Level F(1,228) = 0.0, p = 0.912 F(1,25) = 0.0, p = 0.853
IMP N/A F(1,25) = 0.2, p = 0.673
Drug x IMP N/A F(1,25) = 4.2 p = 0.051
Drug x Level x IMP N/A F(1,25) = 5.0, p = 0.034
Drug x Amt x IMP N/A F(1,212) = 0.3, p = 0.605
Drug x Level x Amt x 
IMP
N/A F(1,212) = 0.1, p = 0.809
Digit Span N/A F(1,25) = 5.6, p = 0.026
Drug x Span N/A F(1,25) = 1.3, p = 0.268
Drug x Level x Span N/A F(1,25) = 1.0, p = 0.320
Drug x Amt x Span N/A F(1,212) = 0.2, p = 0.667
Drug x Level x Amt x 
Span
N/A F(1,212) = 1.6, p = 0.211
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 4.9 | Statistical effects of full model
Statistical effects of Model 1.2 now including ‘offer amount’ as random effect. 
Note that this model gives convergence-warnings due to model complexity. In-
text, we describe results of Model 1.2 presented in Supplemental Material 4.8. 
However, this table shows that our main conclusions on impulsivity-dependent 
tyrosine effects hold.
Effects Model 1.2 + random effect of ‘offer amount’
Drug x IMP F(1,25) = 4.2 p = 0.052
Drug x Level x IMP F(1,25) = 4.7, p = 0.041
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CHAPTER 
Does tyrosine modulate the 
flexibility/stability tradeoff in 
working memory in healthy 
aging?
This chapter is in preparation for submission as:
M. I. Froböse, M. Bloemendaal, S. J. Fallon, B. B. Zandbelt, E. 
Aarts, R. Cools (in preparation). Does tyrosine modulate the 
flexibility/stability tradeoff in working memory in healthy aging?
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ABSTRACT
Healthy aging has been associated with changes in catecholamine 
functioning and decrements in working memory performance. Following prior 
psychopharmacological evidence from young adults, we assessed whether 
the administration of a catecholamine precursor to older adults alters working 
memory performance and associated BOLD signal in fronto-striatal circuitry as 
a function of task demands. More specifically, we hypothesized that tyrosine 
improves cognitive stability (i.e. distractor resistance) accompanied by increased 
BOLD signal in the prefrontal cortex, while impairing cognitive flexibility (i.e. 
updating working memory representations). We therefore administered an 
adapted delayed match-to-sample task in a within-subjects design to 29 healthy 
older adults (60-75 years). Surprisingly, tyrosine reduced the ability to stabilize 
relevant representations and ignore irrelevant information, evidenced by a larger 
distractor cost on trials requiring stabilization compared with that on flexible 
update trials. This effect was accompanied by a tyrosine-induced increase in 
update- versus ignore-related activity in the right anterior cingulate cortex. Thus, 
tyrosine promoted the gating of both relevant and irrelevant information into 
working memory, while also enhancing flexible update-related medial frontal 
signal. These findings demonstrate that the effects of a catecholamine challenge 
depend on task demands and raise the hypothesis that tyrosine biases the aging 
brain away from cognitive rigidity towards distractibility, by modulating the 
prefrontal cortex.
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INTRODUCTION
Catecholamine transmission has long been implicated in cognitive control, 
including working memory (Arnsten, 1998; Brozoski et al., 1979; Goldman-
Rakic, 1997). A key role for catecholamines is also supported by pharmacological 
interventions, showing that administration of dopamine receptor agonists and 
antagonists respectively improved and impaired performance on a working 
memory task in healthy young adults (Luciana et al., 1992; Mehta et al., 1999). 
Critically, healthy aging is characterized by impairments in working memory 
(Cai and Arnsten, 1997; Gazzaley et al., 2005; Turner and Spreng, 2012) and 
reduced dopamine transmission (Bäckman et al., 2006; Karlsson et al., 2009; 
Karrer et al., 2017). In aged animals, repleting prefrontal cortex dopamine with 
a D1 receptor agonist improved performance on working memory tasks (Cai 
and Arnsten, 1997; Mizoguchi et al., 2009). These findings invite the assessment 
of potential beneficial effects on cognition of pharmacological interventions that 
increase catecholamine synthesis in older adults.
Other than in young adults, previous studies on the consequences of changes 
in catecholamine transmission on working memory performance in older adults 
have yielded inconsistent results: Administration of amphetamine increased 
BOLD response variability during N-back task performance in older adults who, 
compared with young adults, had low response variability during a placebo session 
(Garrett et al., 2015). However, performance was not altered by amphetamine 
or methylphenidate when assessed with the N-back task (Garrett et al., 2015), 
digit span, spatial working memory or spatial span task (Turner et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, a recent study has revealed impaired working memory performance 
after the administration of a catecholamine precursor: Acute administration of 
high doses of tyrosine to older adults resulted in poorer instead of better N-back 
performance, despite drug-induced increase in plasma tyrosine concentrations 
(van de Rest et al., 2017). In contrast, higher habitual dietary tyrosine intake has 
been shown in a large sample to be positively associated with working memory 
capacity in young and older adults (Kühn et al., 2017).
We propose that this variability in (or lack of) drug effects on working memory might 
be accounted for by variation in specific working memory task demands. This is 
based on prior evidence for contrasting effects of dopaminergic drugs depending 
on task demands and associated neural systems. While prefrontal dopamine has 
been theorized to increase the signal-to-noise ratio of neuronal firing in the PFC, 
leading to increased robustness of working memory representations (Durstewitz 
and Seamans, 2008; Durstewitz et al., 2000; Seamans and Yang, 2004; Servan-
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schreiber et al., 1990), dopamine in the basal ganglia (BG) has been proposed 
to be involved in the flexible gating of new representations into the PFC (Hazy et 
al., 2007)(see Cognitive stability versus flexibility). Thus, depending on the locus of 
effect, catecholaminergic interventions can shift the balance towards or away from 
cognitive stability (Braver and Cohen, 2000; Cools and D’Esposito, 2011; Fallon 
and Cools, 2014; Fallon et al., 2016), thereby improving and impairing working 
memory performance depending on specific demand. To test the hypothesis 
that catecholamine effects in older adults depend on specific task demands, we 
characterized in the current study the behavioral and neural effects of tyrosine 
administration on distinct processes of working memory: cognitive stability (i.e. 
distractor inhibition) versus cognitive flexibility (i.e. updating of working memory 
representations).
Cognitive stability versus flexibility
Adaptive behavior relies on an arbitration between focus and flexibility (Cools, 
2016; D’Ardenne et al., 2012). The PFC has been reliably implicated in the active 
online maintenance of goal-relevant representations (Baddeley et al., 1986) by 
increasing the activity of brain regions that process goal-relevant representations 
(Fuster and Alexander, 1971; Gazzaley et al., 2007b; Jha et al., 2004; Miller 
et al., 1996; Toepper et al., 2010; Yoon et al., 2006). In healthy young adults, 
amphetamine and methylphenidate have been found to increase BOLD signal 
during working memory tasks, especially in the PFC (Fallon et al., 2016; Mattay 
et al., 2000). The increase in prefrontal activation was accompanied by increased 
distractor inhibition (Fallon et al., 2016). Note that there are also reports on 
L-DOPA-induced improvements in working memory performance that were 
accompanied by decreases in prefrontal signal, suggesting that dopamine 
might alter the recruitment but also physiological efficiency (Cools et al., 2002b; 
Mattay et al., 2002). BOLD-changes might reflect dopamine-induced changes 
in the signal-to-noise ratio of neuronal firing in the PFC, leading to increased 
robustness of currently goal-relevant representations in the face of intervening 
distractors (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008; Durstewitz et al., 2000; Seamans 
and Yang, 2004; Servan-schreiber et al., 1990). According to the dual state 
theory of prefrontal cortex dopamine, robust online maintenance of information 
is facilitated by enhanced D1 relative D2 receptor stimulation in the prefrontal 
cortex (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008).
However, accumulating evidence indicates that dopamine is also implicated in 
flexible updating by modulating BG processing with the use of a gating mechanism 
that regulates the inputs to PFC (Bhandari and Badre, 2018; Braver and Cohen, 
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2000; Chatham and Badre, 2015; Chatham et al., 2014; Rougier et al., 2005). In 
line with this proposal, BOLD signals in the BG have been found to increase during 
processes that require the flexible updating of current goal representations (Cools 
et al., 2002a; Fallon and Cools, 2014; Fallon et al., 2016; Leber et al., 2008). 
As such, similar to the role of the basal ganglia in action selection (Gerfen and 
Surmeier, 2011; Mink, 1996), it has a ‘gating-like’ function in working memory: 
more ‘Go’ activity, which is triggered by dopamine release due to expected 
reward or drug treatment, stimulates update of WM representations in the PFC 
(Hazy et al., 2007). This is in line with the observation that the administration 
of D2 receptor stimulation bromocriptine, which has abundant receptors in the 
BG, impaired distractor resistance in humans (Bloemendaal et al., 2015) and 
modulated BG signals during cognitive switching (Cools et al., 2007).
Aging has been primarily associated with impairments in cognitive stability and 
greater flexibility (Dunnett et al., 1988; Lindenberger and Mayr, 2014; Wang et 
al., 2011), in line with animal studies pointing at a specific decline in dopamine 
level within the prefrontal cortex (Goldman-Rakic, 1997; Goldman-Rakic and 
Brown, 1981).
Tyrosine administration
Tyrosine is a precursor of dopamine and noradrenaline and the administration 
of tyrosine stimulates synthesis and release of catecholamines (Growdon et al., 
1982; Scally et al., 1977; Tam and Roth, 1997). The main source of tyrosine is 
protein-rich food, but tyrosine has also been administered selectively as a powder 
for study purposes and has been shown to alter cognition (Jongkees et al., 2015). 
In young adults, similar to beneficial effects of dietary tyrosine intake (Kühn et 
al., 2017), tyrosine administration has been shown to improve cognitive control 
functions that are commonly associated with catecholamine transmission, such 
as working memory, response inhibition, and task switching (see Deijen, 2005; 
Jongkees et al., 2015 for reviews).
As is the case for other dopaminergic drugs, effects of tyrosine administration 
have been shown to depend on the baseline state of the system. For example, 
tyrosine was shown to be particularly effective in enhancing catecholamine 
metabolism under stress or high cognitive demand, while having disruptive 
effects in conditions where baseline catecholamine levels are thought to be 
higher (Jongkees et al., 2015; Tam and Roth, 1997). We administered tyrosine 
to older adults, aged 60-75, who we anticipated would be more sensitive to 
tyrosine administration than young adults for two reasons. First, healthy aging 
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is accompanied by a decline in dopamine transmission (Bäckman et al., 2006). 
Second, older adults suffer from an impairment in working memory performance 
(Abdulrahman et al., 2017; Bloemendaal et al., 2016; Kray et al., 2002; van de 
Laar et al., 2011; Mitchell et al., 2000; Onur et al., 2011).
Hypothesis
Our hypothesis is grounded in prior observations suggesting that manipulation 
of brain dopamine modulates distinct cognitive functions, i.e. flexible updating 
and distractor-inhibition, by acting on dissociable brain regions, i.e. the BG and 
the PFC respectively (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011).
Given that older adults show greatest deficits in cognitive stability and given 
the proposal that tyrosine improves dopamine-dependent functions with greater 
cognitive demand (Colzato et al., 2013), we hypothesize that tyrosine improves 
distractor inhibition by increasing the signal-to-noise ratio of task-relevant 
representations in the PFC. This change in distractor inhibition, however, is 
anticipated to be accompanied by a change in the degree to which working 
memory representations can be updated, thus leading to improved distractor 
inhibition and increase in prefrontal BOLD signal, but reduced flexibility. To test 
this hypothesis we used a modified version of a classic delayed match-to-sample 
test of working memory, which has previously been shown to be sensitive to the 
administration of methylphenidate, a catecholamine transporter blocker (Fallon 
et al., 2016). In line with our current prediction, methylphenidate increased 
performance and prefrontal BOLD signal when cognitive stability was required, 
but impaired cognitive flexibility. Using this task, we assess tyrosine effects on 
the critical intervening phase in which stimuli either needed to be protected 
against distraction (i.e. ignore condition) or used to update working memory 
representations (i.e. update).
While our study was set up to assess the hypothesis that tyrosine administration 
would alter update/ignore balance, we also explored whether tyrosine altered 
working memory in a manner that depended on either of two well-known 
dopamine proxy measures: trait impulsivity (Buckholtz et al., 2010) and working 
memory capacity (Cools et al., 2008; Landau et al., 2009). This exploratory 
analysis was motivated by the observations that the effects of manipulating 
catecholamine transmission on cognitive control are well established to depend 
on (a proxy of) baseline levels of dopamine (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011; Swart 
et al., 2017) and that effects of tyrosine in older adults have been shown to be 
baseline-dependent (Bloemendaal et al., 2018; van de Rest et al., 2017).
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METHODS
Participants
Exclusion criteria for this study were a history of clinically significant psychiatric, 
neurological or cardiovascular disorder, abuse of drugs or alcohol, abnormal 
blood pressure (< 90/60 mmHg or > 160/90 mmHg), medication use that can 
interfere with tyrosine’s action, blindness or colorblindness, smoking > 1 pack of 
cigarettes per week, or contra-indications for MRI. For a complete list of exclusion 
criteria, see Supplemental Material 4.1.
After a screening session, 33 healthy, right-handed adults were initially included 
for participation. However, 4 additional participants were excluded or decided to 
discontinue during or after the first experimental session, due to blood pressure 
exceeding our inclusion criteria (n = 1) and fMRI-intolerance (anxiety: n = 1; 
nausea: n = 1, headache: n = 1), leaving a sample of 29 participants (age: 
M = 66.7, range = 61-71, 16 males) who completed both experimental sessions. 
For the fMRI analysis we excluded one additional participant, due to a high 
frequency of signal intensity spikes (>20 spikes per session) in one session, 
resulting in a final sample of 28 participants (see Statistical analyses section).
We report questionnaire and neuropsychological assessment data for the complete 
sample (n = 29) in Table 4.1. Note that this is an exact replication of Table 4.1, 
because the same participants completed multiple experiments in the context of 
the same study. All procedures were in accordance with the local ethical guidelines 
approved by the local ethics committee (CMO protocol NL49758.091.14) and in 
line with the Helsinki Declaration of 1975.
General procedure
A within-subjects, placebo-controlled, double-blind, cross-over design was 
employed. Participants visited the institute three times: once for a screening and 
twice for experimental sessions of around 4.5 hours (Figure 5.1). The general 
procedure was identical to the procedure presented in chapter 4.
The screening session started with a provision of additional information about 
the study, informed consent and a check for medical exclusion criteria. To assess 
exclusion criteria, we administered the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale 
(HADS, Bjelland et al., 2002), Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE, Folstein et 
al., 1975) and the Dutch reading test for an estimate of verbal intelligence (NLV, 
Schmand et al., 1991). In addition, participants’ trait impulsivity (BIS-11, Patton 
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et al., 1995) and Need for Cognition (NCS scale, Cacioppo and Petty, 1982; 
Cacioppo et al., 1984) were assessed. We assessed trait impulsivity to explore how 
individual variation in impulsiveness were associated with drug-effects (Statistical 
analyses section). The Need for Cognition scale was administered to assess the 
relationship with cognitive effort discounting, reported elsewhere (Chapter 4). 
Scores of these self-report questionnaires are presented in Table 4.1. In case of 
an inclusion, participants were familiarized with the cognitive test battery that 
was administered during the experimental sessions. This consisted of practicing 
a response inhibition task (Bloemendaal et al., 2018), the update/ignore working 
memory task described here (see Update/ignore working memory task section 
based on Fallon and Cools, 2014; Fallon et al., 2016) and an N-back task 
(Chapter 4). Afterwards, participants were escorted to the fMRI facility and their 
weight was assessed for adequate dosage calculation (see Tyrosine administration 
section).
The two experimental sessions were identical, except that participants received 
placebo on one day and tyrosine on the other day in counter-balanced order. 
Participants were asked to come to the lab in the morning (at 8am or 10am) 
after overnight fasting: they refrained from eating, drinking except from water 
and taking any medication from 10PM of the previous day. The overnight fast 
prevents large variability in large neutral amino acid levels in plasma between 
participants caused by the previous meal (Fernstrom and Wurtman, 1979). A 
similar fasting procedure has been adopted in other research using tyrosine 
supplementation (Banderet and Lieberman, 1989; Colzato et al., 2014; Lieberman 
et al., 1985; Mahoney et al., 2007; Shurtleff et al., 1994). Sessions started 
approximately at the same time of the day (maximal deviation was 90 minutes), 
with an interval of one week to a max of 17 weeks between testing days. After 
signing an informed consent form, participants practiced the response-inhibition 
task (see Bloemendaal et al., 2018), and right after drug administration (see 
Tyrosine administration section), the N-back task and update/ignore working 
memory task (see Update/ignore working memory task section) were rehearsed. 
The cognitive test battery consisted in total of 3 paradigms (Figure 5.1). The order 
of practice and paradigms was constant across sessions and participants. After 
a break of 90 minutes, the response inhibition task (Bloemendaal et al., 2018) 
and update/ignore working memory task were administered in the fMRI scanner. 
After fMRI (duration ~90 minutes), we administered a cognitive effort discounting 
task (Chapter 4) and different neuropsychological tests, including immediate 
and delayed story recall (Wilson et al., 1989), digit span forward and backward 
(Groth-Marnat, 2001), Stroop cards (Stroop, 1935), verbal fluency (Tombaugh 
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et al., 1999), box completion (Salthouse, 1996) and number cancellation (Lewis 
and Kupke, 1977). Summary scores are presented in Table 4.1.
For safety reasons, blood pressure and heart rate were measured three times 
throughout the days (start of testing day, before task battery, after task battery). 
At the same time points, participants’ mood was assessed using the Bond and 
Lader Visual Analogue Scales (calmness, contentedness, alertness; (Bond and 
Lader, 1974). For exploratory purposes, assessing tyrosine’s effect on dopamine 
metabolites, urine was collected on both testing sessions off drug (i.e. before drug 
administration) and around the peak of tyrosine concentration (i.e. right after the 
fMRI part). Drug effects on mood, blood pressure and urine data (all T1-T0 due 
to peak level of intervention) are reported in Table 4.1. Supplemental Material 
4.2 reports mood and blood pressure data for T2-T0.
FIGURE 5.1 | Schema of study setup (A) and experimental sessions (B). A An initial 
screening was followed by two identical (except for placebo versus tyrosine intervention) ex-
perimental sessions. Duration between screening and session 1 was on average 22 days, 
between the two experimental sessions on average 20 days. To prevent any carry-over 
effects of pharmacological interventions, the experimental sessions were separated by at 
least 7 days. B During the experimental sessions, participants received yoghurt contain-
ing placebo or tyrosine and conducted a test battery (see General Procedure section). 
The update/ignore working memory task was administered during fMRI and took place 
around 150 minutes after the intervention. Plasma levels of tyrosine have been shown to 
peak 90-120 minutes after the administration.
Tyrosine administration
As also described in earlier publications of the same study (Bloemendaal et 
al., 2018) and chapter 4, participants received tyrosine on one and a placebo 
substance on the other day, both adjusted to body weight as determined during 
the screening session (see General procedure section). Following multiple previous 
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studies in young volunteers (Mahoney et al., 2007; but see e.g. Colzato et al., 
2013), we administered 150 mg/kg L-tyrosine powder (BulkpowdersTM, Sports 
Supplements Ltd. Colchester, Essex, United Kingdom). The placebo product was 
a mixture of 54 mg/kg dextrine-maltose (Fantomalt by Nutricia) with 110 mg/kg 
maizena (ratio Fantomalt/cornstarch = ~½). The ratio of Fantomalt to cornstarch 
was adjusted to ensure that placebo and tyrosine mixture have an equal energy 
level, similar structure and aftertaste. Tyrosine and placebo powders were mixed 
with 200 g of banana-flavored yoghurt (Arla Foods Nederland, Nijkerk, The 
Netherlands) to ensure comfortable ingestion. Weighting of the doses and 
preparing and coding the samples were performed by staff members who were 
not involved in the study, ensuring double-blind administration.
Tyrosine is a precursor of the catecholamines: When tyrosine enters the brain via 
the blood-brain barrier, it is converted into levodopa through the rate-limiting 
enzyme tyrosine-hydroxylase (TH; Daubner et al., 2011) and then further converted 
into dopamine through the enzyme aromatic l-amino acid decarboxylase (AADC), 
resulting in an increase in dopamine levels. In turn, dopamine can be converted 
into noradrenaline through the enzyme dopamine beta-hydroxylase (DBH; 
Jongkees et al., 2015; Kaufman & Friedman, 1965). The oral administration of 
tyrosine significantly enhances central catecholamine synthesis in rodents (Cuche 
et al., 1985; Fernstrom, 1983; Gibson and Wurtman, 1976; Scally et al., 1977; 
Sved et al., 1979; Tam et al., 1990) and humans (Growdon et al., 1982). Plasma 
concentrations peak ~2 hours after administration and remain significantly 
elevated up to 8h (Glaeser et al., 1979). The administration of 150 mg/kg 
body weight tyrosine has been shown to significantly increase plasma tyrosine 
concentrations also in older adults (van de Rest et al., 2017). To test participants at 
maximal plasma levels, participants underwent the cognitive test battery starting 
~90 minutes after drug intake. The delay between drug administration and 
the update/ignore working memory task (described in Update/ignore working 
memory task section), the paradigm of primary interest for our research question, 
was on average 148 (SD = 8.9) minutes (after tyrosine M = 147.7, SD = 6.6; 
after placebo M = 149.0, SD = 10.9).
Update/ignore working memory task
The task design of the update/ignore working memory task was based on earlier 
work by Fallon and colleagues (Fallon and Cools, 2014; Fallon et al., 2016). The 
task was programmed and administered using Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 
1997; Pelli, 1997) in MATLAB 2013a (Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA).
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Participants completed the update/ignore working memory task on three different 
occasions: they completed a shorter practice version of the task (24 trials) during 
the screening and both experimental sessions. And, to address our research 
questions, they completed a longer version (96 trials) of the task twice in the fMRI 
scanner, once after placebo and once after tyrosine administration.
The task is an adapted delayed match-to-sample task (Figure 5.2A). Participants 
encode stimuli and need to indicate after some delay whether a probe matches 
one of the two stimuli that have previously been presented. In this task, as in 
earlier versions (Fallon and Cools, 2014; Fallon et al., 2016), we added an 
extra phase during the delay, which allowed us to distinguish cognitive stability 
from cognitive flexibility: the intervening phase. During the intervening phase, 
participants were required to ignore (i.e. ignore condition) or update (i.e. update 
condition) stimuli that were presented on the screen. In the ignore condition, 
participants needed to inhibit distraction by stimuli that are presented on-screen 
and keep in mind only the stimuli presented during encoding. In the update 
condition, they had to flexibly update/over-write the encoded stimuli and only 
remember the newly presented stimuli. We also included control trials, in which 
no intervening stimuli were presented (no-interference condition), very similar to 
a standard delayed match-to-sample task. Thus, these trials were identical to the 
ignore condition regarding the delay between relevant stimuli (i.e. encoding) and 
target presentation, but lacked distraction.
Stimuli in this task were computer-generated “spirographs,” which were composed 
of different RGB elements. Every trial started with the encoding phase, in which 
two distinct stimuli were presented on the left and right side of the centre (centered 
at  ¼ of the screen width and ½ of the screen height) on a black background for 
2 seconds. During encoding, a white letter ‘T’ (Times New Roman, font size = 64) 
was presented in the centre of the screen, indicating that these were target stimuli 
relevant for encoding. Then, after a delay consisting of a blank screen, during 
the intervening phase, two new distinct stimuli were presented for 2 seconds on 
the left and right side from the centre. If the white letter presented in the centre 
was an ‘N’, participants had to ignore the stimuli, if the letter was a ‘T’, then 
these were the new target shapes and needed to replace the previously encoded 
stimuli. In case of the no-interference condition, only a white fixation cross was 
presented. Then, after another delay, the probe screen was presented: one single 
stimulus was presented in the centre of the screen with the word ‘yes’ (Dutch: ‘ja’) 
and ‘no’ (Dutch: ‘nee’) printed below the stimulus on the left and right side. Here, 
participants were supposed to indicate by a click on the button box with their right 
index or middle finger, whether they were supposed to remember this probe. They 
5
CHAPTER 5UPDATE/IGNORE PERFORMANCE
140
were supposed to click ‘yes’ for a match and ‘no’ for a non-match. In the ignore 
and no-interference condition, the probe is a match when it is identical to one of 
the two stimuli presented during the encoding phase; in the update condition, a 
probe is a match if it is identical to one of the two stimuli presented during the 
intervening phase. Participants had 2 seconds to respond to the probes before the 
next trial started after an inter-trial-interval. In contrast to earlier versions of the 
task, here, the 3 conditions (ignore, no-interference and ignore) were randomized 
instead of blocked. There was an equal probability of the probe being a match or 
non-match stimulus, such that participants, if responding correctly, were supposed 
to respond ‘yes’ and ‘no’ in 50% of the trials. Of the non-match trials, half were 
novel stimuli, the other half were lures. Lures were defined as stimuli that featured 
as distractors in the ignore condition and initially encoded stimuli in the update 
condition (Figure 5.2B). We refer to the lures as distractor probes.
The practice version was administered in behavioral labs with participants sitting 
comfortably in front of the screen, hands positioned on the keyboard. Participants 
completed 48 trials which were split in 2 blocks of 24 trials (8 trials per condition: 
ignore, no-interference, update). Delays between encoding, intervening and 
probe phase were fixed to last 3 seconds each. Inter-trial-interval (ITI) was 2 
seconds. After each block, participants were provided with feedback (% correct 
across conditions). Responses were given with index and middle finger on the 
keyboard.
The main version of the task was administered while participants were lying 
in the fMRI scanner. The task was projected via a mirror and the button box 
was located on the right leg for comfortable access with the right hand (see 
MRI acquisition section). In the fMRI, participants completed 96 trials, distributed 
across 4 blocks. Each block contained 24 trials (8 trials per condition). After each 
block, participants had a break and were provided with feedback (% correct 
across conditions) for 10 seconds. Delay periods and ITIs were jittered to last 
respectively 2-6 seconds with a mean of 3 and 1-5 seconds with a mean of 2 
seconds. To optimize design efficiency of hemodynamic response estimation, we 
extracted 4 out of 100 randomizations containing trial order and timings that had 
minimal correlations between regressors of interest. Each participant conducted 
2 of these 4 sequences, one at each experimental session.
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FIGURE 5.2 | A An illustration of the modified delay match-to-sample task. Participants 
were presented with two stimuli for 2 s that always had to be encoded. After a variable 
delay period (2–6 s), participants were presented with novel stimuli (2 s) that had to be 
ignored (in the case of ‘N’) or used for working memory updating (in the case of ‘T’). 
A no-interference condition, in which only a fixation cross appeared (also for 2 s), was 
included as a control condition. After another variable delay period (2-6 s), participants 
were presented with a probe item. Participants had to respond according to whether the 
presented item matched or did not match one of the relevant stimuli depending on the 
task condition. In the present example, the correct answer would be ‘No’ in all conditions, 
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because it is a non-match (novel stimulus). Participants had a maximum of 2 s to respond 
before the variable inter-trial-interval (ITI; 1-5 s). Order of task conditions was randomized. 
Note that for illustration purposes, stimuli are presented larger in this figure than in the real 
experiment. See Update/ignore working memory task section for details on size. B Half 
of the probes were matches (Target) and half non-matches (distractors (Dist) or Novel). 
Targets for ignore and no-interference trials were the stimuli presented during encoding 
(here: blue shape). In the update condition, the target shapes are presented during the 
intervening phase (here: red ‘circle’). Distractors are stimuli that were presented during 
the trial, but they needed to be displaced (in the update condition) or ignored (in the 
ignore condition). Novel probes are shapes that were never presented during encoding or 
intervening phase (pink shape presented in A and B). C Following signal detection theory, 
we calculated, for each drug session and for each condition, participants’ sensitivity to 
discriminate target from non-target (d’) based on the hit and false alarm rates.
Questionnaires and digit span
A series of questionnaires and neuropsychological tests were completed by 
participants during the screening and experimental sessions. The trait impulsivity, 
the digit span, and need for cognition scales were key to our exploratory research 
questions and will be described in more detail below. Scores on other acquired 
measures are presented in Table 4.1.
Trait impulsivity
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995) was administered 
to assess participants’ degree of trait impulsivity. The scale is a self-report 
questionnaire, consisting of 30 statements that participants rate on a 4-point 
Likert scale (“never” to “almost always”). Examples are “I buy things on impulse” 
or “I am future oriented”. Scores on this questionnaire can range from 30 to 120. 
The total Barratt score has been found to be associated with reduced dopamine 
D2/D3 receptor availability in the midbrain, and enhanced dopamine release 
in the striatum (Buckholtz et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2009) and has been shown to 
predict effects of MPH on learning (Clatworthy et al., 2009). This measure serves 
as a second putative proxy of baseline dopamine function for predicting effects 
of MPH.
Digit span
Baseline working memory capacity was assessed with a recorded version of the 
digit span (Groth-Marnat, 2001) at the end of both experimental sessions. The 
digit span consists of two parts: forward and backward digit span. In the first 
part, participants’ task was to repeat series of numbers that are presented via 
headphones in the same order as presented (forward). Series start with three 
numbers and increase up to 9 numbers. Participants complete two trials for each 
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span and their score is identical to the maximum of digits repeated without any 
error in one of the two trials. The second part is almost identical, except that 
participants have to repeat the span backwards, beginning with the last digit of 
the span. The lowest span contains two and the highest eight digits. Here too, the 
score is equal to the maximum of digits repeated correctly. Forward and backward 
scores are added to obtain a total score, such that scores can range from 0 to 17. 
In the absence of tyrosine effect on this measure, as in earlier studies (van der 
Schaaf et al., 2013), the average total digit span across two days was selected, 
because it was thought to provide a more reliable estimate of working memory 
capacity. The total scores were averaged across the assessments and used as a 
covariate of interest in the analysis (see Statistical analyses section).
MRI acquisition
MRI data were acquired on two different days. Each MRI session lasted ~90 
minutes. Working memory task data were collected in the last run (of ~ 30 
minutes) of each session after the anatomical scan. Visual stimuli were projected 
on a screen and were viewed on a mirror attached to the head coil. Responses 
were given on a MR-compatible button-box located with comfortable access of 
the right hand (index and middle finger).
Whole-brain imaging was performed on a 3.0 T MRI scanner (Magnetom Skyra, 
Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a 32-channel head 
coil. During task performance, a total of 900 images with blood-oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) contrast were acquired using a whole-brain T2*-weighted 
gradient echo multi-echo echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence (34 axial slices 
per functional volume in ascending order; repetition time, 2070 ms; echo-times, 
9.0, 19.3, 30.0, and 40.0 ms; field of view, 224 x 224 mm; flip angle, 90°; 64 
x 64 matrix; 3.5 mm in-plane resolution; 3 mm slice thickness; 0.5 mm slice 
gap). This is a method that uses accelerated parallel imaging to reduce image 
artifacts and acquires images at multiple echo times following a single excitation 
(Poser et al., 2006). Before the task, 30 images with the same pulse sequence 
as used for the task were acquired during resting-state, to determine optimal 
weighting of echo times for each voxel. For within-subject registration purposes, a 
whole-brain structural image was made before the task run, using a T1-weighted 
magnetization prepared, rapid-acquisition gradient echo (MP-RAGE) sequence 
(192 sagittal slices; repetition time, 2300 ms; echo time, 3.03 ms; field of view, 
256 x 256 mm; flip angle, 8°; 256 x 256 matrix; 1.0 mm in-plane resolution; 
1.0 mm slice).
5
CHAPTER 5UPDATE/IGNORE PERFORMANCE
144
Statistical analyses
Behavioral analysis
Behavioral analyses were performed on response times (RT) and d’. Following 
signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 1966), behavior on a Yes/No task can 
be broken down into the sensitivity to discriminate target from non-target (d’) 
and an estimate for the overall tendency to judge stimuli as targets (criterion). 
As our research question concerned working memory performance instead of 
an overall response tendency, we report d’ in the main text and criterion in 
Supplemental Material 5.1. In line with the standard approach to calculate d’ 
values, we subtracted the z-score that corresponds to the false-alarm rate from 
the z-score that corresponds to the hit rate (Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999) per 
task condition per drug (see Figure 5.2C). As outlined in the methods section, 
half of the non-matches were distractors. To be able to take into account probe 
type in the analyses, we calculated two separate d’ values: once correcting target 
responses for false alarms after novel probes (FAnov) and once correcting for false 
alarm rate after distractor probes (FAdis)(see Figure 5.2B and 5.2C).
Mean RTs and d’ data were normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk test of normality: 
p > 0.1) and therefore analyzed with 2 separate repeated measures ANOVA 
using SPSS 23 (IBM Corp., Armonk, N.Y., USA). We included as within-subject 
factors drug (2 levels: tyrosine vs. placebo), condition (2 levels: Ignore vs. Update) 
and probe type (3 levels for RT: Target, Novel, Distractor; 2 levels for d’: hit rate 
corrected for Novel vs Distractors). Effects were considered statistically significant 
if the p-value was smaller than 0.05. Given that our hypothesis concerned the 
direct contrast between ignore and update conditions, we report analyses in the 
main text that contrast directly the two levels (Update versus Ignore). However, 
for completeness, we report in Supplemental Material 5.2 identical analyses, but 
then including three condition types (Ignore, No interference, Update).
MRI analysis
Preprocessing
Preprocessing was performed using Statistical Parametric Mapping 8 (SPM8; 
Wellcome Trust Center for Cognitive Neuroimaging, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.
ac.uk/spm) running in MATLAB and proceeded in four steps. First, multiecho 
images were combined based on the parallel acquired inhomogeneity desensitized 
algorithm (Poser et al., 2006), using in-house built MATLAB software. Using the 
resting-state scans that were collected before the start of the task, the software 
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computed the optimal weighting of echo times for each voxel (after applying a 
smoothing kernel of 3mm full-width at half-maximum) by calculating the contrast-
to-noise ratio for each echo per scan. Next, for head motion correction, the 
software estimated the iterative rigid body realignment that minimizes the residual 
sum of squares between the first echo of the first scan and all other scans. 
These estimated parameters were then applied to all other echos, realigning 
all echos to the first echo of the first scan. Finally, the four echo images of each 
scan were combined into single images using the computed optimal echo time 
weightings. Second, after checking data quality (i.e., for signal intensity spikes: 
see below), the combined and realigned functional images were corrected for 
differences in acquisition times across slices, resampling all slices in time relative 
to the middle (i.e. 17th) slice using Fourier interpolation. Third, for the purpose 
of normalization, i) functional and anatomical data were first co-registered 
to standardized stereotactic space (Montreal Neurological Institute, MNI) 
templates (spm8/templates/EPI.nii and spm8/templates/T1.nii), using the mutual 
information criteria method (Studholme et al., 1999), ii) the anatomical image was 
segmented and normalized to the International Consortium for Brain Mapping 
space template for European brains using linear and non-linear deformations 
(Ashburner and Friston, 1999, 2005), iii) the bias-corrected structural image 
(output from segmentation) was spatially co-registered to the (mean) functional 
images using the mutual information criteria method (Studholme et al., 1999) 
and, finally, iv) the transformation matrix resulting from segmentation was used 
to normalize the functional images (resampled at voxel size 2×2×2 mm) and 
anatomical image. Lastly, functional images were spatially smoothed using an 
8-mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
The data quality check for signal intensity spikes indicated that out of 58 sessions, 
53 sessions did not contain any spikes, as defined by a fractional deviation in of 
the slice mean activity in a certain volume of larger than 0.3 compared to the 
average signal. Four sessions evidenced spikes in one (n = 3) or two (n =1) slices, 
which we removed and replaced by an average signal of the identical slice in the 
previous and next volume in time. However, we excluded one participant from 
further analyses, because the number of spikes was disproportionally high (25) 
and we refrained from correcting raw data to such a great extent.
First-level modeling
First-level statistical analysis involved a mass-univariate approach based on 
general linear models (GLM) in SPM12, comprising three steps. First, each subject’s 
whole-brain BOLD data were modeled with a GLM, including both experimental 
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sessions. For each session, the following 13 task-related regressors were modeled: 
initial encoding stimuli, task conditions (Update, No interference, Ignore), probe 
type per condition (target and novel for all 3 conditions, distractor for ignore and 
update only) and end of block feedback. Task-related regressors were created by 
convolving box-car functions (initiated at the onset of the event) with a canonical 
hemodynamic response function. The box-car function spanned the fixed duration 
of stimulus presentation of 2 s for the first four predictors (i.e. constant epoch 
model); for probe regressors, it spanned the length of subject’s response time 
(i.e. variable epoch model). Following the approach of (Lund et al., 2005), 24 
nuisance regressors were included in the model: the six realignment parameters 
used to realign each image, the square of these realignment parameters, the first 
derivative of these realignment parameters, and the realignment parameters used 
to realign the previous volume (to account for spin-history effect; (Friston et al., 
1996). In addition, we took into account CSF signal based on each individuals’ 
segmented T1 scan to account for movement-related intensity changes and 
physiological noise. Low frequency drifts were controlled using a discrete cosine 
transform with cutoff of 128 s. Serial correlations in the fMRI signal were estimated 
using restricted maximum likelihood estimates of variance components using a 
first-order autoregressive model. The resulting non-sphericity was used to form 
maximum-likelihood estimates of the activations. Microtime onsets were adjusted 
to take into account the earlier slice-timing correction. Second, we performed 
time series statistical analysis using restricted maximum likelihood estimation (i.e. 
model estimation). Third, to assess task and intervention effects, we generated for 
each participant the contrast images of Ignore > Update and Update > Ignore 
across experimental sessions. Of special interest, given our research question of 
demand-specific tyrosine effects, was the interaction of drug (tyrosine vs. placebo) 
and task condition (Ignore vs. Update). These contrasts were also generated per 
participant on the first level.
Second-level modeling
First-level contrasts were then used for the second level analyses to test consistent 
effects across participants. One-sample t-tests were calculated based on these 
contrasts. Group statistical maps were tested for significance using cluster level 
inference (cluster-defining threshold, P<0.001; cluster probability of P<0.05, family 
wise error-corrected for multiple comparisons). Reported local maxima correspond 
to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space. Activations were localized with 
the aid of multi-atlas labeling of human brain structures (Landman et al., 2012). 
Maximum probability tissue labels were provided by Neuromorphometrics, Inc. 
(http://www.neuromorphometrics.com/) under academic subscription and were 
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based on 30 MRI scans originating from the OASIS project (http://www.oasis-
brains.org/).
Control analyses
We performed a number of control analyses, in which we assessed 1) whether the 
main finding (Drug x Condition x Probe in d’) remains significant when including, 
one at a time, the perhaps confounding factors in the repeated measures ANOVA: 
order of drug administration, gender, age, and NLV scores (as a measure of 
verbal intelligence) and 2) whether the effect of interest interacts with these factors. 
Age and NLV scores were mean-centered and added as covariates. Order of drug 
administration and gender were added as between subject factors.
fMRI-behavior association
To assess a relationship between the tyrosine-effects that we observe in the fMRI 
signal with behavior, we extracted contrast estimates of the interaction of drug 
(tyrosine vs. placebo) and task condition (Ignore vs. Update) for each participant 
of significant clusters (using MarsBaR, Brett, Anton, Valabregue, Poline, 2002). 
We then calculated (non-parametric) correlations between extracted beta values 
with according behavioral effects in RT and d’.
Exploratory analyses
In addition to our primary, planned analyses, we conducted several exploratory 
analyses. Since these analyses were data-driven or an a priori hypothesis was 
lacking, we base our conclusions primarily on descriptive statistics (e.g. effect 
sizes) and not inferential statistics (e.g. test statistics and p-values; Wagenmakers 
et al., 2012).
Individual differences in putative proxy measures of dopamine
Given the earlier observations that effects of manipulating catecholamine 
transmission on cognitive control depended on (a proxy of) baseline levels 
of dopamine (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011; Swart et al., 2017), we included 
participants’ mean-centered trait impulsivity (BIS-11) and working memory 
capacity (digit span average) scores as covariates in the repeated measures 
analyses. Likewise, we included these putative proxy measures in two separate 
2nd level t-tests in the fMRI analyses to assess baseline-dependent tyrosine effects. 
Due to missing data for one participant of the trait impulsivity measure, the 
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sample for the behavioral analysis consisted of 28 participants and for the fMRI 
analysis 27 (one exclusion due to signal spikes, see Statistical analyses section).
Link with subjective value of cognitive effort
Given recent theorizing about a link between the subjective value (or cost) of 
cognitive effort and cognitive flexibility versus stability (Inzlicht et al., 2014; Musslick 
et al., 2018) and given the finding that the effects of tyrosine during this working 
memory task depend on impulsivity, we assessed whether the tyrosine-induced 
changes in distractor inhibition in d’ (see Results section; Figure 5.3C-D) related 
to tyrosine-effects on an independent task that was administered in the same 
session in the same participants: the cognitive effort discounting task (Chapter 
4). We therefore calculated parametric correlations between tyrosine-induced 
changes in subjective value and tyrosine-induced changes in the condition–by-
probe interaction on d’.
RESULTS
Behavior - task effects
Participants performed above chance on the update/ignore working memory task, 
evidenced by an overall proportion of 0.80 (SD = 0.09) and 0.79 (SD = 0.08) 
correct responses on the placebo and tyrosine session, respectively. Summary 
scores of the behavioral performance in terms of response times (RTs), hit and 
false alarm rates and d’ are presented in Table 5.1. Statistical analyses were 
performed of RTs and d’
In line with earlier work (Fallon et al., 2016), performance was sensitive to the 
task manipulation: There was a main effect of condition on d′, the estimate of 
participants’ sensitivity to targets corrected for the propensity to make a target 
response (false alarms; condition effect: F(1, 28 = 79.9, p < 0.001; Figure 5.2A). 
Specifically, participants performed better in the update versus ignore condition. 
The same effect was found on response times (condition effect: F(1, 28) = 24.5, 
p < 0.001; Figure 5.2B), due to shorter response latencies in the update relative 
to the ignore condition.
Probes consisted of targets and non-targets, of which the non-targets could 
either be novel shapes or distractors. A distractor or lure in the update condition 
was a shape that was presented during encoding; in the ignore condition the 
distractor was presented during the intervening phase. Probe analysis showed 
that response times were faster and d’ was higher for novel probes compared 
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with distractor probes (probe effect in RT: F(2, 56) = 2.5, p = 0.090, novel versus 
distractor probe: F(1, 28) = 7.9, p = 0.009; probe effect in d’: F (1, 28) = 9.2, 
p = 0.005). The effects of task condition on d’ and RT were not statistically 
significant (condition x probe for d’: F (1, 28) < 0.1, p = 0.918; for RT: F(2, 
56) = 1.1, p = 0.354).
One might argue that participants could close their eyes during ignore trials to 
reduce distraction. However, this in unlikely for multiple reasons. First, distracting 
stimuli were presented at the same time as the condition cue, hence strategically 
closing eyes would lead to an overall performance decline. Second, there is 
evidence that distraction in the ignore trials impaired performance, which would 
not be the case if the eyes were closed: within the ignore condition, participants 
performed more poorly when distractors were probed compared with novel 
probes (d’ distractor vs novel probes: F(1, 28) = 9.2, p = 0.005) and participants 
performed more poorly on ignore trials compared with no interference trials, 
indicating that distractors were actually processed (see Supplemental Material 
5.2: d’ ignore vs. no interference: F(1, 28) = 14.8, p = 0.001). 5
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TABLE 5.1 | Task performance
Drug Cond. Probe RTs d’ Hit False alarm
TYR Ignore Target 1226 (153) - 0.66 (0.20) -
Distract 1183 (189) 1.21 (0.73) - 0.25 (0.11)
Novel 1157 (166) 1.54 (0.74) - 0.17 (0.12)
Update Target 1129 (176) - 0.80 (0.15) -
Distract 1118 (183) 2.02 (0.62) - 0.16 (0.10)
Novel 1125 (197) 2.06 (0.59) - 0.16 (0.10)
PLA Ignore Target 1208 (158) - 0.68 (0.20) -
Distract 1194 (170) 1.38 (0.70) - 0.21 (0.12)
Novel 1163 (159) 1.38 (0.57) - 0.21 (0.11)
Update Target 1138 (162) - 0.80 (0.15) -
Distract 1153 (190) 1.95 (0.73) - 0.19 (0.14)
Nov 1080 (195) 2.25 (0.64) - 0.12 (0.09)
Summary scores (mean, standard deviation in parentheses) of task performance reported 
per drug, task condition and probe type. RTs are presented in ms. Analyses were performed 
on response times and d’, which corresponds to the z-scored difference between hit and 
false alarm rates per probe-type (novel versus distractor). Hit and false alarm rates are 
presented for intuitive interpretation.
Behavior – tyrosine effects
Contrary to our prediction, the effect of tyrosine administration on performance 
did not reach statistical significance, also not as a function of the task conditions 
update versus ignore (for d’: drug x IG vs UP: F(1, 28) = 0.1, p = 0.724; for RTs 
drug x IG vs UP: F(1, 28) < 0.1, p = 0.990), nor as a main effect (drug effect for 
d’: F(1, 28) = 0.1, p = 0.753; for RT: F(1, 28) < 0.1, p = 0.986),
We assessed tyrosine effects as a function of probe types: including the factor 
probe-type revealed a significant modulation by tyrosine in d’ (drug x condition 
x probe: F(1, 28) = 9.0, p = 0.006), but the effect on RTs was not significant 
(drug x condition x probe: F(2, 56) = 1.5, p = 0.242). A post-hoc test indicated 
that tyrosine significantly impaired distractor inhibition on ignore trials, evidenced 
by an increase in the degree to which a distractor versus novel probe impaired 
performance (drug x probe: F(1, 28) = 6.6, p = 0.016). Tyrosine numerically 
improved distractor inhibition on update trials, yet the effect was not statistically 
significant (F(1, 28) = 3.2, p = 0.084; Figure 5.2C-D). Further break-down of 
these interactions indicate that on placebo, participants exhibited a significant 
distractor cost (novel – distractor) on update trials, but the effect was not statistically 
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significant on ignore trials (probe: F(1, 28) = 7.9, p = 0.009; probe effect in 
ignore: F(1, 28) < 0.1, p = 0.992). The pattern reversed under tyrosine, where 
the distractor cost was only significant on the ignore trials (probe: F(1, 28) = 10.1, 
p = 0.004; probe effect in update: F(1, 28) = 0.1, p = 0.748). A summary of 
statistical effects is presented in Supplemental Material 5.3.
FIGURE 5.3 | Performance on the update/ignore working memory task as a function of 
task conditions and drug (tyrosine and placebo). Performance did not differ between drug 
sessions. The horizontal lines in the boxplots represent the median, the diamond represents 
the mean and green dots are the subject-specific mean, gray lines connect within-subject 
data points. Outliers are marked by gray dots. A d′, the estimate of participants’ sensi-
tivity to targets corrected for the propensity to make a target response (false alarms) is 
significantly lower for ignore than update trials across drug sessions. B Response times are 
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longer for ignore than update trials. C & D Tyrosine-effects as a function of probe type 
(novel versus distractor) in d’ (drug x condition x probe). Tyrosine increases the distractor 
cost in ignore relative to update trials, compared with placebo. * indicates significance at 
p < 0.05. C Distractor costs in d’ (novel probe – distractor probe) as a function of drug 
and condition. D Condition effects of distractor costs as a function of drug.
fMRI – task results
Consistent with two previous studies using a similar version of this task (Fallon 
and Cools, 2014; Fallon et al., 2016), intervening stimuli that had to be ignored 
elicited differential BOLD responses than when they had to be used to update 
working memory. Ignoring distracting stimuli significantly (p < 0.05, whole-
brain FWE-corrected) increased BOLD signal in bilateral middle frontal gyri, 
bilateral angular gyri, right medial/superior frontal gyrus and left precuneus. 
The reverse contrasts (Update > Ignore) revealed significant clusters of BOLD 
signal in bilateral supplementary motor cortex, bilateral precentral gyri and left 
fusiform gyrus (Figure 5.4A). Significant effects observed in whole-brain analyses 
are displayed in Table 5.2.
fMRI – tyrosine effects
The administration of tyrosine significantly increased update- (versus ignore-) 
related activity in the right anterior cingulate gyrus/ medial frontal gyrus relative 
to placebo (Pcluster_FWE = 0.035, cluster size = 128 voxels, T = 5.6, peak x, y, 
z = 12, 42, 4; Figure 5.4B) in a whole-brain analysis. The reverse contrast did not 
reveal any significant effects. In addition, we assessed tyrosine effects in regions 
of interest, which were defined by the task-effects across drug sessions (Figure 
5.4B). This analysis did not show any significant tyrosine effects.
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FIGURE 5.4 | A Main effect of task conditions across drug sessions. Maps are dual-coded 
and simultaneously display the contrast estimate (x-axis) and un-thresholded values for 
the task contrast (y-axis) in blue for Update (- Ignore) and in red for Ignore (- Update) 
conditions. Thus, the hue indicates the size of the contrast estimate, and the opacity 
indicates the height of the t-value. Significant clusters (cluster-level corrected, FWE < 
p 0.05) are encircled in white. Voxels that were included in the analysis (whole-brain) 
are marked by a dotted line. The coordinates correspond to the standard MNI brain. B 
Drug effects on the contrast between task conditions: update and ignore. Setup of this 
figure is identical to A. Analyses reveal a significant interaction between drug [tyrosine 
> placebo] and task condition [update > ignore] in the right anterior cingulate / medial 
frontal gyrus. Extraction of contrast estimates from the significant clusters for ignore and 
update condition separately (gray bars) suggests that the effect is primarily driven by a 
tyrosine-induced increase in activity in update condition. Neuroimaging data are plotted 
using a procedure introduced by Allen et al. (2012) and implemented by Zandbelt (2017).
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Control analyses
We performed a number of control analyses, where we assessed whether the 
main finding (Drug x Condition x Probe in d’) was affected by any of the following, 
perhaps confounding, factors: order of drug administration, gender, age, and 
NLV scores (as a measure of verbal intelligence). Results of these control analyses 
confirm that 1) the effect was still significant when including these factors, one at a 
time as covariates (for continuous) or between-subject factors and 2) the variables 
did not interact with the effect of interest (for all details, see Supplemental Material 
5.5).
fMRI – behavior correlations
We extracted beta estimates for the drug-by-condition interaction from the 
cluster that showed significant tyrosine effects: the right ACC / medial OFC. The 
extracted activity did not significantly correlate with tyrosine-induced condition 
effects in d’ (r = 0.09, p = 0.634) or RT (r = -0.09, p = 0.653).
TABLE 5.2 | Results of fMRI analyses
Contrast name Cluster
size
t-value p-value
(FWE,
cluster)
p-value
(FWE,
voxel)
Peak MNI
coordinate
(x, y, z)
Tyrosine > Placebo None
Placebo > Tyrosine
L/R suppl. motor cortex /
R superior frontal gyrus
142 4.72 0.022 0.665 -4, 14, 64
Update > Ignore
L fusiform gyrus 20983 10.89 < 0.001 < 0.001 -40, -62, -12
L/R suppl motor cortex 952 8.68 < 0.001 < 0.001 -4, 2, 64
L precentral gyrus 838 7.38 < 0.001 0.004 -50, -4, 44
R precentral gyrus 1034 6.76 < 0.001 0.016 50, 8, 36
Ignore > Update
L angular gyrus 1005 8.70 < 0.001 < 0.001 -54, -58, 34
L precuneus 1067 6.48 < 0.001 0.029 -4, -52, 38
R angular gyrus 930 6.26 < 0.001 0.046 58, -48, 34
L middle frontal gyrus 968 5.71 < 0.001 0.143 -38, 22,38
R middle frontal gyrus 153 5.31 0.024 0.300 38, 24, 44
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Table 5.2 Continued
Contrast name Cluster
size
t-value p-value
(FWE,
cluster)
p-value
(FWE,
voxel)
Peak MNI
coordinate
(x, y, z)
R medial/ superior frontal 
gyrus
159 4.74 0.020 <0.001 12, 60, 16
Tyr > Pla for Ign > Up None
Tyr > Pla for Upd > Ign
R anterior cingulate gyrus 
/ R medial superior frontal 
gyrus
128 5.58 0.036 0.198 12, 42, 4
Exploration:
Drug x Condi x Imp
L ant. insula/ L putamen/
L postcentral gyrus
900 5.99 < 0.001 0.120 -36, 18, -4
R post. orbital gyrus / R ant. 
insula
124 4.67 0.037 0.894 32, 16, -18
This table shows all areas that were significant at cluster-level PFWE < 0.05 in whole-brain 
analyses during the intervening phase of the update/ignore working memory task. We 
present cluster-corrected and voxel-level p-values.
Results of exploratory analyses: individual differences
Given the observation that drug effects vary across individuals as a function of 
baseline dopamine levels (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011), we assessed whether 
in this sample tyrosine effects depended on individual differences in putative 
proxy measures of dopamine: participants’ trait impulsivity scores and digit span. 
We entered the between-subject proxy variables as covariates in two separate 
repeated measures ANOVAs. Due to missing BIS-scores of one participant, 
individual differences analyses are conducted in N = 27.
Trait impulsivity
As reported above, tyrosine reduced distractor inhibition on ignore relative 
to update trials in terms of d’. Entering the between-subject proxy variables 
as covariates in the primary analyses suggests that the effect of tyrosine on 
distractor cost on the ignore versus update condition depended on participants’ 
trait impulsivity scores (F(1, 26) = 9.1, p = 0.003; r = 0.51, Figure 5.5A): for more 
impulsive participants tyrosine decreased the distractor cost on update trials (i.e. 
cost of letting go initial stimulus: r = 0.56) to a greater degree than on ignore 
trials (r = 0.13), thus improving cognitive flexibility.
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Paralleling these behavioral analyses, we also assessed in the fMRI data whether 
tyrosine effects on BOLD signal depended on impulsivity scores. This whole-brain 
simple regression analysis showed that tyrosine increased update-(versus ignore-)
related activity in a cluster containing left anterior insula, putamen and postcentral 
gyrus (Pcluster_FWE < 0.001, cluster size = 900 voxels, T = 6.0, peak x, y, z = -36, 
18, -4; Figure 5.5C). The opposite contrast revealed a cluster containing right 
posterior orbital gyrus / right anterior insula (Pcluster_FWE = 0.037, cluster size = 124 
voxels, T = 4.7, peak x, y, z = 32, 16, -18). Further exploration showed that the 
behavioral effect of tyrosine on distractor-inhibition in the update versus ignore 
condition correlated positively with the neural effect of tyrosine on the left insula/
putamen/postcentral gyrus (r = 0.31), but negatively with the neural effect on the 
right posterior orbital gyrus/insula (r = -0.23). The significant cluster including 
left anterior insula, putamen and postcentral gyrus shows great overlap with 
update-(versus ignore-) related task networks when overlaying effects on a lower 
threshold (see Supplemental Material 5.4).
Trait impulsivity and cognitive effort
Incidentally, the finding that the effects of tyrosine during this working memory 
task depend on impulsivity is reminiscent of a finding from a different experiment, 
conducted in the context of the same study, for which the same participants 
completed a cognitive effort discounting paradigm (COGED) after they came 
out of the scanner (Chapter 4). This COGED paradigm enabled us to quantify 
per participant the tyrosine effect on the subjective value of conducting a 
demanding working memory task: the N-back task (Chapter 4). Exploratory 
analyses suggested that tyrosine reduced subjective value to a greater degree 
in more impulsive participants (Chapter 4). Given these results, we assess here 
the relationship between tyrosine effects on the update/ignore working memory 
task and tyrosine effects on the subjective value. The probe-dependent tyrosine 
effect described in 3.2.1 correlates negatively with the tyrosine-effect on subjective 
value of cognitive effort (medium effect size: r = -0.48): Those participants, who 
exhibited greater tyrosine-related reduced of subjective value of effort also suffer 
from stronger tyrosine-induced decreases in distractor-inhibition (Figure 5.5B). 
These exploratory analyses invite hypothesis-testing in future studies on the link 
between motivation (i.e. subjective value) and the cognitive flexibility/stability 
tradeoff. This is of interest in particular given recent suggestions that cognitive 
effort cost might serve as a motivational signal to bias the system towards greater 
cognitive flexibility (Cools, 2016; Musslick et al., 2018). There was no evidence for 
a correlation between tyrosine effects on subjective value and tyrosine effects on 
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the BOLD signal extracted from the left anterior insula / putamen / postcentral 
gyrus cluster (r = 0.25, p = 0.295) or on a whole-brain level.
Digit span
Entering the between-subject proxy variables as covariates revealed no significant 
interactions of digit span scores in behavior (drug x IG vs UP x digit span: 
F(1,24) = 4.0, p = 0.057; drug x IG vs UP x probe x digit span: F(1, 24) = 3.8, 
p = 0.064). Including digit span as a covariate in the fMRI analysis did not reveal 
any significant modulations by tyrosine neither.
Figure 5.5 | A Positive correlation with large effect size between impulsivity scores 
and tyrosine-induced condition-dependent effects on distractor cost. B Tyrosine effect 
on condition-dependent distractor cost correlates negatively (medium effect size) with 
tyrosine-effects on subjective value acquired in a separate cognitive effort discounting 
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task (see Chapter 4). Dots represent difference scores to visualize the drug x condition x 
probe-effect: drug effect (tyrosine - placebo) of the condition effect (ignore – update) in 
distractor cost (novel – distractor). Positive scores on the y-axis reflect larger impairment in 
distractor inhibition on tyrosine relative to placebo in ignore relative to update trials. The 
black line represents conditional means given the linear model. C The figure displays the 
significant interaction between drug [tyrosine > placebo] and task condition [update > 
ignore] as a function of trait impulsivity scores in a cluster containing left anterior insula, 
left putamen and left postcentral gyrus in red and right posterior central gyrus / anterior 
insula in blue. Setup of this figure is identical to Figure 5.4.
DISCUSSION
In this study we set out to assess whether the administration of a catecholamine 
precursor to older participants alters performance on a working memory task 
with distinct demands for cognitive stability and flexibility. We hypothesized that 
administering the precursor tyrosine to older adults (age 60-75 years) would 
improve distractor inhibition, but would impair flexible updating. This hypothesis 
follows from a range of studies highlighting a role for the PFC and its modulation 
by dopamine in active maintenance of representations (Brozoski et al., 1979; 
Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008) and the observation that older adults suffer 
primarily from impairments in active maintenance (Dunnett et al., 1988) and 
prefrontal dopamine depletion (Karrer et al., 2017). Thus, we predicted that 
tyrosine might improve distractor inhibition by acting in the PFC to improve the 
stabilization and distractor resistance of task-relevant representations. To test our 
hypothesis, we employed an adapted delayed match-to-sample task, the update/
ignore working memory task, that has previously been shown to 1) implicate 
distinct neural regions when implementing cognitive stability and flexibility, and 
2) to be sensitive to neural and behavioral modulations by a catecholamine 
challenge (Fallon et al., 2016). Specifically, administration of methylphenidate to 
young adults increased prefrontal activity and improved distractor inhibition at 
the cost of flexible updating (Fallon et al., 2016).
Task effects
In line with earlier reports, we observed that, across sessions, participants 
performed well on the task and their performance was sensitive to the task 
condition: They performed best (i.e. faster and more accurate), when they were 
required to update their working memory representation, both compared with a 
control condition in which they remembered certain stimuli without any intervening 
information and compared with the ignore trials. This difference between update 
and ignore trials might be a consequence of the timing of the task rather than an 
index of enhanced flexibility. On update trials the delay between relevant stimuli 
and the probe is on average 3s shorter than in ignore trials. On ignore trials, in 
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which distracting stimuli needed to be inhibited, performance was poorest, also 
compared with the control trials. This shows that the need to inhibit a distractor 
impairs performance even when timings are matched. As previously observed, 
ignore and update trials implicated distinct neural regions: Ignoring distracting 
stimuli increased BOLD signal in bilateral middle frontal and angular gyri, right 
medial/superior frontal gyrus and left precuneus. Updating was accompanied 
by bilateral supplementary motor cortex, precentral gyri and left fusiform gyrus 
activity. While these neural task effects are very similar to those observed in 
earlier studies using this task (Fallon and Cools, 2014; Fallon et al., 2016), we 
were surprised to find that updating of working memory representations was 
not significantly accompanied by activity in the striatum. In earlier versions, 
updating increased BOLD activity in the putamen (Fallon and Cools, 2014; 
Fallon et al., 2016). It might be noted that Figure 5.3A suggests that the putamen 
was implicated in update versus ignore trials, although this signal did not reach 
statistical significance (only significant on uncorrected voxel level), perhaps due 
to a lower number of trials or studying an older sample compared with young 
adults recruited in earlier studies.
Tyrosine effects
Contrary to our prediction, we did not observe a tyrosine-induced shift in overall 
performance between trials requiring cognitive stability (i.e. ignore) and cognitive 
flexibility (i.e. update). However, tyrosine had opposite effects on target detection 
in ignore and update trials as a function of probe type (novel versus distractor). 
This effect can be summarized as a decrease in cognitive stability: Tyrosine 
(significantly) increased the distractor cost (distractor – novel) on ignore trials 
relative to update trials. In the update condition tyrosine numerically improved 
letting go of initially relevant stimuli, such that the impact of the distractor (i.e. 
initially encoded stimuli) relative to a novel probe was reduced. These behavioral 
results suggest that, in older adults, tyrosine enhanced the gating of both relevant 
and irrelevant information into working memory. Furthermore, while prior work 
has implicated the striatum in the effects of catecholamine transmission on the 
gating of working memory representations (Chatham and Badre, 2015; Collins 
and Frank, 2014), we demonstrate a tyrosine-induced increase in update-related 
signal in the dorsal medial frontal cortex. While the dorsal medial frontal cortex, 
including the anterior cingulate cortex, is implicated in many control functions, 
its activity has also been associated with signaling the value of disengaging in a 
foraging context (i.e. foraging value (Kolling et al., 2016). As such, an increase in 
ACC activity has been shown to promote disengagement from a current patch. 
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There is also strong evidence from work with human volunteers and animals 
for the involvement of the medial frontal cortex in promoting flexible behavior, 
including set shifting (Buchsbaum et al., 2005; Floresco et al., 2008b; Stefani 
et al., 2003) and task-switching (Aarts et al., 2009; Rushworth et al., 2013). 
In the light of earlier theories of working memory updating, the basal ganglia 
(BG) is thought to provide a gating signal for controlling updating in the frontal 
cortex (Hazy et al., 2007). An extension of the model ascribes a key role to the 
medial frontal cortex for supporting flexible decision-making when environmental 
contingencies change (Pauli et al., 2011). Due to interconnections between BG and 
orbitofrontal cortex, gating is enabled by phasic dopamine release in the ventral 
striatum by neurons in the midbrain. Thus, tyrosine might have impaired distractor 
inhibition via an increase in phasic dopamine release-dependent gating. In this 
context, we note that tyrosine also elicited a (sub-threshold) increase in midbrain 
BOLD signal during update trials (see Figure 5.3B), but this finding should be 
treated with great caution, because it did not reach significance according to our 
statistical criteria.
The present finding that tyrosine reduced distractor inhibition in a working 
memory task concurs generally with a previous observation that the same dose 
of tyrosine (150 mg/kg), relative to a lower dose, impaired N-back performance 
in older adults (van de Rest et al., 2017). In addition, those participants with more 
excessive plasma tyrosine increases showed stronger performance impairments 
(van de Rest et al., 2017). While the N-back task relies on a mixture of working 
memory demands, our current study allowed to distinguish flexibility from 
cognitive stability. Our results suggest that earlier reports on detrimental effects 
of tyrosine administration might be a result of impairments in specifically the 
resistance to distraction due to excessive gating of goal-relevant and irrelevant 
representations. Interestingly, in the current task, we observe that under placebo 
older adults exhibit rigid rather than flexible behavior, contrasting the idea that 
aging is associated with greater flexibility (Dunnett et al., 1988; Lindenberger and 
Mayr, 2014; Wang et al., 2011): probe-type analyses revealed that participants 
had trouble ‘letting go’ of the initially encoded stimuli when they needed to 
update the representation, while there was no significant distractor cost in the 
ignore condition. This evidence of inflexible cognition concurs with earlier reports 
on perseverative errors in set-shifting (Gamboz et al., 2009; Ridderinkhof et 
al., 2002), failed reversals in a reversal learning task (Weiler et al., 2008) and 
increased task-switching costs (Kray & Li, 2002) in healthy older adults. Tyrosine 
altered this pattern of ‘rigidity’: it increased distractor cost in ignore trials, but 
tended to improve letting go of initially encoded stimuli.
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Tyrosine effects – individual differences
The present observation that catecholaminergic drug administration decreases 
(aspects of) working memory performance is in line with an inverted-U shaped 
interpretation which suggests that too little but also excessive dopamine in the 
prefrontal cortex is detrimental for cognitive performance (Cools and D’Esposito, 
2011). To account for individual variability, we conducted exploratory analyses 
including impulsivity and digit span scores, which have previously been associated 
with dopamine transmission (Buckholtz et al., 2010; Cools et al., 2008; Landau 
et al., 2009). These exploratory analyses suggest that the behavioral tyrosine 
effects depend on individual differences in trait impulsivity. This was evidenced by 
a correlation with a large effect size: tyrosine reduced the cost of ‘letting go’ of an 
initially encoded stimulus to a greater degree in more impulsive participants. Thus 
trait impulsivity was associated with greater tyrosine-induced biases away from 
cognitive stability towards flexibility. Moreover, trait impulsivity was also associated 
with tyrosine-induced increases in flexible update-related BOLD signal in a cluster 
containing left insula, putamen and postcentral gyrus. An increase in cognitive 
flexibility and activity in a cluster containing putamen might be consistent with a 
striatal role in excessive gating of working memory representations resulting in 
lower cost of a distractor in more impulsive participants. This pattern of better 
relative updating and increased frontostriatal BOLD signal parallels earlier 
observations in young adults, where bromocriptine improved flexible updating 
(i.e. switching) and increased switch-related striatal activity in high, but not 
low impulsive participants (Cools et al., 2007). Also, irrespective of impulsivity, 
bromocriptine has been reported to increase switch-related BOLD signal in the 
striatum (Stelzel et al., 2013). Note that in earlier versions of this update/ignore 
working memory task, updating had also been accompanied by activity in the 
putamen (Fallon et al., 2016). Overlaying the impulsivity-dependent cluster with 
task-related BOLD signal suggested stronger overlap with an update-related 
than ignore-related network. The tyrosine-induced shift towards more cognitive 
flexibility and less stability was also accompanied by a reduction in right frontal 
signaling (insula / posterior orbital gyrus), mainly in more impulsive participants. 
This effect of a reduction in right frontal activity in combination with impaired 
inhibition has been described before with respect to response inhibition, but also 
inhibition in working memory paradigms in ADHD patients and patients with right 
frontal lesions (Aron et al., 2014; Clark et al., 2007).
Finally, we observed, in exploratory (post-hoc) analyses, a positive correlation 
(of medium effect size) across participants between tyrosine-induced decreases 
in distractor-inhibition and tyrosine-induced decreases in the subjective value of 
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cognitive effort (Chapter 4). The (high-impulsive) individuals who exhibited the 
greatest shift away from stability towards flexibility with tyrosine also expressed 
the greatest increase in cognitive effort costs. While in need of replication, this 
observation might be understood in terms of recent resource allocation accounts 
of cognitive control costs according to which the (subjective) cost of cognitive 
effort serves as a motivational signal to prevent over-fixation on a current ongoing 
task and to promote cognitive flexibility and switching to alternative tasks (Cools, 
2016; Inzlicht et al., 2014; Kool et al., 2010; Kurzban et al., 2013). Specifically, the 
present preliminary finding raises the hypothesis, to be tested in future studies, that 
changes in catecholamine transmission elicit a shift in flexibility/stability tradeoff 
in working memory by altering the subjective cost of mental effort.
LIMITATIONS
We observed that tyrosine altered cognitive control in a demand-specific manner. 
However, the effect was subtler than anticipated and only surfaced when taking 
probe-type into account. Thus rather than changing hit rates, tyrosine modulated 
false alarm rates for novel versus distractor trials. A second note of caution pertains 
to our assumption that tyrosine increased central catecholamine synthesis. While 
peripheral blood plasma levels of DOPAC, a dopamine metabolite, were increased 
after tyrosine relative to placebo, we cannot ensure that central catecholamine 
levels were affected. In this context, we highlight that tyrosine does not selectively 
alter dopamine: oral administration in young adults has also been shown to affect 
plasma noradrenaline levels (Kishore et al., 2013). Lastly, given that we only tested 
older adults in a within-subject design, our study does not speak to age-related 
changes in working memory processes or BOLD signal. Future studies are needed 
to assess whether our findings are specific to older adults by comparing task and 
intervention effects to younger participants.
CONCLUSION
In this pharmacological fMRI study, we have shown that the administration 
of the catecholamine precursor tyrosine to older adults (60-75 years) altered 
working memory processes in a demand-specific manner. Contrary to our 
prediction, tyrosine reduced rather than enhanced cognitive stability (i.e. distractor 
resistance), evidenced by a larger distractor cost on trials requiring stabilization 
compared with flexible updating. This effect was accompanied by a tyrosine-
induced increase of update- versus ignore-related activity in right anterior 
cingulate cortex / medial orbitofrontal cortex. These findings support the idea that 
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effects of a catecholamine intervention depend on the type of cognitive demand 
required and further suggest that, instead of increasing stability, tyrosine in fact 
increased distractibility in older adults, perhaps by promoting gating of relevant 
and irrelevant information into working memory.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS OF CHAPTER 5
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 5.1 | Criterion
Following the signal detection theory, behavior can be broken down into the 
sensitivity to discriminate target from non-target (see d’ analysis above) and 
an estimate for the overall tendency to judge stimuli as targets. The latter is 
referred to as criterion (c) (Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999). A value of 0 means 
that participants maximize hits and false alarms. Negative values represent a 
response bias towards ‘yes’, and positive values a bias toward responding ‘no’. The 
mean criterion in our sample was 0.23 (0.41), indicating that participants had a 
conservative criterion of judging a stimulus as a target (i.e. miss-oriented). Taking 
into account task condition, we observe a trending effect (condition: F(1,28) = 3.9, 
p = 0.052). The criterion is lowest in update (0.12, SD = 0.40), then ignore (0.22, 
SD = 0.40), and highest in no interference (0.35, SD = 0.41) trials. Participants’ 
criterion was not altered by tyrosine (drug: F(1, 28) = 0.1, p = 0.830) or tyrosine 
as a function of condition (drug x condition: F(1, 28) = 0.4, p = 0.520).
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 5.2 | Behavioral results including No interference trials
There was a main effect of condition on d′ (condition effect: F(2, 56 = 29.4, p 
< 0.001). Specifically, participants performed best in the update condition (vs. 
no interference: F(1, 28) = 11.7, p = 0.002 ; vs. ignore: F(1, 28) = 79.9, p < 
0.001), and had the lowest d’ values when they were distracted, i.e. in the ignore 
condition (vs. no interference: F(1, 28) = 14.8, p = 0.001). The same effect 
was found on response times (condition effect: F(2, 56) = 9.8, p < 0.001), due 
to the shortest response times in the update condition (vs. no interference: F(1, 
28) = 5.6, p = 0.025; vs. ignore: F(1, 28) = 24.9, p < 0.001). Response times 
did not differ significantly between the ignore condition and no interference (F 
(1, 28) = 2.9, p = 0.103).
The administration of tyrosine did not significantly alter overall performance, 
also not as a function of the three task condition (for d’: drug: F(1, 28) = 0.5, 
p = 0.496; drug x condition: F(1, 28) = 0.2, p = 0.670; for RTs: drug: F(1, 28) 
< 0.0, p = 0.877, drug x condition: F(1, 28) = 0.1, p = 0.829). There were 
no significant probe-dependent modulations by drug in response times (drug 
x probe: F(1,28) < 0.1, p = 0.990; drug x probe x condition: F(1,28) = 2.2, 
p = 0.150), or d’ (drug x probe: F(1,28) < 0.1, p = 0.973; drug x probe x 
condition: F(1,28) = 3.0, p = 0.092).
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Entering the between-subject proxy variables (BIS impulsiveness and digit span) 
as covariates in the model did not show significant interactions with drug and/or 
task conditions in behavior (all p > 0.05).
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 5.3 | Statistical effects
Statistical effects of a priori repeated measures ANOVAs of performance data (d’ 
and RT). In these models, ignore and update conditions were directly contrasted. 
Drug, condition and probe types were within-subject factors. Bold p-values denote 
significance at p < 0.05.
Effects Model 1: d’ Model 2: RT
Condition F(1,28) = 79.9, p < 0.001 F(1,28) = 24.5, p < 0.001
Drug F(1,28) = 0.1, p = 0.753 F(1,28) < 0.1, p = 0.986
Drug x Condition F(1,28) = 0.1, p = 0.724 F(1,28) < 0.1, p = 0.990
Probe F(1,28) = 9.2, p = 0.005 F(2,56) = 2.5, p = 0.090
Probe x Condi F(1,28) < 0.1, p = 0.918 F(2,56) = 1.1, p = 0.354
Probe x Drug F(1,28) = 0.1, p = 0.777 F(2,56) = 1.5, p = 0.223
Drug x Condi x Probe F(1,28) = 9.0, p = 0.006 F(2,56) = 1.5, p = 0.242
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 5.4 | Overlay
Overlay of update-(versus ignore-) related task effects (yellow) and impulsivity-
dependent tyrosine effect (violet). Results are displayed at p < 0.001, uncorrected, 
which corresponds to t > 3.4. See Table 5.2 and the main text for whole-brain 
FWE-corrected results.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 5.5 | Control models
ANOVA of basic models including putative confounding factors as covariates in 
d’. Bold p-values denote significance at p < 0.05.
*Due to missing NLV scores of 3 participants, this ANOVA contains N = 26 
(df = 1, 24).
Effect  NLV* Order Age Gender
Effect of interest:
Drug x Condi x Probe
F(1,27)
p
6.7
0.016
8.6
0.007
8.6
0.007
8.9
0.006
Effect of interest x confound F(1,27)
p
0.3
0.612
0.3
0.589
<0.1
0.914
0.2
0.642
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ABSTRACT
Exerting cognitive control is well known to be accompanied by a subjective 
effort cost and people are generally biased to avoid it. However, the nature of 
cognitive control costs is currently unclear. Recent theorizing suggests that the cost 
of cognitive effort serves as a motivational signal to bias the system away from 
cognitive stability towards more cognitive flexibility. We asked whether the effort 
cost of cognitive stability is higher than that of cognitive flexibility. Specifically, 
we tested this prediction in the domain of working memory by using (i) a delayed 
response paradigm that allows us to manipulate demands for stability (distractor 
resistance) and flexibility (flexible updating) of working memory representations, 
as well as (ii) a subsequent cognitive effort discounting paradigm that allows 
us to quantify the subjective effort costs assigned to performing the delayed 
response paradigm. We show strong evidence, in two different samples (28 and 
62 participants respectively) that subjective value decreases as a function of 
demand. Moreover, we demonstrate that the subjective cost of performing a task 
requiring cognitive stability (distractor resistance) is higher than that requiring 
flexible updating, supporting the hypothesis that subjective effort cost of cognitive 
stability is higher than that of flexibility.
 UPDATE/IGNORE COSTCHAPTER 6
171
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive control often refers to the set of mechanisms required to focus on 
and pursue a goal, especially in the face of distraction, temptation or conflict. 
Succeeding to exert cognitive control and focusing on the task at hand is highly 
valued in our industrialized society, as it allows us to complete our tasks and 
achieve our long-term goals. Despite its importance, failures of cognitive control 
are very common. Procrastinating, failing to meet deadlines and performance 
decrements after fatigue are familiar to most of us.
Why do people fail to exert cognitive control? Focusing on a task carries an effort 
cost, making people avoid it (Kool et al., 2010), even if such avoidance implies 
forgoing rewards (Massar et al., 2016; Westbrook et al., 2013). The mechanisms 
underlying these cognitive effort costs remain elusive. While poor performance 
on cognitive control tasks has often been explained as limitations in cognitive 
capacity, more recent accounts shift the focus from capacity to motivation 
(Botvinick and Braver, 2015). These accounts are supported by experiments 
that show that performance decrements (caused by effort) can be overcome by 
increases in incentive motivation, for example as a function of the promise of 
monetary rewards (Padmala and Pessoa, 2011). According to some such resource 
allocation accounts, the subjective cost of cognitive effort represents a motivational 
signal to remain open to alternative opportunities, thus promoting flexibility at the 
expense of reduced engagement in a current ongoing task (Cools, 2015; Inzlicht 
et al., 2014; Kool et al., 2010; Kurzban et al., 2013). As our attentional resources 
are limited (Botvinick and Cohen, 2014; Shenhav et al., 2017), focusing on a 
given task means that we have to give up on other tasks that require the same set 
of mechanisms, thus evoking an opportunity cost (Kurzban et al., 2013). Hence, 
failures of cognitive control can be viewed as stemming not just from failures in 
implementation, but also as a choice to pursue alternative tasks that may be more 
rewarding.
Such a motivational mechanism would be adaptive, given that our constantly 
changing environment requires a dynamic balance between the cognitive states 
of focus and flexibility (Cools, 2015, 2016). Focusing is crucial for completing 
our goals, but flexibility is essential when goals change. Flexibility also allows 
us to explore alternative ways to solve a problem and come up with new ideas, 
i.e. to be innovative and creative. According to current theorizing the stability/
flexibility tradeoff in working memory is moderated by the strength of current 
task representations. Strong representations facilitate focusing on a current 
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task-set at the cost of reduced flexibility, required for e.g. task-switching. Weak 
representations in contrast allow flexible adaptation but reduce focused intensity.
How do we decide when to be focused and when to relax constraints in order to be 
flexible? We have previously argued that we arbitrate between a focused (closed) 
state versus a flexible (open) one, based on a cost-benefit analysis in which the 
value of cognitive effort corresponds to increased focus and is weighted against 
its (e.g. opportunity) cost, corresponding to reduced flexibility (Cools, 2016). We 
thus reasoned that the cost of cognitive stability is higher than that of cognitive 
flexibility. Here, we investigate this hypothesis by using a novel version of cognitive 
effort discounting (COGED) paradigm (Westbrook et al., 2013). that allowed us 
to measure the value that people assign to performing tasks requiring cognitive 
stability or flexibility. Specifically, rather than asking participants to discount 
monetary offers to perform the N-back task, which requires both focusing and 
flexibility at the same time, we asked participants to discount offers to perform a 
working memory task requiring either maintenance and distractor resistance or 
updating. This design allowed us to separately quantify the subjective costs of a 
task with demands for greater stability or flexibility, respectively. We obtained two 
independent datasets to replicate, and robustly establish the predicted differences 
between the costs of focus and flexibility.
As in the case of the original COGED paradigm, our paradigm consisted of 
two stages. In the first stage, subjects performed variants of a well-established 
color wheel working memory task (Zhang and Luck, 2008). Participants 
experienced different demands (set sizes 1 to 4) of two conditions of the task. 
One condition required flexible updating; the other condition required focused 
distractor resistance. In the second stage, participants made a series of choices 
about whether or not to repeat one of the task conditions in return for monetary 
reward. Some trials required choices between either one of the (update or ignore) 
task conditions versus taking a break. Other trials required direct comparisons 
between the two (update versus ignore) task conditions.
RESULTS
Working memory task performance
We investigated the effect of demands for working memory stability versus 
flexibility using a modified color wheel task (Figure 6.1A, see Methods section for 
more details). Participants were exposed to conditions requiring either distractor 
resistance (i.e. ignore condition) or flexible updating (i.e. update condition). Every 
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trial of the paradigm consisted of three phases that were separated by two delay 
periods. In the first phase (encoding), participants saw colored squares, which 
they always had to memorize. Then after a delay of two seconds, participants saw 
new colors in the same square locations. In the ignore condition, participants were 
instructed to maintain in their memory the colors from the encoding phase and not 
be distracted by the new interfering colors. In the update condition, participants 
had to let go of their initial representations and update the new stimuli into their 
working memory. We manipulated the working memory demand by varying the 
number of stimuli that needed to be remembered. During the response phase, 
participants had to match the color of one of the relevant squares by clicking with 
the mouse on a color wheel.
Figure 6.1 | A An illustration of the color wheel working memory task. Every trial of the 
task consists of three phases. In the encoding phase (2 s), participants need to memorize 
colored squares. After a delay of 2 s, during the interference phase (2 s), a letter indi-
cates if it is an Ignore (I for ignore) or an updating (U for update) trial. In ignore trials, 
participants need to maintain in their memory the colors from the encoding phase and 
not be distracted by the new intervening stimuli. In update trials, participants have to let 
go of their previous representations and update into their memory the stimuli from the 
interference phase. Another delay separates interference from the response phase. This 
delay is 2 s for ignore and 6 s for update trials to match the time that the target stimuli 
are maintained between conditions. During response phase, participants see a color 
wheel and black frames of the same squares; they have 4 s to click on the target color for 
the highlighted square. Demand is manipulated by varying the number of squares from 
one to four. The example displayed here is of the highest demand. B Example trials of 
the COGED task. Participants perform two versions of choices. In the “task vs no effort” 
version participants have to choose between repeating a level of ignore or update and 
not repeating the color wheel task at all (“No Redo”). The task option offer remains fixed 
at €2 and the no effort “No Redo” option varies from €0.1 to €2.2. In the “Ignore vs 
Update” trials, participants have to choose between repeating either the ignore or update 
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condition of the same demand. Ignore offers are always fixed at €2 and update offers 
vary from €0.1 to €4. Trial duration is 6 s. The trials are intermixed.
Accuracy
Figure 6.2A&B shows accuracy (absolute deviance in degrees from target color) in 
the color wheel working memory task as a function of set size and task condition 
(Supplemental Table 6.1 for descriptive statistics and Supplemental Figure 6.1 
for precision indices). Performance was sensitive to the demand (i.e. set size) 
manipulation and, in line with earlier studies contrasting ignore and update trials, 
participants performed more poorly in the ignore compared with the than update 
condition (Fallon and Cools, 2014; Fallon et al., 2016). This observation was 
supported by Bayesian model comparison (Table 6.1), showing strongest support 
for the model including set size and condition in both studies (BF10 =24876 & 
BF10 =5.5e +12). The runner-up model was the one including both main effects 
and their interaction, which was ~2.3 and ~2 times less likely than the model 
with the main effects only for experiment 1 and 2 respectively. The effects analysis 
confirmed the conclusion based on model comparison, showing that accuracy 
decreased with increasing set size (Experiment 1: F1.52,39.6=6.510, p=0.007, 
BFINC=83; Experiment 2: F1.63,97.7=16.998, p=2.8e-6, BFINC=1.6e +10) and that 
participants performed better on update compared with ignore trials (Experiment 
1: F1,26=11.068, p=0.003, BFINC=448; Experiment 2: F1,60=24.095, p=7.4e-6, 
BFINC=939) (Table 6.2). Evidence for an interaction effect was not conclusive 
(Experiment 1: F2.14,78=2.205, p=0.116, BFINC=1.3; Experiment 2: F2.32,139.3=3.238, 
p=0.035, BFINC=1.9). We conclude that accuracy decreased as a function of set 
size and, across set sizes, was worse on ignore relative to update trials.
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FIGURE 6.2 | Performance on the color wheel working memory task. A Median deviance 
for experiment 1 (27 participants). B Median deviance for replication experiment 2 (61 
participants). Deviance in degrees from the correct color is displayed here as a function of 
set size for ignore and update trials. C, D Median reaction times as a function of set size 
for ignore and update conditions. C Experiment 1 (27 participants). D Experiment 2 (61 
participants). Error bars indicate within-participant SEM (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008).
TABLE 6.1 | Model comparison: deviance
Models BF 10
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Condition+ Set size 24875.5 5.5e +12
Condition+ Set size+ Condition* Set size 8023.0 2.7e +12
Set size 48.3 5.8e +9
Condition 263.2 346.2
Model comparison relative to a null model for deviance on the working memory task
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TABLE 6.2 | Effects analysis: deviance
Effects BF inclusion Pvalue
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Condition 448.2 939.4 0.003 7.4e-6
Set size 83.2 1.6e +10 0.007 2.8e-6
Condition* Set size 1.3 1.9 0.116 0.035
 Effects analysis for deviance in the working memory task
Reaction times
Figure 6.2C&D depicts reaction times (RTs) as a function of set size and condition 
(Supplemental Table 6.2 for descriptive statistics). Statistical analyses suggest 
that RTs varied as a function of demand and task condition; participants were 
responding faster on trials that presented fewer squares (i.e. lower set size) and 
in the ignore (versus update) condition. In the first experiment, Bayesian model 
comparison (Table 6.3) showed that the best model was the one including 
condition, set size and the interaction between the two (BF10 =4.8e +31, ~ 1.4 
times better than the one also including the interaction). Effects analyses (Table 
6.4) confirmed that participants were faster on ignore compared with update trials 
(F1,26=16.436, p=4.1e-4, BFINC=44.6), a very strong set size effect (F3,78=64.739, 
p=4.1e-21, BFINC=∞) and an interaction effect (F2.41,62.7=5.643, p=0.003, 
BFINC=26). In the second experiment, the main effects were in the same direction 
(set size: F2.4,141=90.386, p=1.6e-28, BFINC=∞, condition: F1,60=16.179, p=1.6e-
4, BFINC=88), but the evidence for an interaction was weaker (F2.7,165=4.405, 
p=0.007, BFINC=3.8). The model that only involves condition and set size was 
marginally better than the one including the interaction. Thus, the dependence 
of the set size effect on task demand is not clear.
TABLE 6.3 | Model comparison: RTs
Models BF 10
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Condition+ Set size 6.7e +30 1.4e +53
Condition+ Set size+ Condition* Set size 4.8e +31 1.3e +53
Set size 8.2e +29 2.0e +51
Condition 0.84 3.5
Model comparison relative to the null model for RTs in the working memory task
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TABLE 6.4 | Effects analysis: RTs
Effects BF inclusion Pvalue
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Condition 44.6 87.8 4.1e-4 1.6e-4
Set size ∞ ∞ 4.1e-21 1.6e-28
Condition* Set size 25.5 3.8 0.003 0.007
Effects analysis for RTs in the working memory task
Cognitive effort discounting: To repeat or to avoid?
Next, we quantified the subjective value participants assigned to performing the 
update and ignore trials. The design of this task was inspired by the temporal and 
cognitive effort discounting literature (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Westbrook et 
al., 2013). To assess subjective value, participants made choices about repeating 
a level of the color wheel task for a monetary reward (effort option) or not 
repeating it for a usually smaller reward (no effort option) (Figure 6.1B). The task 
offer was fixed at €2 and the “no effort” offer varied from €0.1 to €2.2. Every 
choice was sampled three times to account for response variability. Participants 
were instructed that after all choices were completed, one of them would be 
randomly selected and they would repeat a few blocks of that set size and mostly 
that condition (to reduce predictability). If the “no effort” option was selected 
they were instructed that they should remain in the testing room for the same 
amount of time, but they could use their time as they pleased, e.g. make use of 
their phone or lab computer. They were also informed that receiving the monetary 
reward would not be contingent on their performance, as long as they put effort 
into doing the task.
We computed participants’ indifference points (IPs) to estimate subjective value. 
Indifference points reflect the monetary amount offered for the presumably less 
effortful option at which participants are equally likely to choose one or the other, 
thus the probability of accepting either option would be 0.5. We calculated the 
probabilities of accepting the presumably easier offer using binomial logistic 
regression analysis.
Figure 6.3A&B depicts the logistic regression curves of an example participant 
for whom it was possible to estimate indifference points (the participant selected 
both the task and no effort options enough times to fit a logistic regression, see 
Methods section) for both update (A) and ignore (B) conditions. The indifference 
point (IP) represents the degree of discounting of the high-effort offer, where an IP 
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of 2 corresponds to subjective equivalence (given that the offer of the discounted 
task was always €2, IP = €2 implies that the participant finds the task and the 
no effort option equally costly). IPs smaller than €2 represent greater discounting 
(the participant finds the redo option to be more costly than the no-redo option) 
and thus reduced subjective value.
FIGURE 6.3 | Example participant logistic regression curves. A, B Logistic regression 
curves for “task vs no effort” choices of one participant for update (A) and ignore (B) con-
dition. The probability of accepting the “no effort” (i.e. no task) offer (y-axis) is plotted as 
a function of the amount of money offered for “no effort” (x-axis). Task offer was always 
€2 for both conditions and all set sizes and the “no effort” offer varied from €0.10 to 
€2.20. The estimated indifference point is the offer for “no effort” where the probability 
of choosing to do the task or the “no effort” option is equal (i.e. 0.5). Indifference points 
decreased with increasing set size. C, D Example logistic regression curves for “ignore 
vs update” indifference points. Presented is the probability of choosing the update offer 
as a function of the amount of money offered for update. Ignore offer was always €2 
for both conditions and all set sizes, while the update offer varied from €0.10 to €4. 
The indifference point is the update offer for which the acceptance probability is 0.5, i.e. 
subjective equivalence. C Example participant who discounted rewards in order to avoid 
ignore trials (preference for update). D Example participant who discounted rewards in 
order to avoid the more demanding levels of update trials (preference for ignore).
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Next, we analyzed IPs using Bayesian and classical 2x4 repeated measures 
ANOVAs to assess whether the subjective value of an offer decreased with 
demand. Indifference points are displayed as a function of set size and experiment 
in Figure 6.4A&B (Supplemental Table 6.3 for descriptive statistics). Overall, the 
results show that participants significantly discounted the working memory task 
as the subjective value decreased as a function of task difficulty (i.e. set size). 
Moreover, in line with our hypothesis, the subjective cost of performing the ignore 
condition is higher than that of the update condition (Figure 6.4). On average, 
participants found the no effort option less costly than the task option, for both 
conditions. Analyses of data from Experiment 1 (Table 6.5) showed that the 
winning model, which included set size and condition (BF10=5006) was four times 
more likely than the runner-up model which included set size alone (BF10 =1229). 
Our second experiment replicated this finding, with the same winning model 
(BF10=9.7e +19) being ~19 times more likely than the runner up (Table 6.5). 
Individual effects analyses (Table 6.6) strengthened these model comparison-
based inferences: They provide very strong evidence for a set size effect 
(Experiment 1: F1.3,31=5.666, p=0.016, BFINC=1246; Experiment 2: F1.57,77=22.230, 
p=2.8e-7, BFINC=6.0e +15), indicating that participants find higher set sizes 
to be increasingly costly. In Experiment 1, there was anecdotal evidence that 
the subjective value of the ignore condition was lower than that of the update 
condition (F1,23=10.924, p=0.003, BF10=3.1). The more powerful replication 
study showed extreme evidence for a lower subjective value of ignore versus 
update (F1,49=18.216, p=9.0e-5, BF10=1684), indicating that participants found 
the ignore condition subjectively more costly than the update condition. Finally, 
there is limited evidence against an interaction effect (Experiment 1: F3,69=1.798, 
p=0.168, BFINC=0.2; Experiment 2: F2.66,130=2.167, p=0.102, BF10=0.5).
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FIGURE 6.4 | A, B “Task vs no effort” indifference points as a function of set size. A 
Experiment 1 (24 participants). B Experiment 2 (50 participants). The more the indifference 
points deviate from 2, the more participants discounted the task option (the task offer was 
fixed at €2). C, D: Logistic regression curves for “task vs no effort” choices per condition 
across set size. The probability of accepting the “no effort” (i.e. no task) offer (y-axis) is 
plotted as a function of the amount of money offered for “no effort” (x-axis). Logistic 
curves estimated using the lmer package (Bates et al., 2015) in R (R Core Team, 2014). C 
Experiment 1 (24 participants). D Experiment 2 (50 participants). E, F Indifference points 
for “ignore versus update” choices as a function of set size. E Data from experiment 1 (26 
participants). F Data from experiment 2 (58 participants). Indifference points smaller than 
2 indicate a preference for update over ignore (offer for ignore was fixed at €2). Error 
bars indicate within- participant SEM (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008).
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TABLE 6.5 | Model comparison: indifference points
Models BF 10
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Condition+ Set size 5002.7 9.7e +19
Condition+ Set size+ Condition* Set size 722.8 5.2e +18
Set size 1229.2 4.0e +16
Condition 2.7 243.7
Model comparison relative to the null model for “task vs no effort” indifference points
TABLE 6.6 | Effects analysis: indifference points
Effects BF inclusion Pvalue
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Condition 3.1 1683.9 0.03 9.0e-3
Set size 1241.0 6.0e +15 0.016 2.8e-7
Condition* Set 
size
0.5 0.2
0.168 0.102
 Effects analysis for “task vs no effort” indifference points
Cognitive effort discounting: To Ignore or to Update?
Next, we assessed choices that involved direct comparison between performing 
the ignore and the update trials. The offer for ignore was fixed at €2 and the offer 
for update varied from €0.1 to €4. Accordingly, an IP < 2 indicates a preference 
for (increased subjective value of) update vs ignore, while an IP > 2 represents 
a preference for ignore vs update (see Methods section for more details). Figure 
6.3C&D depicts logistic regression curves of two example participants, one 
preferring the update condition and exhibiting an effect of set size (left panel) 
and the other preferring the ignore condition and not exhibiting an effect of set 
size (right panel).
Descriptive statistics are presented in Supplemental Table 6.4 and one-sample 
t-test output in Table 6.7. In Figure 6.4E&F, we report the average indifference 
points per set size. In accordance with our second hypothesis, the overall average 
subjective value of ignore versus update choices was less than 2 (1.88), indicating 
a preference for update over ignore. The support in the data for this hypothesis is 
~4.8 times higher than the null (T-test (IP<2) t25=-2.440, p=0.011, BF-0= 4.8). In 
Experiment 2, the average subjective value was 1.73 and a preference for update 
over ignore was ~65 times more supported by the data than no preference 
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(T-test (IP<2): t57=-3.535, p=4.1e-6, BF-0= 65). The output of the one-way 
repeated-measures ANOVA shows very strong evidence for the data under the 
null hypothesis that subjective value is not influenced by set size (Experiment 
1: F1.8,45=0.961 p=0.382, BF10=0.149; Experiment 2: F1.2,69=0.069, p=0.840, 
BF10=0.023). Our results provide confidence in our second hypothesis that 
participants discount rewards in order to repeat flexible updating trials over 
distractor resistance and this does not vary with set size.
TABLE 6.7 | Ignore versus update analysis
Set size BF-o Pvalue
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Across 4.8 64.9 0.011 4.1e-4
1 2.4 6698.0 0.026 2.6e-6
2 4.3 1105.0 0.013 1.8e-5
3 4.2 13.2 0.013 0.002
4 3.0 10.9 0.02 0.003
One-sample t-test that “ignore vs update” IPs are smaller than 2
Exploratory analyses
Having established that ignore is both more difficult and perceived as more costly 
for most participants, we next asked whether variability in preference for update 
varies with variability in task performance. A plot of deviance for ignore versus 
update against preference for ignore versus update reveals little correlation (Figure 
6.5). We also assessed a relationship between preference and performance 
using mixed effects logistic regression (see Methods section). We compared the 
models with and without the main effect of performance (deviance). For both 
experiments, adding deviance did not improve model fit significantly (Experiment 
1: model without deviance: BIC: 4474.3, AIC: 4376.5; full model: BIC: 4482.5, 
AIC: 4377.9, p(pr>Chisq)=0.430; Experiment 2: model without deviance: BIC: 
10535, AIC: 10426; full model: BIC: 10544, AIC: 10427, p(pr>Chisq)=0.463). 
Additionally, in the full model, which includes deviance, the effect of condition is 
still present in Experiment 2 (p=0.061 for Experiment 1; p=0.0001 for Experiment 
2). The above suggest that variability in performance does not explain away 
differences in preference for update versus ignore.
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FIGURE 6.5 | Relationship between reported, measured preference and performance in 
the color wheel task. The y axis represents the difference in performance between ignore 
and update across demand. Measured preference: indifference points in the direct com-
parison across demand being higher or lower than 2 (preference for update or ignore 
respectively). Reported preference: participants written report of which task condition they 
prefer. Performance on update versus ignore trials does not covary with a preference for 
update versus ignore. There is a correlation measured (indifference points) and reported 
(questionnaire) preference for update versus ignore. Depicted data from Experiment 2 
(60 participants).
DISCUSSION
In this project, we set out to quantify the subjective value of cognitive stability and 
cognitive flexibility in the domain of working memory. We asked not only whether 
these working memory processes are associated with higher subjective costs when 
demand increases, but also whether tasks requiring cognitive stability carry a 
lower subjective cost than do tasks requiring cognitive stability. In keeping with 
prior work (Apps et al., 2015; Chong et al., 2017; Massar et al., 2016; Westbrook 
et al., 2013), we demonstrate highly robust and monotonic discounting of delayed 
response task value with parametrically increasing working memory load (i.e. set 
size). Most critically, the results provide strong evidence that the ignore condition 
of the task with high stability demands is more costly than is the update version 
of the task with high flexibility demands: Participants are willing to forego higher 
monetary offers in order to avoid repeating performing ignore compared with 
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update trials. This finding is evident both indirectly when participants had to 
choose between the task and a break, but also directly when they had to choose 
between ignore and update. This result was replicated in the second independent 
sample and concurs with our primary prediction that the cognitive effort cost of 
cognitive stability is higher than that of cognitive flexibility.
Depending on one’s perspective, this effect of condition on effort cost might be 
very intuitive or surprising. We might be surprised, because the update trials were 
longer, and required the encoding and gating into working memory of twice the 
number of stimuli compared with the ignore trials. Moreover, many studies have 
shown that tasks with high demands for cognitive flexibility, like task switching 
and set-shifting, are accompanied by robust (residual) costs (Rogers and Monsell, 
1995; Rubinstein et al., 2001). However, the effect might be considered intuitive, 
if we recognize that reorienting to salient stimuli can be considered a bottom-up 
process. In this task, updating is a relatively automatic process, while ignoring 
requires the withholding of intervening stimuli and thus resolution of conflict, that 
is, the core function of cognitive control (Botvinick and Cohen, 2014; Corbetta and 
Shulman, 2002; Ernst et al., 2011; Feng et al., 2014). This then brings us back to 
the original question: What makes cognitive control costly?
What makes cognitive control costly?
One possibility is that this effect reflects a difference in opportunity costs. In our 
task, the more subjectively costly ignore trials were 4 seconds shorter than were the 
cheaper update trials, thus opportunity costs are unlikely to map directly to time 
costs (Niv et al., 2007). However, we speculate that the effect of task demands 
on subjective cost reflects an opportunity cost of focusing: the cognitive strategy 
required for accurate ignore versus update performance differs in the degree 
to which it allows novel input and thus, alternative opportunities, to impinge on 
current processing. More generally, it is possible that the brain is more strongly 
biased against tasks that demand stable focusing compared with flexible opening 
given that focusing will incur higher opportunity costs across environments.
The observation that the subjective cost of repeating the ignore task is higher than 
that of the update task is in line with the finding that participants perform more 
poorly on ignore compared with update trials. This finding concurs with previous 
results from studies using an analogous task with ignore and update conditions 
(Fallon and Cools, 2014; Fallon et al., 2016, 2017). In those prior studies, 
however, the task-relevant delay between the to-be-remembered items and the 
probe was shorter in the update than ignore condition, rendering inference about 
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the cognitive mechanism underlying the performance difference difficult. Here, 
we show that the ignore condition is accompanied by worse performance than 
the update condition, even if task-relevant delay is matched between conditions.
A key question that is raised by the performance difference between task 
conditions is whether the condition effect on subjective effort cost reflects 
differences in the degree of (aversion to) anticipated performance error. We 
argue, however, that an increase in the anticipated performance error is unlikely 
to account fully for the increase in subjective effort cost of the ignore versus update 
condition, for the following three reasons. First, while instructing participants, 
we highlighted that monetary rewards would not be contingent on performance 
during the ‘redo session’, so that performance error should not have influenced 
participants’ choices in our design. Second, in a statistical mixed-effects model 
that took into account accuracy, the effect of condition was still present, as a trend 
in Experiment 1 and highly significant in the more powerful Experiment 2. Third, 
there was no evidence for a clear association between performance error and 
measured preference (Figure 6.5). In future studies, we might consider matching 
performance between the two conditions or provide “fake” feedback to influence 
participants’ beliefs about their performance. Notably, participants responded not 
only more accurately, but also more slowly on the update than the ignore trials. 
We are puzzled by this finding, and consider it possible that this response time 
effect is a consequence of a differential delay between the presentation of the 
intervening stimulus and the probe in the two conditions. For example, it might 
reflect changes in an orienting response to the intervening stimulus (Loveless 
and Sanford, 1975). We also consider an alternative explanation, namely that 
the effect of condition on reaction times reflects a modulation of a decision 
threshold rather than of attentional orienting, trading off time for higher accuracy 
(Bogacz et al., 2010) in the update condition in which the memory is more robustly 
maintained and such a strategy would be beneficial. Here we should note that in 
both experiments, the time of the mouse click was used as an index of reaction 
time. However, a clearer picture could be formed if we also had data on initial 
response times (mouse move) and decision times (move to click). This is a limitation 
that should be addressed in future studies.
Benefits of current task design
In addition to disentangling the subjective value of distractor resistance and flexible 
updating task performance, the present results strengthen and extend previous 
studies on the value of cognitive engagement. First, we confirm that, on average, 
people are averse to cognitive demand, are ‘cognitive misers’, willing to decline 
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rewards in order to avoid demanding tasks. This strengthens earlier work showing 
that participants prefer to avoid more demanding N-back tasks (Westbrook et al., 
2013), detection tasks (Chong et al., 2017) or sustained attention tasks (Massar 
et al., 2016). Our results further extend these conclusions to the most classic 
of working memory tasks: the delayed response task. A distinct strength of our 
design is the fact that our implementation of the discounting procedure takes 
into account the observation that choices are probabilistic. Unlike prior studies 
on cognitive effort which used staircase procedures sampling every choice option 
only once (Massar et al., 2016; Westbrook et al., 2013), we sampled the full 
discounting curve and every choice option multiple times. Furthermore, unlike 
prior studies, in which on the first trial a lower monetary offer was made for the 
low effort option than for the high effort option, we avoided (potential) anchor 
effects by presenting, on the first trial the same offer for both options. Finally, 
unlike previous discounting studies we gave participants the opportunity to choose 
the effortful option for less money. As expected, most participants declined this 
offer, but the subjective value of four participants (total in both samples) was 
higher than 2 for at least one of the two working memory processes, indicating a 
preference for repeating the working memory task, suggestive of effort seeking. 
These various features of our design likely allowed us to obtain more precise and 
unbiased estimates of the subjective value of cognitive work than previous designs.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this study provides new insights to the novel and growing fields 
of cognitive effort discounting and value-based decision- making. Specifically, 
we showed that with increasing demand on working memory processes, the 
subjective valuation decreased, both for the process of distractor resistance and 
flexible updating. We also show strong evidence that distractor resistance is 
perceived as relatively costlier than flexible updating.
METHODS
Participants
For Experiment 1, 32 participants (22 women), aged between 18-29 years old 
were tested in total. Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Colorblind participants were excluded. Four data sets were lost during data 
transfer, so we ended up with 28 data sets (20 women, 18-33 years old, mean: 
24). For Experiment 2, we estimated the number of participants required to reach 
a Bayes factor of 10 for either the null or the alternative hypothesis that update is 
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more costly than ignore given the effect size estimated from Experiment 1 using 
the BFDA (Schönbrodt, 2016) package in R. Based on the results of the power 
calculation we collected 62 data sets (37 women, 20-44 years old, mean: 25.6, 
standard deviation: 4.3). The study was approved by the local ethics committee 
(CMO region Arnhem/Nijmegen, The Netherlands, CMO2001/095) and all 
participants provided written informed consent, according to the declaration of 
Helsinki.
Exclusion criteria
We excluded participants based on four rules: 1) Failing to pass the color 
sensitivity test twice. 2) Striking evidence that they did not understand or will to 
perform the tasks. 3) Their mean deviating further than 3 standard deviations 
from average for at least one of our main conditions (across demand). 4) In the 
effort discounting tasks analyses we excluded people whose indifference points 
we could not estimate for at least one condition (across demand levels).
Based on our criteria, one outlier was excluded from performance analysis of 
Experiment 1 for deviating more than 3 standard deviations from the mean for 
ignore (~3SD) and one from Experiment 2 for deviating more than 3 standard 
deviations from the mean of both conditions (~5.4SD from Ignore and ~6.6SD 
from Update mean). Four people were excluded from the analysis of task vs 
no effort indifference points in Experiment 1 and twelve in Experiment 2. In 
Experiment 1, all four were excluded because we could not estimate indifference 
points for at least one of the two conditions (ignore/update). Among the four 
that were excluded, one always chose the no task option, one of them always 
chose the task option and one of them always chose no task for update trials 
and task for ignore trials. In Experiment 2, eleven participants were excluded 
due to inadequate response variability and one because he was not performing 
the task. Out of the eleven whose IPs we could not estimate, one almost always 
chose the task option and the rest always preferred the no effort option. The other 
participant always responded using one of the two response buttons. This is a 
clear indication that he was not trying to perform the task because easy and hard 
offer presentation was counterbalanced across response buttons. We excluded 
two participants from the analysis of “ignore vs update” indifference points in 
Experiment 1 analysis; one because we could not estimate any indifference points 
(always chose ignore) and another because they deviated more than 3 standard 
deviations from the mean. Four participants were excluded in Experiment 2 for 
the same analysis. One always chose ignore, two always chose update and one 
did not do the task (see above).
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Task design
All paradigms were entirely programmed in MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, MA, 
USA)(release 2013a) using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997) 
(version 3.0.12) on a Windows 7 operating system. The screen resolution was 
1920x1080 pixels. The background color for all paradigms was grey (R: 200 
G:200 B:200).
The experiment lasted about 130 minutes and consisted of four tasks performed 
at a computer and questionnaires that participants filled in at the end. The first 
task (~7min) was a color sensitivity test aiming to check whether participants were 
sensitive to the colorful stimuli used in the color wheel memory task. Participants 
then proceeded with the color wheel working memory task to acquire experience 
with varying demand of the two working memory processes of interest (~10min 
practice and 30min task). The third task (~5min practice and 55min task) was a 
cognitive effort discounting paradigm that was used to estimate subjective value 
and address our research questions. The last computer-based task was a redo 
of the color wheel task (~10min). Finally, participants filled in some experiment-
related questionnaires (~5min).
Color sensitivity task
For our working memory task, we used color stimuli and a color wheel, so it was 
crucial that our participants’ color vision was not impaired. To test their sensitivity 
to our manipulation we developed a version of the color wheel task without a 
working memory component. In this task participants viewed a colored square 
in the middle of the screen and the same color wheel used in the memory task. 
Their goal was to click on the color of the wheel that matched the colored square.
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FIGURE 6.6 | Two example trials of the color sensitivity task. Participants viewed a colored 
square in the middle of the screen and they had to click with a mouse on the correspond-
ing color on the color wheel. A black line indicated the selected color and a successive 
line the correct color. If the selected color deviated 10o or less from the correct color they 
received feedback that they performed well. The task was self-paced (24 trials total). They 
successfully completed the task if their average deviance was less than 15o.
The stimuli used for the color sensitivity task were a color wheel, black lines and 
colored squares. The color wheel was created by 512 successive colored arcs of 
equal angle (512/360˚ = 1.42˚), each arc carrying a different color. The radius 
of the wheel was 486 pixels. To form the wheel into a ring, a smaller circle was 
superimposed, whose radius was ~362 pixels. The centre of both the wheel and 
the circle coincided with the centre of the screen. The 512 colors of the color wheel 
arcs were generated using the hsv MATLAB colormap. The black lines were 0.4˚ 
black arcs.
In every trial of this task, participants viewed the color wheel and a colored square 
in the middle of the screen (Figure 6.7). They were instructed to look at the color 
of the square and use the mouse to click on the corresponding shade on the 
color wheel. To indicate that their response was recorded a black line appeared 
on the color wheel and successively another black line appeared designating the 
location of the correct color. Feedback consisted of the actual deviance plus a 
positive message (‘Good job! You deviated only __ degrees.’) and was provided 
only when responses deviated less than 10 .˚
To test a representative sample of the color wheel we split the wheel in 12 main 
arcs. Participants were tested in two different shades from each of the 12 color 
categories. So, they performed in total 24 trials of this task. The presentation 
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of the trials as well as the orientation of the color wheel were randomized. The 
responses were self-paced and total task duration was approximately 7min. The 
main dependent variable in this task was deviance in degrees from the correct 
color. If their average deviance was less than 15˚ by the end of the task, the 
experiment continued. Otherwise, they had one more chance to perform the color 
sensitivity task, but if failed again they would be excluded.
All participants from both experiments completed 24 trials of the color sensitivity 
task and they all met the criterion (average deviance from correct color below 
15 degrees) to continue to the main paradigm. For Experiment 1, the average 
deviance from the target color was 6.63 degrees (SD = 1.23; median = 4.72, 
SD = 0.85) and for Experiment 2 mean deviance was 6.27 degrees (SD=1.4; 
median=4.85, SD=1.08). We also reported the median for easy comparison with 
the color wheel working memory task results.
Color wheel working memory task
After successfully completing the color sensitivity task, participants proceeded 
with the color wheel working memory task. In this part, participants experienced 
varying demands of distractor resistance and flexible updating. This task was 
based on a short-recall task (Zhang and Luck, 2008) and delayed-match-
to-sample tasks (Fallon and Cools, 2014) that have previously been used to 
disentangle between the two working memory processes of interest.
The stimuli displayed during this paradigm were a color wheel, colored squares, 
black frames of squares, a fixation cross, black lines and central letter cues. 
The color wheel was generated as described in the color sensitivity section. The 
number of squares varied from one to four and they could be located in four 
different positions. The centres of the squares formed a rectangle with dimensions 
248x384 pixels. Each of the four squares was 100x100 pixels in size. To choose 
the colors of the squares, we split the color wheel into 12 main arcs of 42 colors 
each and only used the 15 central colors of each arc. The arcs from which the 
colors would be sampled per trial were defined manually, but the exact shade 
(RGB values) was randomly selected. The letter cues were “I” and “U”, colored 
black and presented at the centre of the screen.
Every trial of the task consisted of three phases separated by two delay periods 
(Figure 6.1A). During the encoding phase, participants viewed the fixation 
cross and one to four colored squares for two seconds. The number of squares 
displayed (set size 1-4) represented the demand of the trial. A delay of two 
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seconds followed, during which only the fixation cross was displayed. Then the 
interference phase followed. In this phase, participants viewed the same number 
of squares as during encoding, at the same locations, but with different colors. 
Instead of a fixation cross, one of the two letter cues were presented during 
interference in the middle of the screen. The cue indicated the condition of the 
trial: “I” for distractor resistance trials and “U” for flexible updating. The second 
delay duration depended on trial condition, and was two seconds for distractor 
resistance and six seconds for updating trials. Finally, during the response phase 
participants saw black frames of the same squares, one of which was highlighted, 
in addition to the color wheel and the fixation cross. If the participant responded 
within four seconds, a black line appeared on the color wheel, otherwise, they 
were instructed to respond faster (‘Please respond faster!). The total duration of 
the response phase was five seconds.
For the encoding phase, participants were instructed to always memorize the 
colors and locations of all presented squares. The instructions for the interference 
phase differed based on the condition as indicated by the letter cue. In distractor 
resistance trials, participants needed to maintain in their memory the colors 
from the encoding phase and not be distracted by the new intervening stimuli. In 
flexible updating trials, participants had to let go of their previous representations 
and update into their memory the stimuli from the interference phase. Thus, the 
colors that needed to be remembered for distractor resistance were the ones 
from the encoding phase, while on updating trials they were the ones from the 
interference phase. To match the time that the relevant stimuli were maintained in 
memory for both conditions, the second delay was 4 seconds longer for update 
trials. Participants were to indicate the color for only the highlighted square. 
They had to identify the target color on the color wheel and click using a mouse, 
within four seconds. Only the first response counted. A black line indicated their 
response. Only during practice trials, a second line appeared at the correct color 
and positive feedback was displayed if they were performing well (as in color 
sensitivity section). During the task, no feedback was provided. We instructed 
participants to fixate in the middle of the screen throughout the task in order to 
dissuade them from adopting the strategy of closing their eyes during ignore trials 
in order to avoid being distracted.
Participants first underwent a practice session of 16 trials and then performed 
two blocks of the task. A block consisted of 64 trials, resulting from repeating 
each combination of difficulty (four levels: set size 1 – 4) and condition (two levels: 
ignore and update) eight times. Depending on the difficulty level of the trial, a 
group of two to eight colors was used to create the trial stimuli, each color coming 
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from one of the 12 arcs. Colors of the same arc never appeared more than once 
in the same trial. To make sure that ignore and update trials were as similar and 
counterbalanced as possible, the color stimuli sets displayed and the target colors 
were the same for both conditions. Because the relevant colors appeared during 
encoding for Ignore and during interference for update, we made sure that the 
same group of stimuli also appeared in reverse order between these two phases. 
So, the same groups of colored squares were presented four times per set size 
and in total 32 groups of colors were used. To decrease learning effects due to 
repetition, we split the same stimuli groups between the two blocks. To control 
for differences between the two hemispheres in representation of color(Gilbert 
et al., 2006), target locations (left/right) were counterbalanced across conditions. 
Moreover, the same colors were highlighted for all four set sizes.
Cognitive effort discounting task
After participants gained experience with all four difficulty levels of update and 
ignore conditions of the color wheel working memory task, they proceeded with 
the third part of the experiment: the effort discounting task (Figure 6.1B). The aim 
of this paradigm was to quantify the subjective value that participants assigned to 
color wheel task performance. There were two versions of choice trials to address 
our two research questions. In both versions, two options were accompanied by 
an amount of money and the options defined what participants would do in the 
last part of the experiment.
In every trial of the task participants saw a rectangle containing two options and a 
fixation cross. The options could be “No Redo” or any set size of ignore or update, 
for example “Ignore 2”, corresponding to the ignore condition of the task and 
set size of 2. Below each option, a monetary reward was displayed, for example 
“for 2€”. Participants could choose the left or right option by pressing 1 or 2 on 
the keyboard and they had six seconds to respond. When participants made a 
choice, a black square surrounding the selected offer appeared to indicate that 
their response was recorded.
At this stage, participants were instructed that there were two more parts in the 
experiment. In the last part, they would have the opportunity to earn a bonus 
monetary reward by redoing one to three blocks of the color wheel task. However, 
the amount of the bonus and the type of trials they would repeat would be 
based on the choices they made on the choice task. To highlight the importance 
of every choice, we instructed them that of all the choices they made (of both 
versions) the computer would select only one randomly and the bonus and redo 
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would be based on that single choice. To minimize effects of error avoidance on 
choices, we informed participants that accuracy during the redo part would not 
influence whether they receive the monetary reward, as long as their performance 
was comparable with the first time that they did the color wheel task (part 2 of 
experiment). Both the rewards and the redo were real and not hypothetical.
Task vs No effort: Choices between working memory task and no 
task
These trials addressed the first research question: whether the subjective value 
of distractor resistance and flexible updating subjective values decreases as a 
function of task demand. Here, participants had to choose between repeating a 
level of ignore or update (task offer) and not redoing the color wheel task at all (no 
effort offer). If they chose the no task option (“No Redo” ) they were instructed that 
they would be able to use their time as they pleased (e.g. by using their phones 
or lab computer) but they would still have to stay in the testing lab so that time 
spent on the experiment was the same for both options. Otherwise, if the option 
to repeat the task was selected, the redo trials would consist of mostly the selected 
choice condition and level. “Mostly” is important because if they always did the 
same condition during the redo, they would be able to predict whether they had 
to update or ignore. We emphasized that they should take their time to respond, 
consider both the money and their experience while doing the color wheel task as 
well as the importance of choosing their true preference and not try to please us.
Ignore vs Update: Choices between distractor resistance and flexi-
ble updating
This trial type aimed to investigate whether distractor resistance is perceived 
as costlier than flexible updating by directly contrasting them. In these trials, 
participants had to choose between doing the same level of either ignore or 
update.
The amount they were offered for the no effort “No Redo” option varied from 
€0.10 to €2.20 in €0.20 steps (except the first step, which was €0.10), while 
the task option (effort offer) was always fixed at €2.00. The €2.20 option for 
“No Redo” was included to identify whether there were participants who strongly 
preferred performing the task, even if that meant forgoing rewards. As we 
hypothesized that ignore would be costlier, in this case ignore (hard offer) was 
kept steady at €2 and update (easy offer) was varying from €0.10 to €4 in €0.20 
steps (as above). There were 96 possible pairs for “task vs no effort” choices 
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(12 amounts*2 conditions*4 set sizes) and 84 for “ignore vs update” choices (21 
amounts*4 set sizes). As there is evidence that choice is probabilistic rather than 
deterministic (Rieskamp, 2008), every pair of options was sampled three times. 
We decided on three repetitions of the pairs based on a simulation analysis using 
pilot data (Supplemental Figure 6.3) in order to optimize the trade-off between 
indifference point estimation and task duration. Each participant performed three 
blocks that contained in total 288 trials of “task vs no effort” trials and 255 trials 
of “ignore vs update”. There was a short practice session of 12 trials, where the 
amounts offered were the same for all options (€2) to avoid anchor effects. The 
trials of the two versions were interleaved (mixed) and randomized within each 
block. To avoid location effects, we counterbalanced the left-right presentation 
of the two options. Total task duration was about 55 minutes.
We decided to use fixed sets of offers and not a titrated staircase procedure to 
estimate subjective value because staircase procedures do not sample the entire 
logistic regression curve. Our version of effort discounting task sampled the 
logistic regression curves adequately because all participants were faced with 
the entire range of offer options.
Redo
After participants finished three blocks of the discounting choice task, one of their 
choices was pseudo-randomly selected. Specifically, the computer only sampled 
from “ignore vs update” choices of level 3 or 4. Participants always did one block 
of 24 trials of the color wheel task. Two-thirds of these trials were their preferred 
condition (ignore/update). We decided to never select the no effort option to 
maintain experimenter credibility, so that participants discussing the task are 
convinced that the consequences are real. The redo data were not analyzed and 
participants always received the bonus regardless of their performance.
Debriefing questions
After the end of the experiment we requested participants to complete 
questionnaires. We explicitly asked them to report their preference by asking 
“Which trials did you prefer?”.
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Data analysis
We analyzed our data using both frequentist and Bayesian statistics. All statistical 
analyses were performed using open source software JASP (version 0.7.5.6)(JASP 
Team, 2016; Wagenmakers et al., 2016a) on a Windows 7 operating system.
As skepticism against classical statistical tools increases (Ioannidis, 2005), we 
turned to Bayesian statistics (Wagenmakers et al., 2016b). This allowed us to 
quantify evidence for our hypotheses instead of forcing an all-or-none decision 
and an arbitrary cut- off of significance. Bayesian statistics can also provide 
evidence for the null hypothesis (H0), thus distinguishing between undiagnostic 
data (“absence of evidence”) and data supporting H0 (“evidence of absence”). 
Another important benefit is that we were able to monitor evidence as data 
accumulate and we can continue sampling without biasing the result. Due to all 
the above advantages, we decided that our main conclusions would be drawn 
based on the Bayesian analyses.
However, frequentist statistics are well-established and widely-acknowledged 
tools, so more scientists are familiar with their rationale and interpretation. To 
ensure that our results are interpretable for all and to allow comparison with earlier 
work, we additionally included classical statistics. Bayesian statistics allow model 
comparison, but also provide evidence for individual effects. When possible, we 
reported Bayesian model comparison (BF10: Bayes factor of model against the 
null) as well as Bayesian and frequentist effects analyses (BFINC(LUSION): Bayes factor 
of Bayesian model averaging). We used the default JASP Cauchy priors for all 
Bayesian statistics (Wagenmakers et al., 2016a). Regarding frequentist statistics, 
we considered a p-value of 0.05 or smaller as significant. In the cases where 
sphericity was violated, we reported the Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values.
Color sensitivity task analysis
The data from this task were used only to establish that participants are sensitive 
enough to our color wheel. We calculated the overall average deviance in degrees.
Color wheel task data analysis
We computed the median deviance and median reaction time for all levels of 
ignore and update. The rationale behind choosing the median was that it is less 
sensitive to extreme values. For example, 90o and 180o accuracy scores are both 
wrong responses, but the latter affects the mean much more strongly. We used 
the above indices for the statistical analysis using classical and Bayesian 2x4 
6
 UPDATE/IGNORE COST CHAPTER 6
196
repeated measures ANOVAs with condition (ignore/update) and set size (levels 
1-4) as within-subject factors. All participants in both experiments performed 
above chance level (mean deviance less than 90o).
Discounting choice task data analysis
As an estimate of subjective value, we computed participants’ indifference points. 
The indifference points can be interpreted as the financial amount offered for 
the presumably less effortful option (no effort or update) at which participants 
are equally likely to choose one or the other, thus the probability of accepting 
either option would be 0.5. With the main dependent variable being choice, a 
dichotomous variable, we calculated the probabilities of accepting the presumably 
less effortful offer using binomial logistic regression analysis in MATLAB and 
extracted the indifference points for the different conditions.
Choices between working memory task and no effort
Having determined the indifference points for all levels of both working memory 
tasks per participant, we continued with the statistical analysis using classical 
and Bayesian 2x4 repeated measures ANOVAs to assess our first hypothesis that 
subjective value decreases with demand for distractor resistance and updating. 
Confirmation of this hypothesis would require that the model including set size is 
more likely than the null model, or the presence of a set size effect with p-value 
smaller than 0.05. We also performed Bayesian and classical one sample t-tests 
on the indifference points across levels for both conditions to assess whether the 
subjective value of the working memory functions was overall lower than the no 
task subjective value. The task offer was always €2, so a subjective value lower 
than 2 would imply that participants were discounting the task option.
Choices between Update and Ignore
We then computed participants’ indifference points collapsing across levels of 
“ignore vs update” choice trials to evaluate our hypothesis that ignore has a 
lower subjective value than update using Bayesian and classical one sample 
t-tests. As ignore offer was set at €2, subjective values lower than 2 indicate that 
participants were willing to forgo rewards to repeat update instead of ignore 
trials. Additionally, we calculated indifference points for all levels separately and 
used a 1x4 ANOVA with set size as a factor to assess if the preference for update 
varies with demand.
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Mixed effects analysis
We tested for a relationship between preference and performance with mixed 
effects logistic regression analyses, using the lmer package (Bates et al., 2015) 
in R (R Core Team, 2014). In our model, we regressed preference on fixed effects 
of set size, condition, the money offered for the “no effort” option and deviance 
(accuracy index). We also included random intercepts and slopes for the effects 
of easy offer amount, condition and set size. Continuous variables “easy offer 
amount” and “deviance” were log-transformed and standardized. We also 
assessed if the effect of condition remained significant after including deviance 
in the model. For that analysis, deviance was also added as a random slope. 
Model fits were compared using likelihood ratio chi- square tests. To estimate 
the discounting curves across participants (Figure 6.3C&D) we used a mixed 
effects model per condition with offer amount as fixed factor and participant as 
a random factor.
6
 UPDATE/IGNORE COST CHAPTER 6
198
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS OF CHAPTER 6
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 6.1 | Descriptive statistics for color wheel task deviance
Condition Set size Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Mean SD Mean SD
Ignore 1 8.69 2.71 7.96 3.51
2 10.55 4.67 9.19 3.49
3 13.42 10.39 11.96 7.78
4 15.60 13.47 13.95 9.49
Update 1 8.01 3.24 7.41 2.84
2 7.65 2.70 8.09 3.76
3 8.47 2.60 8.24 3.51
4 10.50 6.02 11.25 8.94
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 6.2 | Descriptive statistics for color wheel task RTs
Condition Set size Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Mean SD Mean SD
Ignore 1 1.84 0.32 1.91 0.31
2 2.27 0.35 2.25 0.28
3 2.24 0.27 2.23 0.28
4 2.22 0.29 2.23 0.30
Update 1 1.93 0.33 1.94 0.33
2 2.26 0.32 2.27 0.29
3 2.23 0.31 2.26 0.26
4 2.40 0.30 2.37 0.28
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SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 6.3 | Descriptive statistics for “task vs no effort” indifference 
points
Condition Set size Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Mean SD Mean SD
Ignore Across 1.48 0.45 1.36 0.52
1 1.57 0.47 1.48 0.49
2 1.56 0.39 1.42 0.52
3 1.46 0.48 1.29 0.58
4 1.34 0.56 1.16 0.62
Update Across 1.55 0.46 1.48 0.42
1 1.59 0.44 1.58 0.41
2 1.60 0.44 1.54 0.45
3 1.58 0.50 1.35 0.55
4 1.46 0.57 1.30 0.56
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 6.4 | Descriptive statistics for “Ignore vs Update” indifference 
points
Set size Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Mean SD Mean SD
Across 1.88 0.25 1.73 0.58
1 1.91 0.22 1.72 0.42
2 1.88 0.26 1.71 0.50
3 1.89 0.24 1.73 0.69
4 1.85 0.36 1.73 0.74
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SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE 6.1 | Precision (Bays et al., 2009) in the color wheel task 
as a function of set size for Experiment 1 (A, 28 participants) and Experiment 2 (B, 62 
participants). 
SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE 6.2 | Distribution of color wheel task responses per condition 
per set size in Experiment 1 (A, 28 participants) and 2 (B, 61 participants). X axis represents 
deviance from target color.
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SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS | Individual differences
In both studies, as well as in previous pilot studies, the majority of participants 
(83%) preferred update. However, a smaller percentage reported preference for 
Ignore (17%). Given this observation, we considered the possibility that, on the 
direct (Update versus Ignore) comparison trials, an effect of set size was in fact 
present, but masked by relevant individual variation in the overall preference 
for Update or Ignore. To assess this, we conducted supplementary analysis of 
Experiment 2 data, in which the effect of set size on IP was stratified by a group 
factor representing overall preference for Update over Ignore. Specifically, 
participants from the larger replication Experiment 2 were assigned to one or 
the other group based on their average IP being larger or smaller than 2. In 
keeping with our hypothesis, one-way ANOVAs in each group separately revealed 
effects of set size, both in those preferring Update (70 participants), as well as in 
those preferring Ignore (14 participants)(Ignore: p=0.076, BF10=4.56; Update: 
p=3.12e-4, BF10=865). 
SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE 6.4 | “Ignore vs Update” indifference points varying by 
demand separately for participants who overall preferred distractor resistance (ignore) 
or flexible updating (update) trials. Participants pooled from both experiments. The update 
group consists of 70 participants and the ignore group consists of 14. Error bars indicate 
within- participant SEM (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008).
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The overarching goal of this thesis was to characterize the role of catecholamines 
and specific task-demands in shaping our motivation for cognitively demanding 
processes in the healthy population. To begin to understand the mechanisms of 
cognitive control and its avoidance, the concrete aims of this thesis were to:
• quantify the willingness (i.e. motivation) to conduct cognitively effortful tasks 
and assess how motivation is affected by pharmacological interventions that 
challenge the catecholamine system;
• develop a novel paradigm that allows quantification of the motivation to 
engage in flexible versus stable cognition;
• study how a catecholamine challenge alters performance on a task probing 
flexible versus stable cognition in older adults.
KEY FINDINGS
In this section, I summarize the key findings according to the three aims defined 
above, interpret them in the context of related literature, describe implications 
and concrete limitations.
Catecholamine challenge alters cognitive control avoidance 
as a function of impulsivity 
(based on Chapters 2-4)
Summary
As introduced in 1.3, accumulating evidence indicates that cognitive control 
is subjectively costly (Westbrook et al., 2013) and people generally choose to 
refrain from effortful control (Kool et al., 2010), despite, at times, devastating 
consequences. However, when increasing the motivation by promising incentives, 
most people manage to improve cognitive control performance (Botvinick and 
Braver, 2015), pointing towards limited motivation instead of lack of capacity 
(Cools, 2016). By understanding the mechanisms that alter motivation for cognitive 
control, we can develop interventions that promote motivation and achievements 
in the long-term.
In chapter 2, we highlighted in a literature review the potential contribution 
of the major ascending neuromodulators, in particular catecholamines, to our 
tendency to avoid cognitive control. We argued that striatal dopamine might alter 
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choices about cognitive control (avoidance) by modulating (and learning about) 
the expected value of cognitive task performance. Thus, we hypothesized that 
increases in (striatal) dopamine lead to an emphasis on the benefits, but reduced 
weight on the costs of cognitive control. This follows from earlier empirical and 
neurocomputational work on a role for dopamine in value-based decision-making 
(Collins and Frank, 2014). Based on further empirical evidence for baseline-
dependency of catecholaminergic manipulations (see 1.6), we also hypothesized 
that excess or supraoptimal levels of dopamine might paradoxically reduce 
the value of cognitive control (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). To begin to assess 
contributions of catecholamines to choices about cognitive demand avoidance, 
we conducted two pharmacological studies, of which one is also reported in 
chapter 2.
In chapter 3, we administered methylphenidate in a within-subject design to 100 
healthy young adults and let them complete the demand selection task (Figure 
3.1C) twice, once after a placebo pill and once after 20mg of methylphenidate. 
In the demand selection task, participants chose between two patches of which 
one has a low and the other a high demand on task-switching. The proportion 
of low demand choices was used as an index of demand (i.e. task-switching) 
avoidance. We recruited a large sample for this study given the earlier reports 
on baseline-dependency in catecholaminergic interventions. Thus, we were 
interested in individual differences in drug response and assessed whether 
putative proxy measures of dopamine transmission modulated drug responses. 
As proxy measures, we employed working memory capacity (Daneman and 
Carpenter, 1980) and trait impulsivity (Patton et al., 1995) (Buckholtz et al., 2010; 
Cools et al., 2008; Landau et al., 2009). In line with our predictions, participants 
were demand avoidant and methylphenidate altered demand avoidance in a 
baseline-dependent manner. Methylphenidate increased demand avoidance in 
more relative to less impulsive participants (Figure 3.3) whereas the effect on 
task-switching performance was not statistically significant.
In chapter 4, we administered the catecholamine precursor tyrosine to 29 healthy 
older adults (aged 60-75), given that aging has been associated with reductions in 
dopamine transmission (Karrer et al., 2017) and reduced motivation for cognitive 
control (Westbrook et al., 2013)(see 1.3). We hypothesized that tyrosine might 
increase the value of control, as measured by the cognitive effort discounting 
paradigm (Figure 4.2). Contrary to our prediction, tyrosine administration did 
not increase the subjective value of conducting an N-back task for reward, as a 
main effect. Instead, in line with chapter 3, drug effects varied as a function of 
participants’ trait impulsivity scores. Specifically, tyrosine reduced the subjective 
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value of conducting higher N-back levels in more relative to less impulsive 
participants. In this task, effort execution (N-back task performance) and choices 
(effort discounting) were separated in time, of which only the choices were 
conducted when tyrosine levels were expected to be elevated. 
Interpretation
In line with the hypothesis that catecholamines alter choices about cognitive 
control investment, we observed, for the first time and in two independent studies, 
that a catecholamine challenge changed participants’ motivation to conduct 
demanding tasks, including task-switching and N-back tasks. Importantly, both 
studies showed that drug effects were isolated only when taking into account 
participants’ trait impulsivity scores. Even though chapter 4 was not set up 
to investigate individual differences in older adults, we explored the link with 
impulsivity based on chapter 3. Results of the two studies converged, showing 
consistent effects despite differences in drug manipulation, task, and population. 
Next to this generalization, chapter 4 extends chapter 3 in different ways; Chapter 
3 employs the demand selection task, where choices might represent learning of 
demand costs because demand is manipulated implicitly. In addition, there was 
no benefit of engaging in demanding choices, thus the value of control was not 
(parametrically) manipulated. In chapter 4, we observe a modulation of choices 
by catecholamine manipulation when measuring cost-benefit decision-making. 
Thus, we could conclude that a pharmacological catecholamine manipulation 
modulates the subjective value of cognitive effort in the absence of learning about 
effort costs. This is in line with the proposal that catecholamines alter cognitive 
control beyond learning by modulating cost/benefit-based decision making 
(Cools, 2016; Shenhav et al., 2013). It also converges with empirical findings 
from animal work, showing that dopamine neurons signal cost-discounted reward 
values when deciding whether to engage in physical effort (Varazzani et al., 2015). 
Moreover, work with experimental rodents has shown that amphetamine altered 
the willingness to invest cognitive effort (Cocker et al., 2012). 
One important question remains: What is the mechanism that links trait impulsivity 
and drug effects on the value of cognitive control? In earlier work, higher trait 
impulsivity scores were accompanied by enhanced baseline levels of striatal 
dopamine release and lower presynaptic dopamine D2 receptor availability in 
the midbrain (Buckholtz et al., 2010). In addition, impulsivity scores correlated 
with greater catecholaminergic drug effects in previous studies (Clatworthy et 
al., 2009; Cools et al., 2007). We therefore put forward two possible accounts. 
One possibility is that in high-impulsive participants, a catecholamine challenge 
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potentiates the demand cost by eliciting supraoptimal levels of dopamine. This 
might work by acting on (fewer but perhaps more sensitive) pre-synaptic D2 
receptors and thereby triggering a self-regulatory mechanism, leading to a net 
reduction in dopamine release in more impulsive subjects (Grace, 2001; Seeman 
and Madras, 2002). An alternative account is that greater drug-induced increases 
in striatal dopamine in more impulsive participants convey higher opportunity 
costs (Niv et al., 2007) of engaging with effortful cognition (i.e. opportunity 
cost; Boureau et al., 2015) resulting in disengagement. Indeed, there are recent 
proposals arguing that subjective cognitive effort costs reflect opportunity costs 
(Kurzban et al., 2013).
Ongoing studies address the link between dopamine synthesis capacity (instead 
of D2 receptor binding (Buckholtz et al., 2010) and various measures including 
trait impulsivity and cognitive demand avoidance in a large sample. This will help 
interpret impulsivity-dependent effects, as earlier work showed an association of 
trait impulsivity with D2 receptor density and drug-induced dopamine release, 
which only indirectly point towards increased baseline synthesis capacity. The 
conclusion of our studies is that the self-report measure of trait impulsivity was 
associated with catecholaminergic drug effects on the motivation to engage in 
effortful cognition, which is informative, also irrespective of its biological correlate. 
Implications for a proxy model, smart drug use, and clinical disor-
ders
In line with earlier work, we observed that drug effects were baseline-dependent 
and might be predicted by non-invasive, self-report measures (e.g. Clatworthy et 
al., 2009; Cools et al., 2007). The aim of an ongoing large-scale study (https://
www.trialregister.nl/trial/5959) is to reveal a proxy model that helps combine 
various self-report, cognitive and physiological measures to predict baseline-
dependent drug effects. This model should offer a non-invasive, cheap alternative 
for PET measurements and facilitate personalized medicine on the long term. 
Here, we observed that drug effects depend on impulsivity scores, supporting its 
relevance in such a model. Alternative or additional candidates are e.g. eye-blink 
rate (Groman et al., 2014; Müller et al., 2007, but Dang et al., 2017; Sescousse 
et al., 2018), color vision (Roy et al., 2003), pupil dilation (Joshi, Li, Kalwani, & 
Gold, 2016, but Costa & Rudebeck, 2016) or performance on different (reward-
related) paradigms. 
Next to putative implications of such a proxy model for personalized medicine, 
these findings might have concrete societal implications. More and more healthy 
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students and academics use “smart drugs” for cognitive enhancement (Maher, 
2008). The key implication of our studies for smart drug use is that not everyone 
benefits and some cognitive processes, such as the motivation to perform 
challenging tasks, might even be impaired. Also, in older adults, who have been 
associated with altered dopamine transmission, tyrosine does not remedy a lack 
of motivation. Based on our finding, an additional, tentative implication is that 
especially more impulsive people should not use e.g. methylphenidate when 
aiming to boost their motivation for studying. This is interesting in part because i) 
ADHD patients are highly impulsive and commonly treated with methylphenidate, 
and ii) it is usually the more impulsive students who are more tempted or at risk to 
try out (smart) drugs (de Wit, 2009). It might be true that other cognitive functions 
that we did not quantify here do improve in more impulsive participants. Indeed, 
earlier work evidenced that methylphenidate improves reversal learning in more 
relative to less impulsive participants (Clatworthy et al., 2009). Here, we observed 
that methylphenidate and tyrosine speeded up overall responding in the tasks. This 
illustrates that we cannot conclude (yet) on an individual level who would benefit 
in which context and emphasizes the need for careful dissemination of research 
findings to the public. We do not in any way intend to encourage smart drug use 
or increase pressure on parents or students to do so, as its use is accompanied 
by risks and side effects (Lakhan and Kirchgessner, 2012), though primarily in 
chronic use. Researchers who administer drugs that are known as ‘smart drugs’ 
in the general population, should be aware of ethical considerations. These have 
been acknowledged in interesting editorials (Farah et al., 2014; Greely et al., 
2009; Partridge et al., 2011; Sahakian and Morein-Zamir, 2011) and thoughtful 
proposals for the ‘responsible use of cognitive-enhancing drugs’ (e.g. in a special 
report by the American Academy of Neurology, September 2009 in Neurology).
Our findings might have clinical implications, because catecholaminergic drugs 
are the first-choice treatment in several neuropsychiatric disorders that are also 
characterized by high trait impulsivity (Iacobucci, 2018). It seems paradoxical 
that methylphenidate enhanced cognitive demand avoidance in more impulsive 
participants, while in ADHD patients - who are generally highly impulsive - 
methylphenidate is known to remedy cognitive deficits (Coghill et al., 2013; 
Faraone and Buitelaar, 2010; Leonard et al., 2004). Our findings highlight the 
need to i) quantify motivation in addition to execution of cognitive control tasks 
in patient populations and ii) assess drug-induced changes in the perceived 
cost of cognitive control to observe whether treatment might actually harm its 
motivation. A core symptom of ADHD in the DSM-5 diagnosis is “avoids, dislikes, 
or is reluctant to engage in tasks that require sustained mental effort”. Thus, there 
is some progress in taking into account motivational factors in ADHD (diagnosis) 
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(Mies et al., 2019; Morsink et al., 2017; Sergeant, 2005; Sonuga-Barke et al., 
2003), but future work should further assess whether this and more disorders 
should be described and treated as disorders of the will. Note that our findings 
were obtained in the lab-context of choices with little alternative opportunity 
than doing a task (easy versus hard). The question remains whether the effects 
generalize to real-life environments where high effort choices are compared 
against taking a break or more rewarding activities. 
Limitations
One caveat of our studies is that we do not know how task performance alters 
effort avoidance and, therefore, whether drug effects on effort avoidance (partly) 
reflect changes in (perceived) task performance. This is an important limitation, 
given i) that the more demanding option is usually accompanied by poorer 
performance (higher error rate, longer response times), ii) drug effects on task 
execution in addition to choices, and iii) earlier work indicating that performance 
feedback and the (false) belief about one’s capacity altered cognitive control 
performance, motivation to perform a task (Clarkson et al., 2011; Vallerand and 
Reid, 1984). For example, in chapter 3, participants made more mistakes when 
more frequent task-switching was required; in chapter 4, performance decreased 
as a function of working memory load. We aimed to minimize the impact of 
performance on choices by refraining from providing any performance feedback 
in chapter 3 and by splitting performance and choice (i.e. effort discounting) in 
two separate parts of the experiment in chapter 4. Only the second part took 
place when tyrosine effects were peaking, thus minimizing drug alterations of 
performance. To assess whether intervention effects on choice reflect indirect 
modulations of the capacity to execute a task, we analyzed, in addition to changes 
in choices, the effect of the intervention on task performance. We observed that 
in both tasks, accuracy was not different as a function of drug and impulsivity, 
thus failure avoidance should not have driven the changes in demand avoidance. 
However, methylphenidate speeded responding in more impulsive participants 
irrespective of demand (Chapter 3) and tyrosine reduced level-induced slowing 
on the N-back task as a function of impulsivity (Chapter 4). Thus, more impulsive 
participants who expressed lower motivation for cognitive control also showed 
speeding on the cognitive control tasks. This is not in line with an account in which 
time on task enhances subsequent avoidance or reduces its value. One might 
argue that the opposite (but not correlating) drug-induced effects on value and 
response speed can be explained by a drug-induced increase in the capacity 
of effort allocation which results in faster responding but the enhanced effort 
7
CHAPTER 7DISCUSSION
212
investment was then perceived as more costly. We cannot address this hypothesis 
with the current data. Future work may employ pupil dilation, as this has been 
suggested to correlate with effort allocation (Kahneman and Beatty, 1966; Massar 
et al., 2015) and might be used as an index of effort investment. 
One key remaining open question is whether the observed drug effects reflect 
modulations of dopamine, noradrenaline or both. Our hypotheses were motivated 
primarily by a robust literature on dopamine’s role in physical effort and cost-
benefit decision making. However, both our pharmacological interventions do not 
selectively stimulate dopamine transmission, but also noradrenaline (Kishore et 
al., 2013; Kuczenski and Segal, 2001; Scheel-Krüger, 1971). The locus-coeruleus-
noradrenaline system has been associated with processes closely related to 
cognitive effort, such as mental fatigue (Berridge and Waterhouse, 2003), task 
engagement (i.e. exploitation) versus disengagement (i.e. exploration)(Aston-
Jones and Cohen, 2005; Gilzenrat et al., 2010), lapses of attention (Van den 
Brink et al., 2016) and meta-cognitive regulatory functions, including confidence 
(Hauser et al., 2017). When assessing the distinct contributions of dopaminergic 
versus noradrenergic neuron activity during effort-based decisions in monkeys, 
it seems that these systems may play complementary roles in resolving decisions 
about physical effort investment (Varazzani et al., 2015); dopamine encoded 
cost-discounted values of rewards, whereas noradrenergic cells modified activity 
in relation to the amount of effort required to obtain them (Floresco, 2015). 
In ongoing work, we administer drugs with selective affinity for dopaminergic 
receptors while quantifying motivation of cognitive control, which will help assess 
the unique contribution of dopamine in the cognitive domain. The administration 
of selective drugs has an additional advantage: due to their selectivity to e.g. 
D2-type receptors, it is possible to draw conclusions about regional effects as D2 
receptors are particularly abundant in the striatum. 
Cognitive stability is subjectively more costly than cognitive 
flexibility
(based on chapter 6)
Summary
Exerting cognitive control is perceived as effortful and was suggested to carry an 
intrinsic cost resulting in its avoidance. However, it is unclear which aspects of 
cognitive control are accompanied by high effort costs and whether this depends 
CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION
213
on the demand for flexible versus stable control. Chapter 6 presents a novel effort 
discounting paradigm (see Figure 6.1) that allows to quantify the subjective cost of 
cognitive processes with specific demands for stable versus flexible control. For this 
purpose, we merged multiple streams of literature: we added to a well-established 
working memory task (Zhang and Luck, 2008) an intermediate phase to probe 
distractor resistance (i.e. cognitive stability) versus flexible updating (i.e. cognitive 
flexibility) (cf. Fallon and Cools, 2014; Fallon et al., 2016) and a subsequent effort-
discounting phase (cf. Westbrook et al., 2013). Based on recent theorizing, the cost 
of cognitive effort might represent a motivational signal that biases behavior away 
from focusing on a task towards opening up for new opportunities (Cools, 2016; 
Kurzban et al., 2013; Musslick et al., 2018). Thus, we predicted that the effort 
cost of cognitive stability is larger than that of cognitive flexibility. In keeping with 
prior work (Apps et al., 2015; Massar et al., 2015; Westbrook et al., 2013), we 
demonstrated in two independent samples (28 and 62 participants respectively) 
that the subjective cost of conducting cognitive control tasks increased as a 
function of working memory load . Moreover, the subjective cost of performing 
a task requiring distractor resistance (i.e. cognitive stability) was higher than that 
requiring updating (i.e. cognitive flexibility; see Figure 6.4).
Interpretation
Results of this study indicated that our novel task is sensitive to changes in subjective 
value based on the load manipulation and that both processes carry an effort 
cost. Based on our research question, we assessed in two ways whether tasks 
requiring cognitive stability carry a greater subjective cost than do tasks requiring 
cognitive flexibility; we quantified the cost i) indirectly, by letting participants 
compare and choose between task engagement (i.e. update or ignore trials) 
and taking a break (‘no redo’) and ii) directly by contrasting choices between 
updating versus ignoring for varying levels of rewards. Both discounting task 
versions indicated a greater cost of cognitive stability, which is also replicated in 
the second, larger sample. These internal and independent replications strengthen 
our confidence that the task is reliable and conclusions are valid. 
But why is cognitive stability perceived as more costly or put differently, cognitive 
flexibility as more valuable? We speculate that the effect of task demands on 
subjective cost reflects an opportunity cost of focusing: Focusing does not allow 
novel input and thus, alternative opportunities, to impinge on current processing, 
aligning with the hypothesis that subjective effort costs bias against stability 
in favor of flexibility (Musslick et al., 2018). Alternative interpretations of the 
findings are less likely; in this task version, the delay between target stimuli 
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and the target response is matched between conditions. This implies that the 
demand for maintaining the relevant stimulus is identical and cannot explain 
a value difference. However, by equalizing this relevant delay, the total trial 
duration differs between conditions; update trials are longer because the target 
stimuli are only presented during the intervening phase. If effort costs reflect an 
opportunity cost of time (Niv et al., 2007), we should observe a preference for 
faster, shorter processes. This account would thus predict the opposite pattern 
with a preference for the shorter ignore trials. However, a failure-avoidance 
account makes predictions that are congruent with our findings as participants 
perform less accurately (i.e. larger deviance from the correct color) in the ignore 
condition, which is also perceived as more costly. We consider it unlikely that this 
fully accounts for the change in effort cost, given the absence of performance 
feedback during effort execution and the fact that ‘accuracy’ reflects deviance 
from the target color instead of dichotomous correct/incorrect judgment. On the 
highest levels, performance on the two conditions differed on average by only 
5 degrees. In addition, a statistical model that takes performance into account 
still revealed the condition effect of interest and we instructed participants that 
payments are not contingent on performance during a redo. 
Implications for cognitive training in young adults and future para-
digm application
Focusing is crucial for completing our goals, but flexibility is essential when goals 
change. Our findings suggest that young healthy adults are better in responding 
flexibly to environmental triggers and also prefer to do so when contrasted with 
their inhibition. Sometimes, flexibility is useful as it allows us to explore alternative 
ways to solve a problem and come up with new ideas, i.e. to be innovative and 
creative. However, these findings are also worrisome when considering our ever-
changing stimulating environment. I aim to finish my thesis instead of responding 
to Twitter notifications or Pinterest pop-ups. I aim to consume a healthy diet instead 
of acting on a McDonald’s advertisement while driving. Most people manage to 
engage in effortful focusing when needed and some people even prefer to do 
so, but it seems that the majority of our healthy student sample prefers flexible 
cognition. Different interventions, such as mindfulness or meditation training 
might help to increase the value of focus as assessed with this task. Mindfulness 
consistently improves inhibition but has mixed effects on updating and shifting, 
a literature review suggests (Gallant, 2016). Future studies should assess whether 
it is beneficial to train focus and distractor inhibition (i.e. self-control) in young 
adults or whether we should consider adaptations in e.g. our educational and 
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media settings to match an individual’s preference for distractibility versus focus 
(see Future directions).
In the context of this study, we developed and extensively tested a novel paradigm 
that might offer a quantitative measure of cognitive and motivational deficits 
in a healthy and patient population. Before we conducted this study, we knew 
that various cognitive control tasks can be perceived as costly, also in patient 
populations (Gold et al., 2015). However, many tasks, but also many situations 
in everyday life rely on a mixture of focus and flexibility. For example, successful 
completion of the N-back task (Chapter 4) requires participants to keep online 
in working memory recently presented stimuli (i.e. cognitive stability), but also 
updating initially relevant ones (i.e. cognitive flexibility). Likewise, the task-
switching task (Chapter 3) depends on task set maintenance, distractor inhibition 
and updating of task sets. Our novel paradigm allows explicit quantification of 
the motivation for cognitive control with distinct demands for cognitive flexibility 
versus stability, while many disorders are actually characterized by a shift in the 
flexibility/stability tradeoff. As mentioned in the introduction, ADHD for example is 
accompanied by excessive distractibility but perhaps better flexibility and creativity 
(Boot, Nevicka, & Baas, 2017, but Healey & Rucklidge, 2005). Patients suffering 
from Parkinson’s disease or obsessive-compulsive disorder in contrast suffer from 
rigid, compulsive cognition with trouble switching to new things (Cools, 2001; 
Cools et al., 1984; Gu et al., 2008; Lees and Smith, 1983; Meiran et al., 2011). 
We hypothesize that neuropsychiatric disorders might in fact reflect changes in 
preference and not (only) an inability to focus or to let go. Using our paradigm, 
future studies can assess whether ADHD patients or distractible healthy colleagues 
might rather be unmotivated to focus and prefer to process (also distracting) 
stimuli. Our paradigm is well suited to be administered in intervention or 
medication studies to investigate treatment effects on motivation. The main reason 
why it is suited for acute intervention studies is that task execution and choices 
are split in time which enables the assessment of drug effects on the motivation 
only. In addition, baseline task measures and their alteration by chronic treatment 
might yield more objective guidance in choice of therapeutic drug than subjective 
(physician) reports. One remaining open question is whether the administration 
of e.g. methylphenidate or tyrosine would shift the performance versus motivation 
for flexible and stable cognition in healthy and patient populations. This question 
is currently investigated in ongoing studies.
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Limitations
As described in the previous limitations section (p. 211), we cannot rule out that 
(perceived) performance failure reduced the value of redoing the task. That is, the 
‘more costly’ ignore condition was again accompanied by poorer performance in 
terms of accuracy (i.e. deviance from target). We argued above (see Interpretation) 
that we consider it unlikely that this fully accounts for the change in effort cost, 
given the absence of performance feedback and performance-contingent rewards 
and given that control analyses still reveal the condition effect of interest. Future 
work should address this limitation by matching performance or assess the effect 
of feedback manipulation on subjective value of control.
There are several practical limitations of this paradigm. First, the task is extensive 
and takes a long time to complete (~2 h), as participants need to complete 
the color wheel working memory task probing ignore and update trials of four 
different levels before conducting the choice task which contains more than 500 
choices with 3 repetitions of each choice. Earlier versions employed staircase 
procedures (see chapter 4) which are more efficient but perhaps less valid; the 
choice sequence is fixed and every choice pair is sampled only once, assuming that 
choices are deterministic. However, choices have been shown to be probabilistic 
(Rieskamp, 2008) which is taken into account in our paradigm by sampling every 
choice option three times. Future work should compare these approaches to find 
a powerful, yet efficient design. Second, performance relies on correct perception 
of colors, thus it cannot be administered in color-blind participants. Intriguingly, 
color perception has recently been linked to dopamine transmission, as dopamine 
can be found in high concentration in the retina (Bodis-Wollner and Tzelepi, 1998; 
Witkovsky, 2004). Accordingly, color discrimination has been shown to be affected 
in patients suffering from neuropsychiatric conditions implicating dopaminergic 
functioning, such as ADHD, cocaine use and Parkinson’s disease (Hulka et al., 
2013; Melun et al., 2001; Paulus et al., 1993; Pieri et al., 2000; Tannock et al., 
2006). This practical limitation needs to be taken into account when intending 
to compare performance between participants or patient groups. Note that we 
started the experiments with a color sensitivity test to make sure that participants 
were in principle able to select the distinct color stimuli on the color-wheel. In 
addition, we were interested in the distinct processes of cognitive stability versus 
flexibility which were manipulated within subjects and should therefore not be 
differentially affected by color perception. Future studies should address the link 
between dopamine transmission and the ability to discriminate colors and assess 
the suitability of this paradigm for patient populations.
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Catecholamine challenge impairs distractor inhibition in 
older adults
(based on chapter 5)
Summary
Adaptive behavior relies on a dynamic arbitration between focus and flexibility. 
As introduced in 1.3, dopamine in the prefrontal cortex is thought to support 
primarily cognitive stability (Braver and Barch, 2006; Koechlin, 2003; Miller, 
2000; Seamans and Yang, 2004), while striatal dopamine has been proposed 
to be involved in cognitive flexibility (Cools, Barker, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003; 
Hazy et al., 2007; Rogers et al., 2000; see also Figure 1.1B). It seems that older 
adults generally perform poorly when tasks put a high load on cognitive stability 
(Dunnett et al., 1988; Wang et al., 2012), perhaps due to a decline in dopamine 
in the prefrontal cortex (Goldman-Rakic, 1997; Goldman-Rakic and Brown, 1981; 
Karrer et al., 2017). In chapter 5, we assessed the behavioral and neural effects 
of administering the catecholamine precursor tyrosine on distinct processes of 
working memory: distractor inhibition (i.e. cognitive stability) versus updating 
of working memory representations (i.e. cognitive flexibility)(Figure 5.2). We 
predicted that tyrosine might improve distractor inhibition by increasing the signal-
to-noise ratio of task-relevant representations in the PFC but impair the degree to 
which working memory representations can be updated, thus reduce flexibility. 
Contrary to this prediction, we observed that tyrosine reduced distractor inhibition 
in older adults, evidenced by a larger distractor cost on trials requiring stabilization 
compared with that on flexible update trials after tyrosine administration (Figure 
5.3C-D). This effect was accompanied by a tyrosine-induced increase in update- 
versus ignore-related activity in a cluster containing the right anterior cingulate 
cortex and medial frontal cortex (Figure 5.3B). Following impulsivity-dependent 
effects of methylphenidate (Chapter 3) and tyrosine (Chapter 4) reported above, 
we also explored in this paradigm whether tyrosine altered neural and behavioral 
effects in a baseline-dependent manner. Here again, we observe that tyrosine 
effects depended on trait impulsivity scores. More impulsive participants showed 
a greater shift towards cognitive flexibility, accompanied by a greater increase in 
update-related activity in putamen, insula and postcentral gyrus, all relative to 
less impulsive participants.
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Interpretation
In this study we employed a delayed match-to-sample task that has earlier been 
developed to probe cognitive stability and flexibility in the working memory 
domain. We show that neural and behavioral task effects align well with earlier 
administrations of this task (Fallon and Cools, 2014; Fallon et al., 2008). However, 
in young adults the administration of methylphenidate improved distractor 
resistance but impaired flexible updating by increasing ignore-related activity 
in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Fallon et al., 2016). Here, we observed the 
opposite effects when administering tyrosine: older adults became less resistant 
to distraction, evidenced by an increased performance cost when the distractor 
(versus a novel stimulus) was probed. In the update condition, disengagement of 
the initially encoded stimuli, if anything, improved. We interpret this as a tyrosine-
induced increase in the gating of relevant (i.e. in the update condition), but also 
irrelevant (i.e. in the ignore condition) working memory representations, in line 
with a key role for striatal dopamine in cognitive flexibility (Cools et al., 2007; 
Hazy et al., 2007). However, in earlier work in young adults, cognitive flexibility 
has been associated with an increase in striatal activity. Here, in the older sample, 
we observed significant update-related increases in anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) and medial frontal cortex. Next to the involvement of the medial frontal 
cortex in promoting flexible behavior, including set shifting (Buchsbaum et al., 
2005; Floresco et al., 2008a; Stefani et al., 2003) and task-switching (Rushworth 
et al., 2013), the ACC has also been shown to signal the value of disengaging 
from a current option, in a foraging task in young adults (i.e. foraging value 
(Kolling et al., 2016). An open question is whether the observed tyrosine effects 
are specific to older adults due to age-related changes in the catecholamine 
system or whether this drug would also increase ACC-activity and distractor costs 
in a young population.
In chapter 6 we propose a link between sensitivity to effort costs and the ability 
to focus, in line with the idea that the (subjective) cost of cognitive effort serves 
as a motivational signal to prevent over-fixation on a current ongoing task and 
to promote cognitive flexibility and switching to alternative tasks (Cools, 2016; 
Inzlicht et al., 2014; Kool et al., 2010; Kurzban et al., 2013). Here, we speculate 
about a role for catecholamines in eliciting the shift in flexibility/stability tradeoff 
in working memory (in part) by altering the subjective cost of mental effort (Cools 
et al., 2008). This speculation is based on an explorative analysis in which we 
correlated data from the same participants on the working memory paradigm 
with the cognitive effort discounting task described in chapter 4 and 7.1.1. We 
assessed whether tyrosine effects on the effort cost correlated with tyrosine effects 
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on the update (versus ignore) benefit. Interestingly, the individuals who expressed 
the greatest increase in cognitive effort costs also exhibited the greatest shift 
away from stability towards flexibility with tyrosine, evidenced by a correlation of 
medium effect size. This observation extends the finding described in chapter 6 in 
suggesting that changes in catecholamine transmission elicit a shift in flexibility/
stability tradeoff in working memory by altering the subjective cost of mental 
effort (Cools, 2016).
Implications for cognitive training, motivation and tyrosine use in 
older adults
What did this study tell us about flexibility versus stability in aging and the potential 
role of tyrosine in remedying cognitive deficits? Our study suggests that working 
memory performance in older adults suffers less from irrelevant distractors than 
previously hypothesized (Gazzaley et al., 2005) and that tyrosine made them in 
fact more distractible. We were surprised to observe that under placebo older 
adults exhibited a distractor cost (i.e. lure effect) only in the update condition. This 
implies that they had trouble letting go of the initially encoded stimuli, although 
the distractor cost was not statistically significantly different from zero in the ignore 
condition. Instead of an age-related increase in flexibility (Lindenberger and Mayr, 
2014), this points towards cognitive rigidity in older adults, concurring with earlier 
reports on perseverative errors in set-shifting (Gamboz et al., 2009; Ridderinkhof 
et al., 2002), failed reversals in a reversal learning task (Weiler et al., 2008) 
and increased task-switching costs (Kray et al., 2002) in healthy older adults. 
Note that in the current paradigm, participants performed better in the flexible 
updating than in distractor inhibition condition. However, this difference can be a 
consequence of a shorter delay between relevant stimuli and target presentation in 
the update condition (see Limitations) and should not be interpreted as an index of 
a flexibility benefit. When administering tyrosine, the pattern reversed; participants 
showed distractor effects in the ignore trials but no longer in the update condition. 
Of course, it depends on the context and environmental demand, whether it is 
beneficial to be more focused or more flexible. Perhaps the environment of older 
adults puts a higher weight on stable cognition due to (health) risks of excessive 
distractibility. For example, being distracted by cell phone conversations while 
riding a car can have catastrophic consequences. When comparing distractibility 
in young and older adults in a car-following paradigm in a driving simulator, it 
seems that older adults were not impaired to a greater degree by multi-tasking 
(hands-free cell phone conversation) than younger adults (Strayer and Drews, 
2004). In this case, it is advantageous to be focused. However, when older 
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adults are required to flexibly update cues, such as playing Halli Galli with their 
grandchildren or more seriously, traffic requires them to suddenly brake because 
a child jumps on the street, tyrosine might improve their performance. Intriguingly, 
I suggested in 7.1.2 to assess whether mindfulness training could increase the 
value and ability to focus in younger adults. In older adults, trainings have been 
developed to delay impairments in or recover cognitive functions. However most 
cognitive trainings are targeted at reducing distractibility (e.g. Mishra, de Villers-
Sidani, Merzenich, & Gazzaley, 2014), improving (working) memory (Berry et al., 
2010; Frankenmolen et al., 2018; Mahncke et al., 2006; Vermeij et al., 2016) 
or speeding of visual processes (Ball et al., 2007; Wolinsky et al., 2015). Few 
trainings are targeted at improving cognitive flexibility. There is evidence that 
benefits of task-switching training were transferred to a structurally similar new 
switching task in older adults (Karbach and Kray, 2009; Minear and Shah, 2008), 
suggesting that dual task performance can be improved. Future studies should 
assess dynamic trainings that are tailored towards specific impairments, which can 
be quantified in several ways; for example, based on performance on cognitive 
tasks, such as the working memory task employed here (or in chapter 6) or the 
recruitment of prefrontal cortex during task execution (Vermeij et al., 2017). 
Remaining open questions are whether older adults also perceive tasks 
requiring flexibility as more costly than young adults and, importantly, whether a 
catecholamine challenge has opposite effects on the subjective cost as a function 
of age. This might be achieved by administering the novel discounting paradigm 
(Chapter 6) in young and old adults in future studies. Earlier work using the 
cognitive effort discounting paradigm (COGED; Figure 4.2) in older and younger 
adults points towards reduced motivation for conducting an N-back task, but as 
outlined in 1.3, the N-back task relies on flexible and stable cognitive processes, 
which can be teased apart in the novel version.
To conclude, would I advice older adults to use tyrosine for cognitive enhancement? 
Probably not. We observed in chapter 4 that, across the group, tyrosine did not 
significantly increase motivation for conducting an N-back task and chapter 5 
demonstrates significant increases in distractibility. In addition, the same dose of 
tyrosine has shown to impair N-back performance in older adults (van de Rest et 
al., 2017) and proactive response inhibition as a function of age (Bloemendaal et 
al., 2018). Also, the administration of tyrosine in such large amounts (150 mg/kg) 
increases competition of precursors at the blood brain barrier, thus also reducing 
precursor availability of other relevant neurotransmitters. The amount of tyrosine 
that we administered is 4-5 times higher than the advised daily ratio (WHO 1985; 
Basile-Filho et al., 1998; Food and Nutrition Board of the Institute of Medicine). 
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A more responsible advice would be to adapt the diet to consume food high in 
tyrosine concentrations to increase perhaps reduced dopamine transmission in 
the aging brain (Karrer et al., 2017 but Berry et al., 2016). An increase in daily 
tyrosine intake has indeed been associated with cognitive benefits in older adults 
(Kühn et al., 2017).
Limitations
The study design and the interpretation of findings have several caveats, also 
discussed in chapter 4. First, the performance comparison between update and 
ignore conditions of e.g. the placebo sessions cannot be used as an index of 
an age-related shift in the update/ignore tradeoff. This is the case, because 
these conditions differ not only in terms of the relevant manipulation of distractor 
resistance versus updating, but also in their demands for working memory 
maintenance. Unlike the novel paradigm presented in chapter 6, here the task 
conditions are of identical total duration, but the delay between to-be-matched 
stimuli and probe is shorter for the update condition than the ignore condition. 
Note that this limitation does not affect our main interpretations, because these 
are based on within-subject tyrosine-induced changes in performance. For 
exploring patterns in placebo or tyrosine sessions separately, we looked at probe-
dependent effects within update and ignore conditions, which are less sensitive 
to the timing issue described above. Also, this limitation is less problematic for 
the fMRI analyses, as we focus on the intervening phase where the process 
of updating or ignoring took place. Up to that point participants encountered 
identical visual input (i.e. encoding) and identical demand for maintenance in the 
two conditions. Yet, it is important to emphasize that any proposal on age-related 
enhancement in rigidity (see Implications) need to be assessed in future studies 
comparing performance of older adults with that of younger adults. 
Second, there is inconsistency in the literature regarding alterations of 
catecholamine synthesis in healthy aging with reports on reduced, but also 
enhanced dopamine and noradrenaline synthesis (Berry et al., 2016; Karrer et al., 
2017; Manaye et al., 1995; Wang et al., 2013). This complicates the interpretation 
of intervention effects. If synthesis is indeed increased, the administration of 
additional tyrosine might lead the rate-limiting TH enzyme to inhibit further 
transformation of tyrosine into L-DOPA for homeostatic reasons (Fisone et al., 
2001; Grace, 2001). As a consequence, tyrosine administration might decrease 
instead of increase dopamine synthesis and transmission in older adults. We did 
not measure central tyrosine levels here, but earlier work shows that an identical 
tyrosine dose increased peripheral tyrosine levels to a greater degree in older 
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than in younger participants (van de Rest et al., 2017). It is unclear whether 
this reflects a higher peripheral need of tyrosine in older adults resulting in less 
central tyrosine availability. Future work might investigate this mechanism, which 
is relevant for the interpretation of the tyrosine effects in chapter 3 and chapter 4.
Lastly, in line with the limitations described above (p. 212), one key remaining 
open question is whether the observed drug effects reflect modulations of 
dopamine, noradrenaline or both. This is pertinent also because tyrosine has 
been shown to affect both, dopamine and noradrenaline synthesis (Kishore et al., 
2013; Kuczenski and Segal, 2001; Scheel-Krüger, 1971) and both systems were 
suggested to affect processes related to working memory and cognitive flexibility 
(Alexander et al., 2007; Sales et al., 2019).
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The studies presented in this thesis have increased our insight into the 
catecholaminergic modulation of cognitive control and the motivation to conduct 
cognitively effortful tasks. However, the findings also raise new questions that 
may be addressed in future studies. Concrete follow-up studies were mentioned 
in the limitation and implication paragraphs, such as selective manipulations of 
dopamine versus noradrenaline or performance-matching on cognitive effort 
tasks. Here, I want to go beyond concrete follow-up steps and highlight two novel 
approaches and future directions.
Learning from effort costs versus effort relief?
Effort-based decision-making concerns how we make choices based on the 
integration of expected effort and reward (Shenhav et al., 2013). Yet, relatively 
little is known how the cost of a cognitive action, such as a mental effortful task, 
contributes to the (learning of) choices to engage or avoid effortful control. Striatal 
dopamine promotes motivated behavior (Berridge and Robinson, 1998) and has 
been suggested to play a role in overcoming physical and cognitive effort ‘costs’ 
(Manohar et al., 2015; Salamone and Correa, 2002). In addition, dopamine 
influences choices via (reinforcement) learning (Glimcher, 2011; Montague et al., 
2004), where phasic dopamine release signals unexpected rewards and reward-
predicting cues (Schultz, 1997). In the case of learning about simple states and/
or actions, it has previously been shown that increases in dopamine potentiate 
the impact of benefits (reward) on learning and choice, while undermining the 
impact of punishment (and other costs) on learning and choice (Collins and 
Frank, 2014; Cools et al., 2009). Future studies could employ computational 
modeling of learning task data to disentangle the degree to which the effect of 
catecholaminergic interventions on demand avoidance reflect learning (or choice) 
based on reward (i.e. effort relief) or punishment (i.e. effort cost). In one of our 
studies (Chapter 3), greater methylphenidate effects on demand avoidance in the 
high-impulsive subjects might represent greater increases in striatal dopamine, 
thereby potentiating the impact of mental effort relief (i.e., reward) on learning 
and choice. The present study was not set up (and, given high response stickiness 
rates, did not allow us) to make this distinction. Critically, as is the case in chapter 
3, evidence indicates that there is large individual variability in the direction and 
extent of the effects of dopaminergic drugs on the learning and choice (van der 
Schaaf et al., 2013; Swart et al., 2017). Intriguingly, there are also reports on 
effort being perceived as valuable (Inzlicht et al., 2018) and some participants 
indicated in chapter 6 that they prefer to do a task instead of taking a break. We 
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hypothesize that baseline dopamine levels, perhaps reflected in impulsivity scores, 
might relate to the sensitivity to (learn from) cognitive effort costs versus effort 
relief, similar to a role of dopamine and impulsivity in reward versus punishment 
sensitivity (Frank et al., 2004; Potts et al., 2006). 
Power of motivation - non-pharmacological interventions to 
promote motivation 
As described above, striatal dopamine promotes motivated behavior (Berridge 
and Robinson, 1998) and has been suggested to play a role in overcoming 
physical and cognitive effort ‘costs’ (Manohar et al., 2015; Salamone and Correa, 
2002). Like dopaminergic drugs, the promise of a reward implicates the dopamine 
system and has been shown to alter cognitive performance and the willingness to 
engage in physical and cognitive effort (Massar et al., 2016; Padmala and Pessoa, 
2011). I suggest to investigate the potential role of feedback and task structure on 
cognitive motivation beyond the lab settings. In children, academic motivation was 
primarily measured with self-report questionnaires (e.g. Broussard & Garrison, 
2004; Entwistle, 1968) or observational assessments of motivation while solving 
challenging puzzles in kindergarten (Berhenke et al., 2011). These subjective 
measures were indicative of academic performance (Entwistle, 1968) and teacher 
rating of children’s academic achievement (Berhenke et al., 2011), emphasizing 
the key contribution of motivation to academic success. However, employing 
cognitive tasks in educational settings has two advantages. First, it yields a more 
objective, rater-independent measure of motivation for cognitive control. Second, 
it can be easily adapted to quantify the motivation for specific aspects of cognition, 
such as flexible versus stable cognition (Chapter 6), feedback versus no feedback, 
and valence of feedback. This information can be implemented in educational 
programmes tailored to individual preferences. There are several reasons for 
the need of a tailored approach when intending to promote motivation; for 
example, it is very striking that adults perceive tasks as more costly that were 
accompanied by poorer performance (Kool et al., 2010; Westbrook et al., 2013), 
while effort-discounting in children evidenced demand instead of error avoidance 
(Chevalier, 2018). However, not everyone avoids effort; also, in adults there are 
reports on effort being perceived as valuable (Inzlicht et al., 2018) and some 
participants indicated that they prefer to do a task instead of taking a break 
(Chapter 4), despite greater risks of failing. Similar individual differences have 
been reported with respect to the promise of performance-contingent reward; the 
promise of reward might promote motivation in most students, but actually impair 
motivation and performance in others (Aarts et al., 2014, Chapter 3, Chapter 
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4). The development of such task batteries and programmes should happen in 
close collaboration with educational scientists and teachers to allow successful 
implementation and realistic goal-setting. 
CONCLUSION
The overall goal of this thesis was to characterize the role of catecholamines 
and specific task-demands in shaping our motivation for cognitively demanding 
processes in the healthy population. First, we show in two independent studies 
that a pharmacological challenge of the catecholamine system alters cognitive 
effort avoidance as a function of trait impulsivity; in more relative to less 
impulsive participants, methylphenidate increased demand avoidance in a 
young adult sample and tyrosine increased the cost of conducting an effortful 
working memory task in older adults (aged 60-75). Second, using a novel effort 
discounting procedure, we quantified the cost of conducting a working memory 
task with distinct demands for flexible (i.e. updating) versus stable (i.e. distractor 
inhibition) cognition. Findings of two studies converge in indicating that distractor 
inhibition is accompanied by a greater effort cost than flexible control. Third, the 
administration of tyrosine to older adults impaired the ability to inhibit distractors 
and tended to improve flexible updating in a working memory task. This was 
accompanied by update-related increases in anterior cingulate cortex activity. 
In sum, the studies presented in this thesis demonstrate that cognitive control 
is costly and that catecholaminergic drugs do not just alter the ability to 
perform a task but also the motivation to do so. This is in line with the idea that 
catecholamines have a double duty in altering cognitive control performance but 
also decisions about cognitive control investment.
7
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SUMMARY
In this dissertation, I studied the phenomenon of (un-)motivated cognition. The 
overarching goal was to characterize the role of catecholamines (dopamine and 
noradrenaline) in shaping the motivation for cognitively demanding processes 
in the healthy population. The mental couch potato described in the title is a 
metaphor for someone who enjoys to put his brain on a couch and watch Netflix 
instead of engaging in effortful cognition, such as conducting Sudoku puzzles. 
Understanding the basis of such cognitive ‘laziness’ will bring us closer to the 
long-term goal, which is to promote the motivation in the healthy and clinical 
population to engage in cognitive control. In this dissertation, I
• quantified the willingness (i.e. motivation) to conduct cognitively effortful tasks 
and assessed how the motivation is affected by pharmacological interventions 
that challenge the catecholamine system (chapter 3 and 4);
• developed a novel paradigm that allowed to quantify the motivation to 
engage in flexible versus stable cognition (chapter 6);
• studied how drugs that challenge the catecholamine system alter performance 
on a task probing flexible versus stable cognition (chapter 5).
Cognitive control is a broad term that can be defined as the capacity to guide 
behavior in the service of internally represented goals. As such, it is an umbrella 
term that refers to the set of cognitive functions that enable us to stabilize our goals 
by resisting impulses, temptation and distraction. In this thesis, I studied cognitive 
control from two perspectives: i) the motivation to engage in cognitive control 
functions and ii) the neural and behavioral mechanisms of cognitive stability and 
cognitive flexibility.
Motivation to engage in cognitive control
When cognitive control is assessed in the lab or exams are graded, it is often 
assumed that the performance or grades reflect a person’s true and maximal 
capacity. This implies that we always perform at our best. However, there is 
a rich body of evidence suggesting that this is not the case. Participants who 
receive a bonus or monetary incentive for good performance tend to improve 
their performance. Thus, it seems that people do not always perform at their 
best and that cognitive control performance is a mixture of (at least) the capacity 
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to perform to best of one’s ability during a certain task and the motivation, or 
choice, to do so.
In chapter 2, we highlighted in a literature review the potential contribution 
of the major ascending neuromodulators, in particular catecholamines, to the 
tendency to avoid cognitive control. We argued that striatal dopamine alters 
choices about cognitive control (avoidance) by modulating the expected value 
of cognitive task performance. Thus, we hypothesized that increases in striatal 
dopamine lead to an emphasis on the benefits, but reduced weight on the costs of 
cognitive control. Based on further empirical evidence for baseline-dependency of 
catecholaminergic manipulations, we also hypothesized that excess or suboptimal 
levels of dopamine might paradoxically reduce the value of cognitive control. 
To assess contributions of catecholamines to cognitive demand avoidance, we 
setup two pharmacological experiments. In these studies, we quantified how 
catecholamine challenges alter value-based decision making about cognitive 
control investment. In chapter 3, we administered the catecholamine transporter 
blocker methylphenidate and assessed demand avoidance in a large sample of 
young adults to probe individual differences in drug effects. Chapter 4 describes 
how the catecholamine precursor tyrosine altered the subjective value of cognitive 
effort in older adults. 
In chapter 3, healthy young adults conducted a demand selection task twice, 
once with 20 mg intake of methylphenidate and once after taking a placebo 
pill. In this task, participants chose between two pictures of which one has a 
low and the other a high demand on task-switching. The proportion of low-
demand choices was used as an index of demand (i.e. task-switching) avoidance. 
Earlier research has shown that there is large individual variability in the direction 
and extent of catecholaminergic drug effects on human cognition and that the 
individual differences reflect dependency on baseline levels of dopamine. We 
therefore included in the study two putative proxy measures of dopamine levels: 
working memory capacity as assessed with the listening span and trait impulsivity 
measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. In line with our predictions, 
participants preferred the option with lower demand for task-switching (i.e. mental 
couch potatoes) and methylphenidate altered demand avoidance in a baseline-
dependent manner. Methylphenidate intake increased demand avoidance in more 
relative to less impulsive participants, whereas methylphenidate effects on task-
switching performance were not found.
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In chapter 4, we administered the catecholamine precursor tyrosine to 29 healthy 
senior adults (aged 60-75), given that aging has been associated with reductions 
in dopamine transmission and reduced motivation for cognitive control. We 
hypothesized that tyrosine (relative to placebo) increases the value of control, 
as measured by the cognitive effort discounting paradigm. Contrary to our 
prediction, tyrosine administration did not (significantly) increase the subjective 
value of conducting an N-back task for reward, as a main effect. Instead, in line 
with chapter 3, drug effects varied as a function of participants’ trait impulsivity 
scores. Specifically, tyrosine reduced the subjective value of conducting higher 
N-back levels (again) in more relative to less impulsive participants. In this task, 
effort execution (working memory performance) and choices (effort discounting) 
were separated in time, of which only the choices were conducted when tyrosine 
levels were expected to be elevated. Together these studies provide first empirical 
evidence in humans that catecholaminergic drugs act in part by modulating value-
based (learning and/or choice) processes that can boost but also undermine the 
willingness to exert cognitive control. This leads to re-conceptualize cognitive 
control as involving cost/benefit choice in addition to ability.
Cognitive flexibility versus stability
The need for an optimal balance between flexible and stable cognition can be 
illustrated easily by means of the office life: When you share an office with multiple 
people, it requires you to inhibit incoming distractors, such as office mates running 
in and out or conversations with students. However, when the fire alarm in the 
building goes off, you should be able to allow registration of the signal and act on 
it. Many situations in everyday life and experimental paradigms rely on a mixture 
of these processes. Performance impairments can therefore be a consequence 
of reduced stability and/or increased flexibility. In chapter 5 & 6, we studied the 
opposing functions by administering an adapted delayed match-to-sample task. 
Like in delayed match-to-sample tasks, participants needed to encode stimuli and 
judge after a delay whether a probe is a ‘match’ or ‘non-match’. However, during 
the delay period, we either present distracting stimuli that need to be ignored 
(i.e. the office mates), or stimuli that need to be processed (i.e. the fire alarm). 
Many executive functions are known to implicate the cortico-basal ganglia loops 
that link the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the striatum and their modulation by 
dopamine. The prefrontal cortex has been suggested to support the stabilization 
of goals and distractor resistance while the striatum has been associated with the 
de-stabilization of goals with the purpose of letting in new environmental stimuli 
for flexible responses. One hypothesis for how the brain arbitrates between stable 
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versus flexible states is with the use of a dopamine-dependent gating mechanism 
that regulates the inputs to PFC. 
In chapter 5, we assessed the behavioral and neural effects of administering 
the catecholamine precursor tyrosine on distinct processes of working memory: 
distractor inhibition (i.e. cognitive stability) versus updating of working memory 
representations (i.e. cognitive flexibility). We administered this task in 29 senior 
adults (identical sample as described in chapter 4) given that aging has been 
associated with reductions in dopamine transmission and a shift in flexibility/
stability tradeoff. We predicted that tyrosine (relative to placebo) improves age-
related impairments in distractor inhibition by increasing the signal-to-noise ratio 
of task-relevant representations in the PFC. At the same time, we expected tyrosine 
administration to impair the degree to which working memory representations 
can be updated, thus reduce flexibility. Contrary to this prediction, we observed 
that tyrosine reduced distractor inhibition, evidenced by a larger distractor cost 
on trials requiring stabilization compared with that on flexible update trials after 
tyrosine administration. This effect was accompanied by a tyrosine-induced 
increase in update- versus ignore-related activity in a brain cluster containing 
the right anterior cingulate cortex and medial frontal cortex. 
In the light of motivated cognitive control described above, one might expect 
that changes in the flexibility/stability tradeoff, as evidenced here, (partly) reflect 
changes in preference and not just an inability to focus or flexibly update. 
Distractible colleagues might rather be unmotivated to focus and prefer to process 
(also distracting) stimuli. 
In chapter 6, we therefore developed a novel effort discounting paradigm 
that allowed to quantify the subjective cost of cognitive processes with specific 
demands for stable versus flexible control. For this purpose, we added to a well-
established working memory task an intermediate phase to probe distractor 
resistance (i.e. cognitive stability) versus flexible updating (i.e. cognitive flexibility) 
and a subsequent effort-discounting phase. Based on recent theories, the cost 
of cognitive effort might represent a motivational signal that biases behavior 
away from focusing on a task towards opening up for new opportunities. We 
therefore predicted that the (effort) cost is larger when the task requires cognitive 
stability, compared with cognitive flexibility. In keeping with prior work on cognitive 
demand avoidance, we demonstrated in two independent samples (28 and 62 
participants respectively) that the subjective cost of conducting cognitive control 
tasks increased as a function of working memory load. Moreover, the subjective 
cost of performing a task requiring distractor resistance (i.e. cognitive stability) 
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was higher than that requiring updating (i.e. cognitive flexibility), even after taking 
into account performance effects.
CONCLUSION
First, we demonstrated in two independent studies that a pharmacological 
challenge of the catecholamine system altered cognitive demand avoidance 
as a function of trait impulsivity; in more relative to less impulsive participants 
methylphenidate increased cognitive demand avoidance in a young adult sample 
and tyrosine increased the cost of conducting an effortful working memory 
task in senior adults (aged 60-75). Second, using a novel effort discounting 
procedure, we quantified the cost of conducting a working memory task with 
distinct demands for flexible (i.e. updating) versus stable (i.e. distractor inhibition) 
cognition. The findings of these two studies converge in indicating that distractor 
inhibition is accompanied by a greater effort cost than flexible control. Third, the 
administration of tyrosine to older adults impaired the ability to inhibit distractors 
and tended to improve flexible updating in a working memory task. This was 
accompanied by update-related increases in anterior cingulate cortex activity. 
In sum, the studies presented in this thesis demonstrate that task execution with 
a high demand for cognitive control is perceived as subjectively costly and that 
catecholaminergic drugs do not just alter the ability to perform a task but also the 
motivation to do so. This is in line with the general proposal that catecholamines 
have a double duty in altering cognitive control performance but also decisions 
about cognitive control investment. 
Future studies should further investigate the potential impact of also non-
pharmacological interventions (e.g. task- and feedback structure) on cognitive 
motivation beyond the lab settings to work towards the long-term goal of 
promoting motivation in the healthy and clinical population.
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DUTCH SUMMARY
In dit proefschrift heb ik de invloed van motivatie op cognitieve controle 
bestudeerd. Het overkoepelende doel was te bepalen hoe dopamine en 
noradrenaline (samengevat catecholamines) in de gezonde populatie de motivatie 
beïnvloeden om inspannende denkprocessen uit te voeren. De mentale “couch 
potato” die in de titel wordt beschreven, is een metafoor voor iemand die graag 
zijn hersens op een bank legt en Netflix kijkt in plaats van zich bezig te houden 
met moeilijke denkprocessen, zoals het uitvoeren van Sudoku-puzzels. Als we de 
basis van cognitieve ‘luiheid‘ begrijpen, komen we dichter bij het lange termijn 
doel, namelijk de mogelijkheid om motivatie in de gezonde en klinische populatie 
te bevorderen om moeilijke denkprocessen niet uit de weg te gaan. 
In het kader van dit proefschrift, heb ik
• de bereidheid (d.w.z. motivatie) gekwantificeerd om cognitief inspannende 
taken uit te voeren en beoordeelde ik hoe de motivatie wordt beïnvloed 
door farmacologische interventies die het catecholaminesysteem manipuleren 
(hoofdstuk 3 en 4),
• een nieuw paradigma ontwikkeld waarmee de motivatie gekwantificeerd 
kan worden om flexibele versus stabiele cognitieve processen uit te voeren 
(hoofdstuk 6) en 
• onderzocht hoe een catecholamine-manipulatie de prestatie verandert op 
een taak die flexibele versus stabiele controle vereist.
Cognitieve controle is een brede term die kan worden gedefinieerd als het 
vermogen om gedrag te sturen ten dienste van intern gerepresenteerde doelen. 
Als zodanig is het een overkoepelende term die verwijst naar de set van cognitieve 
functies die ons in staat stellen onze doelen te realiseren door weerstand te 
bieden aan impulsen, verleiding en afleiding. In dit proefschrift heb ik cognitieve 
controle vanuit twee perspectieven bestudeerd: i) de motivatie om cognitieve 
controlefuncties uit te voeren en ii) de neurale en gedragsmechanismen van twee 
tegenovergestelde functies: cognitieve stabiliteit en cognitieve flexibiliteit.
Motivatie om cognitieve controle uit te oefenen
Wanneer cognitieve controle in het lab wordt gemeten of examens worden 
getoetst, wordt er vaak van uitgegaan dat de prestatie of het cijfer de ware en 
maximale capaciteit van een persoon weerspiegelt. Dit betekent dat de aanname 
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bestaat dat iedereen altijd op zijn best presteert. Het is echter wetenschappelijk 
aangetoond dat dit niet het geval is. Bijvoorbeeld, deelnemers die een bonus voor 
goede prestaties ontvangen zijn geneigd om vervolgens beter te presteren. Het 
lijkt erop dat prestaties op het gebied van cognitieve controle een combinatie zijn 
van (tenminste) het vermogen om een bepaalde taak uit te voeren en de motivatie 
of keuze om dit ook daadwerkelijk te doen.
In hoofdstuk 2 benadrukten we in een literatuuroverzicht de mogelijke bijdrage 
van de belangrijkste oplopende neuromodulatoren, met name catecholamines, 
aan het vermijden van cognitieve inspanning. We stelden dat (striatale) dopamine 
een bijdrage levert aan het vermijden van cognitieve inspanning door de 
verwachte waarde van cognitieve controle te moduleren. Daarom hebben we de 
hypothese gesteld dat de verhoging van (striatale) dopamine leidt tot een sterkere 
nadruk op de voordelen en minder gewicht legt op de kosten van cognitieve 
controle. 
Om de bijdragen van catecholamines aan keuzes over cognitieve inspanning 
te beoordelen, hebben we twee farmacologische experimenten opgezet. In 
hoofdstuk 3 hebben we de catecholamine transporter blocker methylfenidaat 
toegediend aan een groot aantal gezonde jonge volwassen. Hoofdstuk 4 
beschrijft hoe de catecholamine-voorloper tyrosine de subjectieve waarde van 
cognitieve inspanning bij oudere volwassenen veranderde ten opzichte van de 
placebo sessie.
In hoofdstuk 3 voerden gezonde jonge volwassenen tweemaal een keuzetaak 
uit, eenmaal met 20 mg methylfenidaat en eenmaal na het innemen van een 
placebo-pil. In deze taak kozen de deelnemers tussen twee afbeeldingen. Het 
kiezen van de ene afbeelding leidde deelnemers naar een gemakkelijke taak 
(d.w.z. minder taak-omschakeling) en het kiezen van de andere afbeelding naar 
een moeilijke taak (d.w.z. meer taak-omschakeling). Het aantal keuzes van de 
gemakkelijke optie werd gebruikt als een maat van inspannings-vermijding. We 
verwachtten dat er grote individuele variabiliteit is in de richting en omvang van 
de effecten van methylfenidaat en dat deze o.a. afhangt van de initiële staat van 
het catecholamine systeem. Daarom hebben we in het onderzoek twee maten 
opgenomen om de dopamine-niveaus te schatten: werkgeheugencapaciteit 
zoals beoordeeld met de luisterspan en impulsiviteit gemeten door de Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale. In lijn met onze voorspellingen waren de deelnemers 
inspannings-vermijdend (d.w.z. mentale “couch potatoes”) en veranderde 
metylfenidaat de vermijding als functie van impulsiviteit: methylfenidaat-inname 
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versterkte ‘mentale luiheid’ bij meer (t. o. v. minder) impulsieve deelnemers, terwijl 
effecten op taakprestatie niet werden gevonden.
In hoofdstuk 4 hebben we de catecholamine-voorloper tyrosine toegediend aan 
29 gezonde senioren (60-75 jaar oud). Dit heben we gedaan omdat veroudering 
in verband werd gebracht met vermindering van dopamine-overdracht en 
verminderde motivatie voor cognitieve controle. Onze hypothese was dat tyrosine 
de aversie tegen het uitvoeren van cognitieve controle zou verlagen, gemeten aan 
de hand van een cognitieve inspannings-paradigma. Anders dan in hoofdstuk 3, 
waren hier de taakuitvoering en de keuzes in de tijd gescheiden, waarvan alleen 
de keuzes werden uitgevoerd wanneer medicatie-effecten te verwachten waren. 
In tegenstelling tot onze voorspelling, heeft tyrosine-toediening in deze groep niet 
de motivatie verhoogt om cognitieve controle (d.w.z. een werkgeheugen taak) uit 
te voeren. In plaats daarvan, en in overeenstemming met hoofdstuk 3, varieerden 
de tyrosine-effecten als functie van de impulsiviteits-scores: Tyrosine verminderde 
de motivatie van het uitvoeren van een moeilijke werkgeheugentaak weer meer in 
hoog (t.o.v. minder) impulsieve deelnemers. Samen leveren deze studies het eerste 
empirisch bewijs in mensen dat catecholaminerge geneesmiddelen gedeeltelijk 
werken door processen te moduleren die de motivatie veranderen om cognitieve 
controle uit te oefenen en deze dus ook kunnen ondermijnen. Dit onderzoek 
leidt tot een reconceptualisering van de term cognitieve controle, waarbij, naast 
het vermogen, ook de kosten en baten van cognitieve controle van invloed zijn.
Cognitieve flexibiliteit versus stabiliteit
Een optimale balans tussen flexibele en stabiele cognitieve processen is voordelig. 
Dit kan eenvoudig worden geïllustreerd aan de hand van het kantoorleven: 
wanneer je een kantoor deelt met meerdere mensen, moet je afleiding, zoals 
het in- en uitwandelen van kantoorgenoten of gesprekken met studenten, 
negeren. Wanneer het brandalarm in het gebouw afgaat, moet het signaal echter 
geregistreerd worden om erop te kunnen reageren. Veel situaties in het dagelijks 
leven en experimentele paradigma’s zijn afhankelijk van een combinatie van 
deze processen. Veranderingen in taakprestatie kunnen daarom bijvoorbeeld 
een gevolg zijn van verminderde stabiliteit en / of verhoogde flexibiliteit. In 
hoofdstuk 5 en 6 hebben we de tegengestelde functies bestudeerd door een 
aangepaste uitgestelde match-to-sample-taak af te nemen. Deelnemers moesten 
twee plaatjes onthouden en na een vertraging beoordelen of een enkel plaatje 
op het scherm een ‘match’ of ‘non-match’ is met wat ze moesten onthouden. 
Tijdens het onthouden werden ze echter afgeleid door nieuwe plaatjes die ze óf 
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moesten negeren (d.w.z. de kantoorgenoten), óf moesten onthouden terwijl ze 
de oude plaatjes vergeten (d.w.z. het brandalarm). Van veel cognitieve functies 
is bekend dat ze afhankelijk zijn van functionele cortico-basale ganglia-lussen. 
Deze lussen verbinden de prefrontale cortex (PFC) en het striatum en worden 
gemoduleerd door dopamine transmissie. De prefrontale cortex speelt een 
belangrijke rol bij de stabilisatie van doelen en het buitenhouden van afleiding, 
terwijl het striatum vooral geassocieerd wordt met het binnenlaten van stimuli om 
flexibele responsen te bevorderen. Het wordt aangenomen dat het brein tussen 
een stabiele versus flexibele staat wisselt door het gebruik van een dopamine-
afhankelijk poortmechanisme dat de invoer naar de PFC regelt.
In hoofdstuk 5 hebben we de gedrags- en neurale effecten van het toedienen 
van de catecholamine-voorloper tyrosine op verschillende processen van 
werkgeheugen onderzocht: focus (d.w.z. cognitieve stabiliteit) versus het updaten 
van representaties van het werkgeheugen (d.w.z. cognitieve flexibiliteit). We 
hebben deze taak door 29 senioren (identieke steekproef als hoofdstuk 4) laten 
uitvoeren. Dit hebben we gedaan omdat veroudering in verband is gebracht 
met vermindering van dopamine-overdracht en achteruitgang in cognitieve 
functies die focus vereisen. We voorspelden dat tyrosine de leeftijds-gerelateerde 
achteruitgang van focus zou verbeteren door de signaal-ruisverhouding van 
werkgeheugen-representaties in de PFC te verhogen. Tegelijkertijd verwachtten we 
dat tyrosine-toediening de mate waarin nieuwe plaatjes flexibel kunnen worden 
bijgewerkt nadelig beïnvloedt. In tegenstelling tot deze voorspelling hebben we 
vastgesteld dat tyrosine (ten opzichte van placebo) de focus juist verminderde, wat 
blijkt uit sterkere afleidbaarheid in situaties die stabilisatie vereisen in vergelijking 
met flexibel updaten. Dit effect ging gepaard met een tyrosine-geïnduceerde 
toename in de activiteit in de prefrontale cortext wanneer flexible gedrag vereist 
werd (meer specifiek in een cluster in de rechter anterior cingulate cortex en 
mediale frontale cortex).
In het kader van motivationele invloeden op cognitieve controle die hierboven 
zijn beschreven, zou men kunnen veronderstellen dat veranderingen in prestatie 
gedeeltelijk veranderingen in voorkeur weerspiegelen. Afleidbare collega’s zijn 
misschien minder gemotiveerd om zich te concentreren en verwerken dus liever 
(ook afleidende) stimuli.
In hoofdstuk 6 hebben we daarom een nieuw paradigma ontwikkeld waarbij 
gekwantificeerd kan worden hoe aversief deelnemers zijn ten opzichte van 
cognitieve processen met specifieke eisen voor stabiele versus flexibele controle. 
Voor dit doel hebben we, zoals ook in hoofdstuk 5, aan een bestaande 
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werkgeheugentaak een tussenfase toegevoegd om de focus (d.w.z. cognitieve 
stabiliteit) versus flexibiliteit (d.w.z. cognitieve flexibiliteit) te meten. Bovendien 
hebben we een extra fase toegevoegd waarin keuzes gemaakt worden over 
het vermijden van inspanning. Volgens recente theorieën, kan het voelen van 
cognitieve inspanning een motiverend signaal vormen dat het openstellen voor 
nieuwe kansen bevordert en daardoor het focussen verslecht. We hebben daarom 
voorspeld dat de het meer moeite kost wanneer de taak cognitieve stabiliteit 
vereist in vergelijking met cognitieve flexibiliteit. In overeenstemming met eerder 
onderzoek naar het vermijden van cognitieve inspanning, hebben we in twee 
onafhankelijke steekproeven (respectievelijk 28 en 62 deelnemers) aangetoond 
dat de subjectieve kosten van het uitvoeren van cognitieve controletaken 
toenamen als functie van de moeilijkheid. Bovendien waren de subjectieve kosten 
van het uitvoeren van een taak die focus vergde (d.w.z. cognitieve stabiliteit) 
hoger dan wanneer nieuwe informatie moest worden onthouden (d.w.z. cognitieve 
flexibiliteit). Dit was zelfs het geval wanneer we rekening hielden met verschillen 
in prestatie tijdens de taakuitvoering. Het lijkt er dus op dat fouten maken alleen 
niet kan verklaren waarom focus aversiever aanvoelt. 
CONCLUSIE
Ten eerste hebben we in twee onafhankelijke onderzoeken aangetoond dat een 
farmacologische manipulatie van het catecholamine-systeem de vermijding 
van cognitieve controle heeft veranderd als functie van impulsiviteit; in meer 
ten opzichte van minder impulsieve deelnemers verlaagde het toedienen van 
zowel methylfenidaat als tyrosine de motivatie om moeilijke denkprocessen uit 
te voeren. Ten tweede tonen we aan dat focus en afleiding gepaard gaan met 
hogere inspannings-kosten dan flexibele controle. Ten derde heeft het toedienen 
van tyrosine aan oudere volwassenen het vermogen verminderd om afleiding 
buiten te houden, maar waren deelnemers juist beter in het flexibel updaten van 
het werkgeheugen. Kortom, de studies in dit proefschrift tonen aan dat cognitieve 
controle kostbaar is en dat catecholaminerge geneesmiddelen niet alleen het 
vermogen veranderen om een taak uit te voeren, maar ook de motivatie om 
dit te doen. Dit is in overeenstemming met het idee dat catecholamines een 
dubbele taak hebben, namelijk bij het veranderen van de prestaties van cognitieve 
controle, maar ook bij beslissingen over de investering van cognitieve controle.
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GERMAN SUMMARY
In dieser Dissertation habe ich den Einfluss von Motivation auf das Denkverhalten 
untersucht. Das übergeordnete Ziel bestand darin, herauszufinden, wie die 
Botenstoffe Dopamin und Noradrenalin (zusammengefasst Katecholamine) in 
der gesunden Bevölkerung die Motivation zum Nachdenken beeinflussen. Der 
im Titel beschriebene mentale „Faulpelz“ (couch potato) ist eine Metapher für 
jemanden, der lieber sein Gehirn auf das Sofa legt und Netflix Serien schaut, als 
sich auf anstrengende Denkprozesse einzulassen, wie zum Beispiel das Lösen 
von Sudoku-Rätseln. 
Das Verständnis der Grundlagen einer solchen kognitiven „Faulheit“ bringt uns 
dem langfristigen Ziel näher, die Motivation in der gesunden und klinischen 
Bevölkerung zu fördern und somit mentalen Herausforderungen nicht aus dem 
Weg zu gehen.
Im Rahmen dieser Dissertation habe ich
• die Bereitschaft (d.h. Motivation) zur Ausführung kognitiver Aufgaben 
gemessen und getestet, wie die Motivation durch Medikamente beeinflusst 
wird, die das Katecholamin-System manipulieren (Kapitel 3 und 4),
• eine neue Computeraufgabe entwickelt, mit der die Motivation zur Ausführung 
flexibler gegenüber stabiler kognitiver Prozesse quantifiziert werden kann 
(Kapitel 6) und
• untersucht, wie Medikamente, die das Katecholamin-System manipulieren, 
die Fähigkeit beeinflussen, flexible oder stabile Denkprozesse auszuführen 
(Kapitel 5).
Kognitive Kontrolle ist ein weit gefasster Begriff, der definiert werden kann als 
die Fähigkeit, das Verhalten im Dienst der intern dargestellten Ziele zu steuern. 
Als solcher ist es ein Überbegriff, der sich auf kognitiven Funktionen bezieht, die 
es ermöglichen, unsere Ziele zu erreichen, indem wir Impulsen, Versuchungen 
und Ablenkungen widerstehen. In dieser Arbeit habe ich die kognitive Kontrolle 
aus zwei Perspektiven untersucht: i) die Motivation, kognitive Kontrollfunktionen 
auszuführen und ii) die neuronalen und Verhaltensmechanismen zweier 
entgegengesetzter Funktionen: der kognitiven Stabilität und kognitiven Flexibilität.
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Motivation zur kognitiven Kontrolle 
Bei der Messung der kognitiven Kontrolle im Labor oder in Prüfungen wird 
häufig davon ausgegangen, dass die Beurteilung die wahre und maximale 
Leistungsfähigkeit einer Person widerspiegelt. Laut dieser Beschreibung erbringt 
also jeder stets seine beste Leistung. Es gibt jedoch zahlreiche Belege dafür, dass 
dies nicht der Fall ist. Beispielsweise machen Teilnehmer, die eine Belohnung für 
das richtige Lösen einer Aufgabe erhalten, tendenziell weniger Fehler. Es scheint 
daher, dass Menschen nicht immer maximal funktionieren und dass die kognitive 
Leistung eine Mischung aus (mindestens) der Fähigkeit ist, eine bestimmte Aufgabe 
auszuführen und der Motivation, dies auch tatsächlich zu tun.
In Kapitel 2 haben wir in einer Literaturübersicht beschrieben, wie die wichtigsten 
aufsteigenden Neuromodulatoren, insbesondere die Katecholamine (Abbildung 1 
A&B), die Vermeidung von anstrengenden Denkprozessen beeinflussen können. 
Wir argumentierten, dass (striatales) Dopamin die Motivation zum Nachdenken 
verändert, indem der erwartete Wert von dem Ausführen der kognitiven Aufgaben 
moduliert wird. Wir haben daher die Hypothese aufgestellt, dass ein Anstieg des 
Striatal-Dopamins zu einer Verstärkung des Nutzens und einer Abschwächung 
des Aufwands der kognitiven Kontrolle führt. Basierend auf weiteren empirischen 
Belegen dafür, dass katecholaminerge Manipulationen abhängig sind von dem 
Basiszustand, haben wir auch die Hypothese aufgestellt, dass übermäßige oder 
suboptimale Dopaminspiegel den Wert der kognitiven Kontrolle paradoxerweise 
verringern könnten.
Wir haben zwei pharmakologische Experimente durchgeführt, um den Beitrag 
von Katecholaminen zu Entscheidungen im Rahmen der kognitiven Anstrengung 
zu bewerten. In Kapitel 3 verabreichten wir einer großen Stichprobe junger 
Erwachsener den Katecholamin-Transporter-Blocker Methylphenidat (besser 
bekannt als Ritalin; Abbildung 1C) um individuelle Unterschiede in der 
Arzneimittelwirkung zu untersuchen. Kapitel 4 beschreibt, wie der Katecholamin-
Vorläufer Tyrosin (Abbildung 1D) die subjektive Wahrnehmung von kognitiver 
Anstrengung bei älteren Erwachsenen verändert. In beiden Experimenten wurde 
die Arzneimittelwirkung beurteilt, indem die gleichen Probanden die Aufgaben 
an einem Tag mit Medikament und an einem anderen Tag nach Einnahme einer 
Placebo-Substanz ausgeführt haben.
In Kapitel 3 führten gesunde, junge Erwachsene zweimal eine 
Entscheidungsaufgabe aus, einmal mit 20 mg Methylphenidat und einmal nach 
Einnahme einer Placebo-Tablette. Bei dieser Aufgabe wählten die Teilnehmer 
600 Mal zwischen zwei Bildern aus, von denen die Auswahl des einen Bildes 
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zu einer leichten (weniger Aufgabenwechsel) und die Auswahl des anderen 
Bildes zu einer schwierigen Aufgabe führte. Je öfter ein Proband sich für die 
einfache Aufgabe entschied, desto höher war das Maß für die Vermeidung 
von schwierigen Aufgaben. In Übereinstimmung mit unseren Vorhersagen 
bevorzugten die Teilnehmer die Option mit geringerer Anstrengung, das heißt, sie 
waren „mentale Faulpelze“. Frühere Untersuchungen haben gezeigt, dass es eine 
große individuelle Variabilität in Richtung und Ausmaß der katecholaminergen 
Arzneimittelwirkungen auf die menschliche Kognition gibt und, dass die 
individuellen Unterschiede möglicherweise auf den Grundspiegeln von Dopamin 
basieren. Aus diesem Grund haben wir sowohl die Arbeitsgedächtniskapazität als 
auch Impulsivität als mögliche Schätzung des Dopaminspiegels in die Studie mit 
einbezogen. Erstere wurde anhand eines „Hörspannen“-Tests gemessen, zweitere 
anhand der „Barratt-Impulsivität“-Skala. Die Einnahme von Methylphenidat 
veränderte die Vermeidung von kognitiver Anstrengung, aber nur als Funktion 
von Impulsivität: Methylphenidat verstärkte die „geistige Faulheit“ bei Leuten, 
die impulsiver (als andere) waren, wohingegen das Ausführungsvermögen der 
eigentlichen kognitive Aufgabe nicht beeinflusst wurde. 
In Kapitel 4 verabreichten wir 29 gesunden älteren Erwachsenen (im Alter 
von 60 bis 75 Jahren) den Katecholamin-Vorläufer Tyrosin. Der Grund dafür, 
dass wir diese Studie mit Senioren durchgeführt haben, ist, dass das Altern mit 
einer Verringerung der Dopaminübertragung und einer verringerten Motivation 
für die kognitive Kontrolle in Verbindung gebracht wurde. Unsere Hypothese 
war, dass Tyrosin (im Vergleich zu Placebo) das Vermeiden von anstrengenden 
Denkprozessen reduziert. Dies haben wir mit einer Computeraufgabe gemessen, 
in der Probanden sich entscheiden mussten, ob sie Probleme mit einfachen 
Lösungen für den Gewinn von weniger Geld oder schwierigere Probleme für mehr 
Geld lösen möchten. Entgegen unserer Vorhersage hat die Tyrosin-Verabreichung 
nicht die Motivation zum Nachdenken über schwierigere Probleme (signifikant) 
erhöht. Stattdessen und in Übereinstimmung mit Kapitel 3, hing die Tyrosin-
Wirkung mit der Grundimpulsivität der Teilnehmer zusammen: Tyrosin hat in 
impulsiven (im Vergleich zu weniger impulsiven) Teilnehmern die Motivation zum 
Lösen von schwierigeren Aufgaben reduziert. Zusammen liefern diese Studien 
erste empirische Belege dafür, dass katecholaminerge Arzneimittel teilweise durch 
die Veränderung der Prozesse wirken, die die Bereitschaft zur kognitiven Kontrolle 
fördern, oder, wie hier, reduzieren. Dies führt dazu, dass die kognitive Kontrolle 
neu konzipiert wird. Sie beinhaltet neben der Fähigkeit auch die Kosten-Nutzen-
Analyse zur Ausführung von Denkprozessen.
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Kognitive Flexibilität versus kognitive Stabilität 
Die Notwendigkeit eines optimalen Gleichgewichts zwischen flexibler und stabiler 
kognitiver Prozesse lässt sich anhand des Bürolebens leicht veranschaulichen: 
Wenn Sie ein Büro mit mehreren Personen teilen, müssen Sie mögliche 
Ablenkungen, wie z.B. Gespräche anderer Kollegen, unterdrücken. Wenn jedoch 
der Feueralarm im Gebäude ausgelöst wird, sollten Sie in der Lage sein, dieses 
Signal sofort wahrzunehmen und darauf zu reagieren. Viele Situationen im Alltag 
und experimentelle Aufgaben beruhen auf einer Mischung dieser Prozesse. 
Leistungsbeeinträchtigungen bei einer Konzentrationsaufgabe können daher 
eine Folge einer verringerten Stabilität und / oder einer vermehrten Flexibilität 
sein. In Kapitel 5 und 6 haben wir die gegensätzlichen Funktionen untersucht, 
indem wir Probanden eine angepasste Arbeitsgedächtnis-Aufgabe durchführen 
ließen. Das Arbeitsgedächtnis ist der Teil des Gedächtnisses, der uns erlaubt, 
Informationen vorübergehend zu speichern und gleichzeitig zu manipulieren, z.B. 
das Merken kurzer Telefonnummern. Die Teilnehmer mussten sich hier (immer 
wieder) zwei Bilder einprägen und nach einer Verzögerung beurteilen, ob es 
sich bei der erneuten Präsentation eines Bildes um eine Übereinstimmung oder 
eine Nichtübereinstimmung handelt. Während der Verzögerungszeit präsentierten 
wir jedoch entweder ablenkende Bilder, die ignoriert werden mussten (d.h. 
die Kollegen im Büro), oder Bilder, die verarbeitet werden mussten (d.h. der 
Feueralarm). Es ist bekannt, dass viele kognitive Funktionen durch ein bestimmtes 
Netzwerk im Gehirn (die Basalganglienschleifen) unterstützt werden, das den 
Präfrontallappen und das Striatum verbindet. Es wird davon ausgegangen, 
dass der Präfontallappen vor allem die Stabilisierung von Zielen unterstützt 
und dadurch Ablenkung unterdrückt werden kann, während das Striatum 
mit der Destabilisierung von Zielen in Verbindung gebracht wurde, um neue 
Umweltstimuli verarbeiten zu können (Abbildung 2). Wahrscheinlich wechselt 
das Gehirn zwischen stabilen und flexiblen Zuständen durch die Verwendung 
eines Dopamin-abhängigen Steuerungsmechanismus, der den Eingang von 
Informationen in den Frontallappen reguliert.
In Kapitel 5 haben wir die verhaltensbezogenen und neuronalen Auswirkungen 
der Verabreichung des oben genannten Medikaments Tyrosin auf die 
unterschiedlichen Prozesse untersucht: der Unterdrückung von Ablenkung (d.h. 
kognitive Stabilität) gegenüber der Aktualisierung des Arbeitsgedächtnisses (d.h. 
kognitive Flexibilität). Wir haben diese Aufgabe bei 29 älteren Erwachsenen 
durchgeführt (identische Stichprobe wie in Kapitel 4 beschrieben), da das Altern 
mit einer Verringerung der Dopaminübertragung und einer Verschiebung der 
Flexibilität / Stabilität in Verbindung gebracht wurde. Wir haben vorhergesagt, 
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dass Tyrosin (im Vergleich zu Placebo) die altersbedingten Beeinträchtigungen 
im Fokussieren verbessert, indem es das Signal des relevanten Bildes im 
Frontallappen verstärkt. Gleichzeitig erwarteten wir, dass die Verabreichung 
von Tyrosin die flexible Aktualisierung des Arbeitsgedächtnisses beeinträchtigt 
und damit die Flexibilität verringert. Im Gegensatz zu dieser Vorhersage stellten 
wir fest, dass Tyrosin den Fokus verringerte, was wir an höheren Einbußen des 
Arbeitsgedächtnisses erkennen konnten, wenn Stabilisierung gefragt war. Dieser 
Effekt wurde von einer Zunahme der Aktivität im Frontallappen begleitet, wenn 
flexible Auffrischung nötig war (genauer gesagt im rechten (anterioren) cingulären 
Kortex und den medialen frontalen Kortex).
Angesichts der oben beschriebenen motivationalen Einflüsse auf die kognitive 
Kontrolle, stellt sich die Frage, ob die hier gezeigten Leistungsveränderungen im 
Arbeitsgedächtnis (teilweise) Änderungen der Präferenz widerspiegeln und nicht 
nur die Unfähigkeit, sich zu konzentrieren. Kollegen, die sich viel ablenken lassen, 
sind möglicherweise u.a. unmotiviert, sich zu konzentrieren, und verarbeiten daher 
(auch ablenkende) Reize.
In Kapitel 6 haben wir daher eine neue Computeraufgabe entwickelt, mit der wir 
die subjektive Abneigung gegenüber kognitiver Prozesse bestimmen können, die 
entweder stabile oder flexible Kontrolle verlangen. Zu diesem Zweck haben wir 
zu einer bewährten Arbeitsgedächtnisaufgabe eine Zwischenphase hinzugefügt, 
um wiederum die zwei gegenübergestellten Fähigkeiten zu messen: das Hemmen 
von Ablenkung (d.h. die kognitive Stabilität) und das flexible Aktualisieren des 
Arbeitsgedächtnisses (d.h. die kognitive Flexibilität). Zusätzlich führten Probanden 
nach dem Lösen der Arbeitsgedächtnis-Aufgabe eine Entscheidungsphase aus, in 
der getestet wurde, wie viel Geld wir anbieten müssen, damit sie bereit sind, die 
verschiedenen Versionen der Aufgabe zu wiederholen. Basierend auf neueren 
Theorien, könnte das Fühlen der kognitiven Anstrengung ein Motivationssignal 
darstellen. Dieses hält Leute davon ab, sich auf eine Aufgabe zu konzentrieren 
und lieber für neue (belohnende) Möglichkeiten offen zu sein. Wir haben daher 
vorhergesagt, dass das Gefühl der Anstrengung größer ist, wenn die Aufgabe 
kognitive Stabilität anstelle von Flexibilität erfordert. In Übereinstimmung 
mit früheren Studien und unserem Ergebnis in Kapitel 4, haben wir in zwei 
unabhängigen Stichproben (28 bzw. 62 Teilnehmern) gezeigt, dass Probanden nur 
dann bereit sind, Aufgaben mit einer höheren Belastung des Arbeitsgedächtnisses 
auszuführen, wenn ihnen hierfür mehr Geld geboten wird. Darüber hinaus 
verlangten Probanden auch mehr Geld für die erneute Durchführung der Aufgabe, 
die Ablenkungswiderstand erfordert (d.h. kognitive Stabilität), im Vergleich zu der 
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Aufgabe, die Aktualisierung des Arbeitsgedächtnisses erforderte (d.h. kognitive 
Flexibilität), selbst nach Berücksichtigung von Leistungsunterschieden.
Schlussfolgerung
Zunächst haben wir in zwei unabhängigen Studien gezeigt, dass eine 
pharmakologische Manipulation des Katecholaminsystems die Vermeidung von 
kognitiver Kontrolle impulsivitätsabhängig veränderte: bei mehr, im Vergleich 
zu weniger impulsiven Teilnehmern, erhöhte Methylphenidat die Vermeidung 
kognitiver Arbeit bei jungen Erwachsenen und verstärkte Tyrosin die Abneigung 
gegen die Durchführung einer mühsamen Arbeitsgedächtnis-Aufgabe bei älteren 
Erwachsenen (im Alter von 60 bis 75 Jahren). Zweitens zeigten wir anhand 
einer neu entwickelten Computeraufgabe in zwei Stichproben, dass sowohl das 
Fokussieren als auch das Aktualisieren des Arbeitsgedächtnisses als mühsam 
und kostbar wahrgenommen werden, wobei in einem direkten Vergleich das 
Fokussieren als anstrengender empfunden wird. Drittens beeinträchtigte die 
Verabreichung von Tyrosin bei Senioren in einer Arbeitsgedächtnis-Aufgabe die 
Fähigkeit, Ablenkung zu hemmen und sie verbesserte tendenziell die flexible 
Aktualisierung. 
Zusammenfassend zeigen die in dieser Dissertation vorgestellten Studien, dass 
die Ausführung von Aufgaben mit einem hohen Bedarf an kognitiver Kontrolle als 
subjektiv kostspielig empfunden wird und, dass katecholaminerge Medikamente 
nicht nur die Fähigkeit zur Ausführung einer Aufgabe verändern, sondern auch 
die Motivation dazu. Dies steht im Einklang mit dem allgemeinen Vorschlag, dass 
Katecholamine eine doppelte Aufgabe haben, nämlich bei der Veränderung der 
Fähigkeit, kognitive Kontrolle auszuführen und bei Entscheidungen über Investition 
der kognitiven Kontrolle.
Zukünftige Studien sollten den möglichen Einfluss von u.a. nicht-
pharmakologischen Interventionen (z. B. Aufgaben- und Feedbackstruktur) auf 
die kognitive Motivation untersuchen, sodass Ergebnisse über das Labor hinaus 
angewendet werden können. Somit kann auf ein langfristiges Ziel hingearbeitet 
werden: Die Möglichkeit, Motivation in der gesunden und klinischen Bevölkerung 
zu fördern, wenn ein Mangel daran den Alltag negativ beeinflusst.
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wünschte ich mir manchmal, dass ich so abgezockt wäre wie du. Ich bin so 
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en etentjes. Agatha en Hein, dank dat jullie op Felix hebben gepast tijdens de 
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Felix, mein kleiner Sonnenschein. Danke, dass du mich so glücklich machst und 
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diese Doktorarbeit <3 Ich hab dich lieb, Großer! 
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